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This dissertation explores the formative years of the right-to-life movement in the decade 
prior to Roe v. Wade and explains how early right-to-lifers built a vast and powerful 
movement in the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas most previous studies have focused on the 
connection between right-to-life organizing and the conservative ascendancy in religion 
and politics in the 1970s and 1980s, this dissertation studies the movement’s origins in 
state and local organizing in the years before Roe v. Wade and its growth into a national 
political crusade in the 1970s. During these years, grassroots activists fostered a vision 
for a broad-based right-to-life movement—a movement consisting of Americans from 
across the political and religious spectrums. This movement was made up of Catholics, 
Protestants, and Jews, Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and liberals, lay people 
as well as religious leaders—all of whom opposed legalized abortion for a range of 
reasons. Right-to-lifers believed their broad-based approach was the most effective way 
to fight abortion, and they embraced this diverse coalition, attacking abortion on a 
number of fronts with strategies ranging from legislative lobbying to alternatives to 
abortion to nonviolent direct action. Though their coalition eventually broke apart in the 
1980s, this eclectic group of right-to-lifers built a dynamic and diverse movement and 
proved the powerful resonance of the abortion issue in American society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 1967, six years before the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, Dr. John 
McKelvey, a local obstetrician, attended a hearing before the Minnesota Senate Judiciary 
subcommittee on reforming Minnesota’s abortion law. The hearing was one of several 
that had been held in the 1960s to try to update the state’s nineteenth-century abortion 
law. The committee heard several arguments for and against the proposed bill but 
McKelvey’s testimony stood out. When it was his turn to speak, the doctor surprised the 
committee by placing a preserved 11-week-old fetus on the table in front of the 
committee members, challenging them to answer on the spot “whether that is a human 
life or not and whether we are going to destroy it.”1 Shortly after, he and about twenty-
five other Minnesotans met together to form the Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life 
(MCCL) and to officially begin their fight against abortion.  
From these small beginnings, with just two dozen or so members, MCCL and the 
right-to-life movement in Minnesota would grow into a powerful lobby in state and 
national politics. Just seven years later, nearly five thousand Minnesotans gathered to 
circle the capitol building in St. Paul on January 22, 1974. They marched in solidarity 
with right-to-lifers across the country to mark the first anniversary of Roe v. Wade. In 
New York, several hundred protesters turned up at the capitol building in Albany with at 
least one scuffle breaking out when a pro-life protester “grabbed away and destroyed a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Pat Scharber, “Destruction of the human life held real issue in discussing abortion,” The Catholic Bulletin, 
March 31, 1967. Reel 1, Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life Newspaper Clippings Microfilm 
Collection, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN.  
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pro-abortion sign displayed by two young girls.”2 And in Washington, D.C., ten thousand 
people rallied in support of a constitutional amendment to reverse Roe v. Wade and make 
abortion illegal again. It was the first March for Life, which would become an annual 
tradition for the movement. Right-to-lifers gathered that day to show that despite the 
legalization of abortion they had not given up. In fact, in the preceding years, they had 
turned a disparate grassroots movement rooted in state and local action into a tough and 
determined national crusade. Fran Watson, president of the Celebrate Life Committee 
from Long Island and an attendee of the rally in Washington, D.C., praised what she saw 
as a strong and diverse movement built on the “concern by people from all walks of 
life…hope for the future of our country.”3 Now right-to-lifers were ready to continue the 
fight in their towns and cities and to make their presence felt in the halls of Congress, the 
Supreme Court, and the White House.  
 In less than a decade, the right-to-life movement coalesced into a national 
political force, growing out of the organizing efforts of a few dozen activists scattered 
across the country in the late 1960s. These activists gathered in homes, churches, and 
schools, determined to halt any attempts to liberalize or repeal their states’ abortion laws. 
They included Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, Protestants and 
Catholics, lay people as well as priests and ministers. For many, it was their first 
experience with political activism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, this eclectic group 
built a powerful political movement centered on the belief that their cause was “broad-
based.” By this, right-to-lifers meant that the movement they intended to build was for all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 “Capitol Steps Conflict,” Press-Republican (Plattsburgh, NY), January 23, 1974, 
http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org. 
3 “’Right to Life’ rally in Washington,” The Long-Islander (Huntington, NY), January 31, 1974, 
http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org. 
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Americans. These activists not only believed that their cause was in line with the rights 
enshrined in America’s founding documents but also that their movement should include 
all Americans, regardless of their political or religious affiliations. This core belief 
shaped the movement into the early 1980s as right-to-lifers built up national 
organizations, recruited thousands of new members, welcomed a range of approaches to 
activism, and developed complex legislative and social strategies to fight abortion at the 
state and national levels.  
The process of building this broad-based movement and its networks, rhetoric, 
and strategy was complicated, and scholars continue to grapple with how to explain the 
right-to-life movement’s enduring, if controversial, place in American politics and 
society. Until the last few years, most of the answers to questions about the movement’s 
motivations and makeup revolved around discussion of the Religious Right and the 
conservative turn in American politics since the 1980s. These works characterized the 
movement as conservative backlash to the turbulent changes of the 1960s and to Roe v. 
Wade and placed the abortion issue at the center of the narrative of the rise of the 
Religious Right.4 But now, scholars are beginning to reconsider such one-dimensional 
characterizations of the movement. Historian Daniel Williams has highlighted the long 
history of right-to-life activism in the twentieth century and the movement’s attempts to 
establish itself as a human rights crusade in line with liberal human rights values.5 Neil 
Young has brought attention to the movement’s many attempts at conservative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); 
Robert O. Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2012); Dallas Blanchard, The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious Right: 
From Polite to Fiery Protest (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994); James Risen and Judy L. Thomas, 
Wrath of Angels: The American Abortion War (New York: Basic Books, 1999).  
5 Daniel Williams, Defenders of the Unborn: The Pro-life Movement Before Roe v. Wade (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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ecumenical organizing among Catholics, evangelicals, and Mormons.6 Mary Ziegler has 
explored right-to-lifers’ sophisticated interpretations and uses of Roe v. Wade to bolster 
their cause and expand their rhetoric.7 And Randall Balmer has challenged the Religious 
Right’s origin story, its “abortion myth,” and questioned narratives that use abortion to 
explain the Religious Right’s rise to political prominence.8 All of these important works 
highlight the complexities of right-to-life activism into the 1980s but only begin to 
explain the movement’s multifaceted organizing in the 1960s and 1970s. They point to 
the need for a reconsideration of the right-to-life movement in its formative years in the 
1960s and early 1970s and in its ascendancy as a national movement in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
By building off these works as well as highlighting the complex nature of the 
right-to-life movement, its eclectic make up, and its origins in grassroots organizing 
efforts, I argue that the right-to-life movement was not a monolithic conservative or 
Catholic venture. Moreover, it was not inevitable that the abortion issue would turn into 
one of the consummate conservative causes of the last forty years. Rather, during the 
1960s and 1970s, the movement organized around the principle that it would be broad-
based—a movement made up of a variety of Americans from diverse political and 
religious backgrounds wielding multifaceted arguments against abortion and pursuing a 
wide range of political strategies. Though the movement sometimes faced intense 
disagreements in the 1970s between its Protestant and Catholic as well as liberal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Neil Young, We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2016). 
7 Mary Ziegler, After Roe The Lost History of the Abortion Debate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2015).  
8 Randall Balmer, Evangelicalism in America (Baylor University Press: Waco, TX, 2016), 109. Balmer 
posits that rather than abortion the issue of school desegregation was the real issue around which the 
Religious Right coalesced. 
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conservative members, there was room and flexibility for competing dogmas, political 
views, and strategies into the early 1980s. In making this argument about the movement’s 
dynamism and diversity, I make two important interventions in the historiography.  
 The first intervention is one of chronology, shifting the analysis to the 1960s and 
1970s rather than the 1980s. In the 1960s, the abortion issue became a contentious public 
health issue, and newly formed abortion rights groups as well as groups of doctors and 
lawyers began advocating for the reform of state abortion laws. Accompanying this push 
for the liberalization of abortion laws in the late 1960s, the right-to-life movement 
emerged to oppose any attempts at reform. Individuals who had little to no awareness of 
abortion suddenly had to take a stand as their state representatives began debating the 
abortion issue and introducing legislation to reform or even overturn nineteenth-century 
abortion laws. In the mid to late 1960s, these individuals formed right-to-life 
organizations in their cities and states, and in the early 1970s, they began an intense 
campaign to promote their agenda in state politics. Unfortunately, most histories of the 
right-to-life movement and the abortion rights movement have failed to account for these 
early years of organizing. At best, they acknowledge the actions of small groups of 
Catholic lawyers and doctors in opposing abortion reform in the 1960s.9 At worst, they 
ignore the late 1960s and early 1970s completely.10 For the most part, histories of the 
abortion debate cite the 1973 Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 
as the start of a massive wave of backlash that would kick off the right-to-life movement. 
If there was opposition to abortion prior to 1973, these sources contend that it was due to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Luker, 14. 
10 Faye Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1989), 48; Dallas Blanchard, The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the 
Religious Right: From Polite to Fiery Protest; Kerry N. Jacoby, Souls, Bodies, Spirits: The Drive to 
Abolish Abortion Since 1973 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). 
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the actions of a small group of people in the Catholic Church hierarchy rather than to any 
grassroots action. Only Daniel Williams’ recent history accounts for the work done by 
right-to-lifers in the years preceding Roe v. Wade.11  
 Ignoring the years preceding Roe v. Wade, however, deprives us of the full picture 
of the movement. While it may have been small, underfunded, and sometimes 
predominately Catholic in its earliest iterations, right-to-life organizing was taking place 
in the mid to late 1960s and early 1970s. It often began as a growing individual 
awareness about the abortion issue and about efforts to liberalize abortion laws at the 
state level. These individuals, once aware of the issue, took action to oppose abortion 
such as writing their state legislators or writing letters to the local newspaper. Finally, 
individuals opposed to abortion began to band together and form groups dedicated to 
stopping abortion reform. These groups, with names such as Minnesota Citizens 
Concerned for Life, the New York State Right to Life Committee, and the Right to Life 
League of Southern California, would form the backbone of the movement in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. They chose the term “right-to-life” to invoke their early belief 
that abortion threatened basic human rights; I use this self-designation as well and refer to 
these activists as right-to-lifers, and later pro-lifers, as they would call themselves in the 
mid to late 1970s. These activists quickly staked their place in state politics and 
implemented bold political strategies. This early activism set the stage for the 
development of a national right-to-life organization and also developed many of the 
strategies and rhetoric the movement would use into the 1970s.  
 The second intervention revolves around interpretations of the nature and makeup 
of the movement. Histories of right-to-life activism tend to mischaracterize the movement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Daniel K. Williams, Defenders of the Unborn. 
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in two main ways. First, some histories classify it as a sort of Catholic crusade 
coordinated solely by the church hierarchy. These works contend that “the Roman 
Catholic Church created the right-to-life movement” and directed its initiatives 
throughout the 1970s by providing funding and other resources.12 They focus on the role 
of Catholic priests and lay people in fighting abortion and the transition from this 
Catholic movement of the 1970s to the New Right and the Religious Right in the early 
1980s. Second, other works too often oversimplify the makeup of the movement, 
depicting it as monolithically conservative in both its politics and religion. This literature 
connects right-to-life activism to a broader conservative backlash against the 1960s, Roe 
v. Wade, and perceived excesses in American society. Scholars see this backlash as 
leading to the conservative shift in religion and politics in the 1970s and 1980s, with 
conservatives suddenly concluding they must defend the American family or traditional 
American values in the wake of the 1973 Supreme Court decision to legalize abortion.13 
 Neither of these explanations is adequate in capturing the dynamic nature of the 
movement between the 1960s and the early 1980s. Though the Catholic Church played a 
major role, especially in the movement’s first few years of existence, it was just one of 
many players. Indeed, the movement has always been composed of a mix of people—
Catholics but also liberal Protestants, evangelicals, Mormons, and other religious 
Americans. Characterizing the movement as the Catholic hierarchy’s initiative alone 
obscures the organizing work of thousands of Protestant and Catholic activists on the 
ground. These activists’ emphasis on a “broad-based movement” also belies the Catholic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Connie Paige, The Right to Lifers: Who They Are, How They Operate, Where They Get Their Money 
(New York: Summit Books, 1983), 51; Blanchard, 52; Jacoby, 27; Risen and Thomas, 19.  
13 Robert Putnam and David Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New York: 
Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2010); Robert O. Self, All in the Family; Blanchard, 41.  
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crusade interpretation; both Protestants and Catholics in the movement welcomed a 
plurality of views on abortion, strategies, religious beliefs, and political approaches. And 
Protestant right-to-lifers quickly succeeded in making their voices heard in the movement 
as leaders in the states and in the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC). Their 
influence shaped the movement’s strategy and trajectory in important ways in the 1970s.  
 Furthermore, conservative politics and religion were not at the center of right-to-
life activism during these years. Right-to-lifers were not creating a conservative crusade 
as a backlash to the 1960s but rather saw themselves as building a broad-based movement 
for all Americans regardless of their political or religious affiliation. Conservative views 
on abortion were certainly part of the movement, but they existed alongside liberal and 
even some left-wing approaches to right-to-life activism. The movement’s leaders 
encouraged this diversity in religious and political views, pushed their agenda in both 
political parties, and welcomed disagreements on strategy and tactics. Thanks to this 
approach, right-to-lifers built a diverse and powerful movement with a complex 
legislative and political agenda by the end of the 1970s. Right-to-life activism only 
became closely tied to conservative religion and politics in the early to mid-1980s, but 
not without stalwart opposition from many right-to-lifers. 
 The dissertation begins with a close examination of how right-to-life organizing 
began in three states: Minnesota, New York, and California. These three states provide 
diverse examples of how the movement developed on the ground in different parts of the 
country. Moreover, activists and organizations from New York, California, and 
Minnesota would make vital contributions to the growing national movement in the 
1970s. In the mid-1960s, as abortion rights groups began to organize and push for the 
  9  
liberalization of state abortion laws, local and state right-to-life groups emerged and soon 
became vital centers for organizing and mobilizing grassroots support for the cause. In 
these years, right-to-lifers—mostly a mix of Catholics and mainline Protestants—as well 
as the institutional Catholic Church formed more permanent organizations, developed 
political and educational strategies, and began working on long-term plans of action to 
sustain their fight against abortion. Building off this early grassroots mobilization, state 
right-to-life groups practiced and developed the strategies and rhetoric the movement 
would deploy in the years after Roe v. Wade.  
 Chapter 2 explores a shift in strategy as right-to-lifers went on the offensive and 
took steps to implement their agenda rather than acting defensively to halt attempts at 
liberalization. By 1971, state leaders were also making plans to form their own national 
organization. They had realized local and state efforts were not enough to stop the 
growing push for the repeal of abortion laws and instead began developing bold political 
strategies and powerful rhetoric connecting abortion and violence in American society. 
This pivot in strategy turned their focus more fully to state and national politics as well as 
to mobilizing new groups of people—particularly women and young people. The early 
organizing in local cities and in state politics laid the foundation for the strong national 
right-to-life movement that emerged in 1972 and 1973.  
 In Chapter 3, the focus shifts to how state right-to-life leaders used their 
experience in organizing in their local communities to build a national movement in the 
wake of Roe v. Wade. Though Roe v. Wade took many right-to-lifers by surprise, they 
quickly returned to pursuing the aggressive political strategies they had implemented in 
the states in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, state leaders worked determinedly to 
  10  
form a national right-to-life organization—the NRLC, which they had been trying to 
officially separate from Catholic Church oversight for a number of years. In making the 
NRLC independent, the movement’s leaders hoped to finally realize their vision for a 
broad-based movement. Yet, just as the NRLC achieved independence, latent tension 
between Protestants and Catholics in the movement erupted into open conflict between 
Catholic and Protestant leaders of the NRLC. This infighting was only resolved after a 
series of compromises over organizational policy and the make up of the movement’s 
leadership. 
 Chapter 4 explores the period between 1974 and 1979, when the movement was at 
the height of its strength and was closest to fulfilling its goals of creating a broad-based 
movement. After the upheaval of Roe v. Wade and the turmoil in the NRLC, the right-to-
life movement came into its own. During this time, right-to-lifers pursued a wide range of 
political strategies. Some continued lobbying for a human life amendment to reverse Roe 
v. Wade. Others pushed for greater access to contraception and policies that supported 
women and their children. Still others decided that the only solution was nonviolent 
direct action and began staging sit-ins at abortion clinics. While implementing these 
dynamic strategies, right-to-lifers also welcomed a diverse cohort of activists: 
Republicans and Democrats, feminists, antiwar activists, conservative evangelicals, and 
more.  
 Chapter 5 analyzes how this coalition came apart and highlights those right-to-
lifers who tried to sustain their vision for a broad-based movement. With the rise of the 
New Right, the election of Ronald Reagan, and an increase in conservative rhetoric 
surrounding abortion and other social issues, this broad-based movement began 
  11  
unraveling in the early 1980s. But some members of the Catholic Church hierarchy, pro-
life moderates, and the pro-life left fought to maintain their movement’s broad-based 
identity and challenged the New Right’s growing involvement in right-to-life politics. 
But they found themselves increasingly alienated from their fellow right-to-lifers and 
from both political parties as the 1980s progressed and political divisions crystallized. 
   Ignoring the early years of right-to-life organizing as well as the complexity of the 
movement’s makeup, strategies, and rhetoric in the 1960s and 1970s skews our 
understanding of religion and politics of the last fifty years. Today a person’s stance on 
abortion hews closely to their political and religious affiliation but that has not always 
been the case.14 At least until the mid-1980s, abortion held a more complicated place in 
American life. Rather than starting out as backlash to the 1960s and to Roe v. Wade and 
rather than serving as a harbinger of the conservative shift in American politics and 
religion, the right-to-life movement started as a grassroots effort to create a movement for 
all Americans that would affirm the fundamental rights that right-to-lifers believed were 
at stake and would provide a range of solutions to the abortion question. This diverse and 
vibrant group of activists overcame their vast differences on politics, religion, and 
strategy to create a broad-based right-to-life movement. In doing so, they created many of 
the rhetoric, strategies, and tactics that have sustained activism on the issue in the years 
since, and they created a political movement that endures to today.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Putnam and Campbell, 384; Hannah Fingerhut, “On abortion, persistent divides between—and within—
the two parties,” July 7, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/07/07/on-abortion-persistent-
divides-between-and-within-the-two-parties-2 (accessed February 1, 2018).  
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1.0 A Movement Begins: From Individual Mobilization to Grassroots 
Organizing in the Right-to-Life Movement, 1960-1969 
 
Introduction 
 In 1967, State Senator Anthony Beilenson faced an unexpected and 
overwhelming flood of opposition mail after he introduced a bill to liberalize California’s 
abortion law. Hundreds of letters poured in from his constituents as well as other 
Californians, castigating Beilenson in all sorts of ways. Some letters compared 
Beilenson’s efforts to Hitler’s actions in Nazi Germany. Others invoked the Declaration 
of Independence and the Constitution. Still others lamented that by contemplating 
abortion reform America had forsaken God and all Christian values. Some simply 
attacked Beilenson himself with a surprising vitriol, calling him “Killer Beilenson” or 
wishing his own mother had aborted him. Despite the massive letter writing campaign, 
Beilenson’s bill passed and was signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan. 
 That same year, Fred Mecklenburg, a physician in Minneapolis, and his wife, 
Marjory Mecklenburg, walked over to a neighbor’s home to hear a presentation on 
abortion. They were joined by fellow neighbors along with about twenty-five other 
Minnesotans. Some had recently met each other at hearings on the abortion law at the 
state capitol; others had heard about new attempts to reform the state’s abortion statute in 
their local newspapers. All were concerned about the growing push to legalize abortion in 
their state.15 The Mecklenburgs left the meeting determined to take action. Shortly after, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Patricia Ohmans, “Obsession,” Machete 1980, Box 35, Folder 6, American Citizens Concerned for Life, 
Inc., Records, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter cited as ACCL Records); Marjory 
Mecklenburg to James Kelly, “Responses to questions in letter from James Kelly,” November 1980, Box 
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the couple and their neighbor Alice Hartle, who had hosted that first meeting, formed the 
Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life. The organization was dedicated to fighting all 
attempts to liberalize abortion laws in Minnesota and would soon become one of the most 
successful state right-to-life groups. Fred Mecklenburg became the group’s first 
president.  
 Meanwhile, New York’s Catholic bishops released a joint statement—an 
unprecedented move—that was read at all masses in the state and denounced recent 
attempts at abortion reform in the state legislature. Invoking divine law, the Second 
Vatican Council, and Catholic tradition, the bishops condemned abortion reform in the 
strongest terms and reiterated that the Church viewed abortion as a serious crime. The 
bishops compelled Catholics in the state to take action immediately: “We urge you most 
strongly to do all in your power to prevent direct attacks upon the lives of unborn 
children.”16 The bishops had entered the fray of abortion politics and now encouraged 
New York’s six million Catholics to do the same. 
 After witnessing the turmoil of abortion politics in places like California, 
Minnesota, and New York in 1966 and 1967, the Catholic Church finally took decisive 
action and formed a national organization to oversee its right-to-life activity—the 
National Right-to-Life Committee (NRLC). Church officials were no longer content to 
fight abortion on an ad hoc basis alone. And while lay Catholics were their initial targets, 
they also realized that in forming the NRLC they must foster a “broad-based opposition” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23, Folder 5, ACCL Records; Joan Mahowald, “Marjory Mecklenburg is for Life,” The Catholic Digest, 
June 1973, Box 35, Folder 3, ACCL Records.   
16 George Dugan, “Ask Fight on Abortion Bill: Pastoral Letter Read,” New York Times, February 13, 1967. 
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of Catholics as well as non-Catholic allies.17 Though the organization started out as a 
simple clearinghouse to provide local activists with information on abortion reform 
legislation and right-to-life activities across the country, the NRLC would soon become 
the leading organization for the cause. It would be one of the main developers of national 
right-to-life strategy and the site of debate over the trajectory of the movement through 
the 1970s and into the 1980s. 
 As evident in these episodes, in the mid to late 1960s more and more Americans 
became aware of the debate going on over abortion policy in their states. They learned 
about the growing support for abortion reform in their workplaces, from neighbors, at 
their church services, or from their local newspapers. Disturbed by the suggested changes 
to abortion law, some people began to take action, writing letters to their legislators and 
local newspapers, attending hearings on new abortion laws, and organizing groups to 
oppose reform. These new activists were a diverse group, including Catholic priests and 
religious, lay Catholics, liberal Protestants, Democrats and Republicans, doctors, lawyers, 
professors, housewives, and others. For many of them, this was their first foray into 
political activism. Alongside these individual Americans, the Catholic Church hierarchy 
was also spurred to action and began a serious campaign against abortion. Though the 
Church did not have outright control of the right-to-life movement during this time, right-
to-life activism would not have survived the 1960s without its support and funding.  
 The individual awareness of the abortion issue soon turned into organized and 
sustained grassroots action with the formation of right-to-life organizations at the state 
and national levels. Organizations like the New York State Right-to-Life Committee, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 James T. McHugh, “Report on Abortion Questionnaire,” September 9, 1966, Box 94, Folder 5, Catholic 
Charities USA Papers, Catholic University of America University Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter 
cited as Catholic Charities USA Papers). 
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Right-to-Life Leagues in California, and Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life worked 
to mobilize individuals at the state level, educate them on abortion, and get them engaged 
in political activism. Through their organizing in the states, these groups hoped to halt 
abortion reform. During this time, the Catholic Church also founded the NRLC, which it 
hoped would spread awareness of the movement, recruit new activists, and create a 
national network of right-to-lifers. All these efforts laid the foundation for later 
organizing in the states and in national politics.  
 In fact, this early organizing allowed the right-to-life movement to begin 
developing the rhetoric, strategies, and networks that would be vital in the decades to 
come. The use of local networks to mobilize new activists, the arguments made in the 
many opposition letters sent to Beilenson, the strong denunciation of abortion in a public 
joint statement by New York’s Catholic bishops, the appeals for a broad-based and 
diverse coalition, and the formation of a national organization to conduct right-to-life 
activities across the country—all these would be the main strategies for right-to-lifers in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. Too often, the literature on the movement either ignores this 
period or glosses over it in favor of focusing on the movement following Roe v. Wade.18 
But right-to-life activism in the latter part of the 1960s is central to understanding the 
activism in the 1970s and 1980s. In these early years, right-to-life leaders in the states 
and in the Church figured out what strategies worked and developed a vision for a broad-
based movement—a political and moral crusade that would be for all Americans. By the 
end of the decade, the individuals and groups that would help make the right-to-life 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); 
Faye Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 48; Dallas Blanchard, The Anti-Abortion Movement and the Rise of the Religious 
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movement a national political force in the 1970s and 1980s were already practicing the 
tactics that would be central to their later organizing.  
 In this chapter, I will trace these early years of debate and organizing among 
right-to-lifers as they moved from individual opposition to the abortion issue to a more 
structured movement, focusing on organizing and activism in California, Minnesota, and 
New York as well as within the Catholic Church. Right-to-life organizing began in fits 
and starts in these years and sometimes struggled to find consistent support from people. 
It often arose in response to proposed abortion reform legislation at the state level and, 
once the immediate threat was over, the opposition would mostly fizzle out, aside from a 
few dedicated activists or professionals who were more likely to encounter the abortion 
issue in their day-to-day work. Yet, by the end of the 1960s, this pattern was changing as 
the right-to-lifers formed more permanent organizations in their cities and states and 
began working on long-term plans of action, looking decades ahead to sustain their fight 
against abortion.   
1.1 The Abortion Debate in the 1960s 
 Abortion began to reemerge as a legislative, political, and public health issue in 
the 1960s. It had been a contentious issue in the latter half of the nineteenth century, with 
physicians leading the fight to criminalize abortion in the United States and arguing that 
the procedure was dangerous and immoral.19 But following the successful 
implementation of laws to prohibit abortion, the issue mostly disappeared from public 
debate for nearly a century, a period sociologist Kristin Luker has called the “century of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, 20. Luker describes this period as the “first right-to-life 
movement.” Physicians approached the issue with particular social and political aims in mind as they 
fought to criminalize abortion.  
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silence.” 20 In the 1960s, many states still had the same nineteenth-century abortion laws. 
Thus, when the abortion issue was addressed again in the 1960s, it was initially discussed 
as a legal and public health issue, rather than an issue of privacy or women’s rights. For 
many people, it was just time to update the laws to match current trends and attitudes and 
to ensure the best and safest medical practice, rather than to revolutionize women’s 
rights. The main issue was therapeutic abortions, abortions performed to save a woman’s 
life. A doctor had to recommend a therapeutic abortion, which then had to be approved 
by a hospital committee. As the push for abortion reform began, supporters of reform 
wanted to ensure the legality of these abortions. They believed this would better protect 
women who needed abortions as well as the doctors who performed them. 
 A few events in the early 1960s helped bring the issue to the attention of the 
general public and began to shift public opinion in favor of reform. First, there were a 
few high profile cases of abortions that made it into the local and national news, such as 
the case of Sherri Finkbine.21 Finkbine had mistakenly taken her husband’s thalidomide 
early in her pregnancy, before it was widely known that thalidomide could cause severe 
birth defects. Finkbine’s doctor recommended an abortion but the local hospital 
committee rejected her request. And though her story received widespread news 
coverage, the hospital committee would not reverse its decision. Finkbine ultimately 
traveled to Sweden in order to get an abortion. Her story is significant because it made 
abortion a public issue and put a face to the abortion issue. Finkbine was a normal, 
married mother of four who needed an abortion due to a medical mistake—her story 
challenged people’s common misconceptions about why a woman might seek an 	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21 Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, 62. 
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abortion. 22  In addition to the thalidomide controversy, there were several outbreaks of 
rubella in the mid-1960s, which in early pregnancy could impact fetal development.23 
The rubella outbreaks sustained the discussion about the necessity of legal abortion. Both 
of these events, and the publicity they received, helped shift public opinion and speed up 
the discussion of reforming abortion laws to make it easier and safer for women who 
needed an abortion for therapeutic reasons. 
 At the same time, professional organizations of lawyers and doctors were 
reconsidering their official stances on abortion. As early as 1959, the American Law 
Institute (ALI) recommended changes to the country’s abortion laws.24 They believed 
that abortions should be allowed in cases to protect the mental and physical health of the 
mother, in cases of rape or incest, and in cases of fetal deformity. The American Medical 
Association, as well as other professional organizations, followed the same trajectory, 
and many doctors also spoke out individually in favor of reforming abortion laws.25 
Prominent doctors, such as Alan Guttmacher and Bernard Nathanson, helped lead the 
fight to change the nation’s laws. They framed the issue as a medical safety and public 
health issue aimed at reducing the number of illegal abortions and ensuring women and 
their doctors knew when abortions could be legally performed. 
 All of these events caused state legislators to begin reconsidering the issue as 
well, and debating whether it was time to reform state laws regarding abortion. Most 
states had laws that allowed for abortion to save a woman’s life in some limited 
instances. But with cases of thalidomide and outbreaks of rubella, legislators began to 
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  19  
wonder whether abortion should be allowed in cases of fetal deformity or to protect a 
woman’s mental health. They also began to question the process by which women were 
able to procure abortions. Was it right for a hospital committee to make such decisions or 
should it be left to a woman and her doctor? Should abortion be allowed in cases of rape 
or incest? States began to tackle these issues as legislators offered various bills to reform, 
and later to repeal, abortion laws.26  
 In addition to legislators, doctors, and lawyers, groups dedicated to abortion 
reform, or in some cases to the repeal of all abortion laws, began to emerge at both the 
state and national level. At the state level, groups like the Society for Humane Abortions 
in California and the Minnesota Council for the Legal Termination of Pregnancy 
(MCTLP) urged legislators to reform abortion laws and worked to sway public opinion 
on the issue. In 1969, the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws 
(NARAL) began urging the repeal of all abortion laws.27 NARAL and other repeal 
groups believed that those who wanted to reform abortion laws were not going far 
enough, and they argued that abortion should be a matter decided between a woman and 
her doctor.  
 It was in this environment that the right-to-life movement began. Abortion was no 
longer the taboo subject it had been a decade earlier. Individuals, doctors, lawyers, 
legislators, and the media were much more willing to have frank discussions about 
abortion and to consider making it easier for women to obtain abortions. But not 
everyone was so happy with these changes. The seemingly easy acceptance of abortion 
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by many people left some individuals feeling that America was becoming unmoored from 
its foundational values. These Americans were baffled by how people could accept an act 
that they were firmly convinced was murder. And they suspected that the push for 
therapeutic abortions was really a front for legalizing “abortion on demand”—legal 
abortion with few restrictions. By the end of the 1960s, these individuals had begun to 
join together and create formal organizations to fight attempts at abortion reform in their 
individual states, and they had also begun to see the need for broader opposition to 
abortion across the nation. 
1.2 The Catholic Church and the Abortion Issue 
 One of the earliest responses to the growing push for the liberalization of abortion 
laws came from the institutional Catholic Church. The Church had a head start on the 
issue thanks to its long history of opposing abortion; it had a clear stance while most 
other religious groups in the United States had yet to make decisive statements either in 
favor of or against legalized abortion. The Catholic Church was also on high alert in the 
1960s as it had already been dealing with changes in laws and public opinion regarding 
the use of contraceptives.28 However, like other right-to-life organizing, the church’s 
political opposition to abortion was initially sporadic. Before 1965, its usual course of 
action was to leave the issue to the local priests and bishops. If the abortion issue came 
up, the church hierarchy allowed the local bishop to issue a statement emphasizing the 
church’s position on abortion.29 But from 1966 the Catholic Church in the United States 
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devoted extensive resources and time to studying the abortion issue, developing 
important rhetorical strategies, mobilizing its national network of dioceses, and setting 
itself up as the most vocal opponent of abortion reform. The Catholic Church did not 
create the right-to-life movement on its own, but the movement might not have survived 
its earliest years without the support and funding of the Church. Indeed, the Church laid 
the foundation for right-to-life organizing by developing some of its main strategies and 
rhetoric, especially in envisioning a broad-based movement for Catholics and non-
Catholics alike and founding a national right-to-life organization: the NRLC.  
 By the middle of the decade, church officials, led by the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference (NCWC), realized the strategy of leaving right-to-life activity to 
local bishops and dioceses was no longer sufficient to answer the growing push for more 
relaxed abortion laws and the increased publicity on the issue. They also realized that the 
church hierarchy had little idea of what was happening on the ground among lay 
Catholics and local priests in response to abortion reform. Thus, before diving headfirst 
into abortion politics, the NCWC decided to undertake a serious study and discussion of 
the status of abortion in the United States, assessing what reform measures had been 
proposed across the country and how local parishes had taken action to oppose those 
measures. The Church’s ultimate goal was to determine how it should approach the issue 
both at the national level and in local parishes.  
 This exploratory mission began in 1966, when the NCWC and some other church 
officials decided to hold a series of meetings in response to news of widespread abortion 
reform legislation and to a request from a state legislator in California for more 
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information on the abortion stance held by the NCWC.30 Their initial response to the 
legislator’s inquiry was simple and straightforward: “we see no basis for a position other 
than total opposition to such a proposal.”31 At the same time, the officials realized such a 
simple response was no longer sufficient since public opinion on the abortion issue was 
rapidly changing. Now, they would need to prepare for more questions about abortion 
and develop a range of arguments to counter the growing reproductive rights movement 
that was employing increasingly sophisticated and diverse arguments in favor of 
expanding abortion rights. Thus, church officials scheduled a series of meetings to 
develop a plan.  
 The first meeting was held in June 1966. A number of bishops were in attendance 
as well as representatives of the NCWC’s Legal Department, its Bureau of Health and 
Hospitals, and Catholic Charities. Father James T. McHugh, who would become the 
leading figure in the NRLC, was also at the meeting. Several of those in attendance 
remarked that they were hearing from various dioceses across the country that there was a 
“mounting campaign favoring the liberalization of abortion laws.”32 The group also noted 
that while there was an awareness of the problem at the diocesan level and in local 
Catholic hospitals, there was little concrete action being taken because “everyone seems 
to be waiting for someone else to start a program.”33 Moreover, they expressed concern 
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over the well-organized abortion rights campaign. The supporters of abortion rights had 
already developed material to counter any moral statement against abortion by the 
Catholic Church and recruited clergy of other faiths to make strong moral and religious 
arguments in favor of abortion reform. At the end of the meeting, the group reached the 
same conclusions: “there is a great need for a special campaign against abortion.”34 
 But before developing a right-to-life campaign, the NCWC needed more 
information on what dioceses and their parishes were already doing to oppose abortion in 
their local communities. The answer to this problem and to the lack of a unified plan of 
action was to send out a questionnaire to each diocese. The questionnaire asked dioceses 
to explain what was going on with the abortion issue in their respective state. The NCWC 
wanted to know if there were any bills before state legislators or cases in the courts to 
liberalize abortion laws. They wanted to know what medical professionals were 
recommending in the state and what local chapters of Planned Parenthood were doing to 
change the laws. They also asked the diocesan officials to summarize media coverage of 
the abortion issue and make recommendations for what actions the Church should take to 
confront the abortion rights movement.35 Regardless of whether or not there were efforts 
to reform abortion laws in their states, most of the respondents recommended that the 
Church craft an “education campaign…locally and nationally, stressing the right to 
life.”36 In addition, the respondents argued for a program that could reach both Catholics 
and non-Catholics and encourage them to work together, early recognition that the 
Church could not fight abortion reform alone. 	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 At the same time as they consulted local parishes and dioceses, the NCWC sought 
information from a number of different experts on abortion and set about developing the 
strategy and rhetoric to be used by bishops, priests, and lay Catholics. These experts were 
usually Catholic doctors, lawyers, social workers, theologians, and psychiatrists, and the 
meetings with the experts continued through 1966 and into 1967. The leading Catholic 
experts included people such as John T. Noonan, Charles E. Rice, and Robert Byrn, all 
lawyers who taught at various Catholic universities. Noonan was a particular favorite and 
appeared at many legislative hearings, contributed frequently to various movement 
publications and announcements, and also wrote several books on abortion, which the 
right-to-life movement frequently used. These experts helped the Church develop and 
deploy new arguments against abortion based on medical, legal, sociological, and 
theological evidence rather than solely on church doctrine. 
 It was from among these experts that a momentous recommendation was made: 
“A broad-based opposition should be formulated, one that would elicit support from non-
Catholics as well. Emphasis must be placed on human dignity and the right to life.”37 The 
diocesan directors of Catholic Charities echoed theses sentiments and went a step further, 
recommending the formation of a national organization.38 Though it was just a suggestion 
at this point, the recommendation for a broad-based movement, a movement for Catholics 
as well as their non-Catholic allies, was an important milestone and would set the tone for 
right-to-life organizing into the next decade. Church officials and their experts had 
quickly decided that Catholics alone could not sustain this new crusade. A parish 
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1966, NCWC, Box 87, Folder 7, USCCB Records. 
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education campaign was necessary, but the work of the Church could not stop there. It 
needed to recruit Catholic lay people as well as non-Catholics into the movement, and it 
needed to prepare for right-to-life activism at the national level. 
 This recommendation for broad-based organizing guided the early development 
of the rhetoric and strategy for the movement, especially in the books and pamphlets the 
Church commissioned during this time. The experts and church officials recognized that 
their target audience was bigger than just priests and bishops. They wanted lay people 
involved as well as non-Catholics so they needed to tailor the literature on abortion to 
these groups. Right-to-life literature was also a concern because one of the main findings 
from the questionnaire was that there was little activity going on at the parish level. Thus, 
developing literature became a way to educate people and mobilize them to action. 
Reflecting the work of the Catholic experts, the documents often deployed professional 
arguments against abortion, including reports from doctors and psychiatrists, an analysis 
of the legal issues surrounding abortion, papers on its moral and theological 
ramifications, and a short booklet on abortion and public policy, “a popularly-written 
booklet for general reading.”39 While not necessarily the most accessible material for the 
lay reader, this literature did move the arguments against abortion away from arguments 
rooted solely in church dogma—arguments the church feared might alienate non-
Catholics. And despite the more professional bent of the material, church officials had a 
broader audience in mind—as indicated above, one of the booklets was intended “for 
general reading” and another booklet included study questions at the end, as if the 
booklet were meant to be read and discussed in a small group, perhaps in a local church.40 	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These early booklets and pamphlets would be the tools for recruiting activists for this 
new broad-based right-to-life movement. 
 The bishops worked with their experts to carefully frame the arguments against 
abortion to avoid controversies on issues like contraception as well as to try to reach a 
more general audience. They wanted to distinguish abortion as a distinct, and very 
serious, moral problem. Father McHugh, who would be pivotal in founding the NRLC, 
detailed their stance in a 1967 report, “Abortion: Some Theological and Sociological 
Perspectives.” In the first main point of the paper, McHugh set the abortion issue apart 
from the issues of contraception and sterilization. “The issue of abortion is specifically 
different from contraception and from sterilization,” he commented, “it must be 
theologically evaluated as such, and any moral analysis should maintain this 
separation.”41 Abortion moved beyond these two issues for two main reasons. First, 
setting abortion apart from the issues of contraception and sterilization helped church 
officials avoid the current controversies regarding contraception both within the Church 
as well as in the American court system.42 Second, the Church wanted to frame abortion 
as a much more serious issue—as the murder of unborn babies. This simple fact was 
reflected in the initial response of the NCWC to the inquiry from the legislator in 
California—there was never any other option for the Church besides unequivocal 
opposition to abortion because abortion meant taking innocent human life.43 The Church 
decided to rely primarily on this straightforward message.  	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 In doing so, the bishops could also claim to be speaking for all moral Americans 
as they emphasized the “human dignity” and “the rights of man [sic]” rather than relying 
“solely on Catholic moral theology.”44 This reasoning was also in line with their strategy 
of creating a broad-based movement. After all, every moral person—Catholic or non-
Catholic—should agree that murder is wrong. And though right-to-lifers were sometimes 
accused of resorting to overly emotional arguments against abortion because they called 
it murder, McHugh contended that right-to-lifers were using a “clear and reasoned” 
approach when they used such reasoning. The bishops and other church officials hoped 
this approach would reach a broad audience and mobilize American Catholics as well as 
other religious Americans. 
 The final, and most important, strategic decision made by church officials was the 
formation of the NRLC in 1968. It grew out of the series of meetings among church 
officials and Catholic professionals as well as the reports from the diocesan 
questionnaire. The decision to form the NRLC, or at least some sort of national 
organization, was first suggested at one of the meetings in 1966, though it took several 
years to come to fruition. At the very end of his report on the meeting with the directors 
of Catholic Charities, Msgr. Lawrence J. Corcoran noted their recommendation: “It might 
also be wise to organize a broadly-representative committee nationally (with local 
affiliates) to fight abortion liberalization (or for the defense of the unborn child.)”45 The 
discussions about forming a national organization continued throughout the year. In April 
1967, Msgr. James Murray gave an update on the Church’s progress to the directors of 	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Catholic Charities. It turned out the bishops had met in Chicago earlier in the month and 
had approved $50,000 for a national right-to-life project—the National Right to Life 
Committee. Murray described it as an “educational program to be coordinated by the 
Family Life Bureau of USCC” but whose mission would extend far beyond the Family 
Life Bureau and the Church’s dioceses.46 It was time for the Catholic Church to start 
coordinating right-to-life activity across the country.  
 The NRLC was initially the informational wing of the burgeoning right-to-life 
movement.47 In its early years, the Catholic Church used it as a tool to monitor right-to-
life activity across the country and to distribute the literature it was beginning to develop. 
Local and state right-to-life groups also used the NRLC and its newsletter, National Right 
to Life News, to keep track of what other right-to-life groups were doing around the 
country. In its first few years of existence, the group remained closely tied to the United 
States Catholic Conference’s Family Life Bureau, which Father James McHugh directed. 
The bishops even asked McHugh to head the new NRLC. Though McHugh passed day-
to-day control of the group to Michael Taylor, a Catholic layperson working for the 
Family Life Bureau, he remained a vital presence in the movement.48 Under McHugh’s 
leadership, the NRLC soon became the leader for the growing movement and one of the 
only national groups that organized before Roe v. Wade.  
 The NRLC implemented the strategy the NCWC had been discussing since 1966, 
continuing to develop literature on the abortion issue, starting a newsletter to monitor the 	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right-to-life movement in each state, and targeting a more diverse range of Americans 
with both these endeavors. The NRLC leadership intended their literature and newsletter 
to be used by local and state groups or dispersed in local churches. In addition, they used 
this literature to practice a number of arguments against abortion. In some early booklets, 
the NRLC focused on reasons to oppose abortion that were not related to religion—a 
major early right-to-life project meant to counter charges that those opposing abortion did 
so only because of their religious faith. The reasons the NRLC cited generally fell under 
three categories—medical, legal, and social—again reflecting the reliance on doctors, 
lawyers, and other professionals to advise the Church on its antiabortion policy and 
condensing the arguments of these experts into manageable explanations for the lay 
reader.49 For example, the organization’s early literature described the medical arguments 
against abortion by highlighting the physical and emotional damage it believed abortion 
could cause for women and explaining the stances of doctors and psychiatrists who 
opposed abortion. All these arguments followed the same patterns that church officials 
used in planning the NRLC, but with a more lay-oriented approach focused on educating 
not only Catholics or professionals but non-Catholics as well. 
 Yet, the NRLC moved beyond a reliance on experts, and its early literature began 
invoking what historian Daniel Williams has called a “rights-based” approach. Most 
often, this approach involved citing the Declaration of Independence and the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights.50 The NRLC and church officials claimed a “long and 
respected legal heritage” that recognized the right to life of all people, including the 	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unborn, and quoted the sections of the Declaration of Independence and the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights that recognized this right to life.51 This “rights-based” 
approach would become an essential part of early right-to-life rhetoric.52 As with its 
literature, the orientation of the NRLC, and its diverse arguments against abortion, church 
officials had a bigger target in mind—they wanted to speak for all Americans, not just 
American Catholics. The bishops, especially, truly believed that they could be the moral 
and authoritative voice on abortion, proclaiming its immorality on legal, social, and 
medical grounds backed up by the founding documents of the country, and they assumed 
that other religious Americans were bound to agree with their stance. The NRLC, then, 
was the Church’s means of reaching this broader audience and promoting the rights-
based approach to right-to-life activism. 
 Not everyone was convinced by the Church’s shift in rhetoric, and in light of the 
Church’s involvement in the NRLC’s founding, claims of the Catholic hierarchy’s 
machinations became a common refrain among abortion rights supporters. These claims 
would haunt the new right-to-life movement for years to come. Starting the NRLC had 
been the Catholic Church’s attempt to “shift attention away from the so-called 
‘exclusively Catholic opposition,’” but the abortion rights movement jumped on the fact 
that the Catholic Church hierarchy had been responsible for starting the NRLC and that 
local bishops were the most public opponents of abortion in the early 1960s. 53 Supporters 
of abortion reform saw their chance to portray the movement as solely an endeavor of the 
Catholic hierarchy and in turn framed the fight over abortion as a religious freedom issue. 
NARAL used examples such as a paper presented by Dr. Lester Breslow in which he 	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characterized opposition to abortion as “the influence of one church whose dogma that 
human life begins with conception has been, in effect, foisted upon the body politic.”54 It 
argued that those opposing the right to abortion were trying to impose their religious 
beliefs on others, violating the First Amendment. In its official literature, NARAL firmly 
stated, “No one sect should be allowed to impose its view on other religious groups.”55 
To back up this claim, abortion rights activists also recruited a range of Protestant and 
Jewish leaders, as well as some pro-choice Catholics, to speak in favor of expanded 
abortion rights, and they highlighted these leaders’ reasonableness and rationality as 
opposed to what they argued were the overly emotional and irrational arguments of the 
Catholic Church hierarchy.56 
 Such allegations of a Catholic conspiracy were ubiquitous in abortion rights 
rhetoric throughout the 1970s, and even made their way into the letters of ordinary people 
to their representatives and local newspapers and into the historiography of the right-to-
life movement itself.57 Californian Nan Turner voiced her concerns to State Senator 
Anthony Beilenson: “I can’t see how one or more churches can dictate for everyone.”58 
And Minnesotan Marie Saunders wrote to the Minneapolis Tribune, explaining her 
support for reproductive rights by citing the separation of church and state: “If the 
Catholic Church chooses to disagree with law, science, and other theology, that is its 
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prerogative. However, to impose this thinking on the rest of the public is to deny the 
fundamental separation of church and state.”59 NARAL and other abortion rights groups 
were very successful in framing the fight over abortion as a fight over religious freedom. 
And their argument had some basis in reality, given the close association of the Catholic 
Church to the right-to-life movement in the late 1960s and even up to early 1973 when 
the NRLC finally shed its official ties to the Church.  
 Though the Catholic Church was not orchestrating all right-to-life endeavors, the 
early movement could not have organized as quickly and substantially were it not for the 
work done by church officials, Catholic professionals, and the NRLC in the mid-1960s. 
The Church had the resources to quickly respond to abortion reform and begin right-to-
life organizing, and it also had a network of doctors, psychiatrists, lawyers, professors, 
and social workers who helped develop a variety of arguments against abortion. The 
NRLC proved especially useful. It provided important information for right-to-lifers on 
the ground and a way to build networks of activists and organizations across the country. 
Most importantly, church officials used the NRLC to foster a broad-based movement that 
they hoped could mobilize Americans regardless of their religious affiliation. Despite the 
Church’s overt role in founding and funding the NRLC and the claims that the hierarchy 
orchestrated the entire opposition, lay Americans—both Catholic and non-Catholic—
would be the main driving force behind right-to-life activity at the state and local level. 
Without this grassroots mobilization, the NRLC would remain simply an educational 
venture. But at the same time as the Catholic Church was starting to take action, lay 
Catholics as well as people of other religious faiths, especially a growing number of 	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Protestants, were also beginning to get involved in abortion politics and take a public 
stand to defend the unborn. In fact, by 1967, right-to-life activity was well underway in 
many states, and state groups, in places like California, Minnesota, and New York, were 
mobilizing local populations, connecting to right-to-life groups in other states, and 
sharing strategies and resources for the battle ahead. 
1.3 California: Right-to-life Mobilization and the Therapeutic Abortion  
Bill of 1967 
 
 While the Catholic Church tried to develop a strategy that could effectively reach 
local priests and parishes and organize a national right-to-life movement, the main battle 
against abortion reform occurred in the states where in the late 1960s thousands of 
individuals mobilized to oppose reform. California was the site of one of these early 
fights. Efforts to reform the state’s abortion law had begun in the early 1960s, with State 
Senator Anthony Beilenson largely responsible for spearheading these efforts. His early 
attempts to introduce this legislation had not been successful, but he was persistent. In 
1967, he reintroduced his Therapeutic Abortion Bill, a modest measure that 
recommended that abortion be allowed in cases to protect a woman’s life, in cases of rape 
or incest, and in cases of fetal deformity. As Beilenson repeatedly attempted to introduce 
legislation, the Catholic Church remained his major foe—at least until 1967 when he 
suddenly faced opposition from thousands of Californians. Despite this major opposition, 
in 1967 he finally succeeded, and the bill passed. Nevertheless, the situation in California 
provides an illustrative example of how individual Americans first became aware of and 
reacted to the push for abortion reform. In California, it became clear that abortion could 
be a powerful and polarizing political issue that resonated with a broad swath of 
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Americans, and as many residents of the state became aware of Beilenson’s reform 
attempts, they mobilized to take action to oppose legalized abortion. 
 At first, the right-to-life activity in California mirrored that of the Church. 
California’s bishops had even been some of the first people to warn the NCWC about the 
efforts to liberalize abortion laws in the state. In June 1966, Bishop Alden J. Bell of 
Sacramento notified the NCWC of the potential changes to abortion law in California as 
well as the publicity the issue was getting. He wrote, “the campaign on liberalizing 
abortion continues at a fast pace…We feel the need of a very succinct and effective 
statement on the moral issues involved as a basis for an educational program among even 
our own Catholic people.”60 Bishop Bell also warned that the abortion issue would most 
likely become a national issue in the coming years. The bishops in California joined 
together at the end of that year to make a formal statement opposing abortion reform. The 
statement, entitled “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” laid out various arguments against abortion and 
reiterated the Church’s strict stance: “Those who would weaken laws which protect 
human life are posing both a threat to society itself and to the fundamental moral 
principles upon which society is based.”61 They stated that they opposed abortion not 
only because of the Church’s teaching but also because of scientific evidence about 
embryonic life and the rights enshrined in the Declaration of Independence.  
 Like their counterparts at the national level, the Catholic bishops in California 
also began supporting a group of Catholic professionals and experts on the abortion issue 
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who had begun meeting in Los Angeles in 1966.62 The group of twelve lawyers and 
doctors crafted a statement to release to the public in California, hoping to counter the 
positive publicity for abortion reform. They noted the “increasing volume of comment, 
argument and outright propaganda” in favor of liberalization.63 They also claimed that the 
proponents of abortion reform were too “emotionally-charged” and that their arguments 
in favor of the reform bill were “lacking in substance.”64 While the men on the committee 
said they were sympathetic to the issues faced by women, they recommended “medical 
aid, psychological guidance, and social and spiritual assistance” rather than legalized 
abortion.65 The Catholic bishops included this report with their own statement, using it to 
bolster their case against abortion reform. Like the work of the NCWC and other church 
officials, the statement aimed to show that seasoned experts and professionals could 
present reasoned and rational arguments against abortion. This was the standard approach 
to the abortion issue by the Catholic Church and Catholic professionals at this time. 
 Despite this public statement, Beilenson persisted in his efforts to reform the 
state’s abortion laws. This opposition was, after all, very similar to opposition he had 
encountered in previous years when he had presented abortion reform legislation; 
however, Beilenson soon encountered a sudden and impressive wave of opposition to the 
new proposed legislation. His office and his colleagues’ offices were flooded with letters 
from angry Californians—both his own constituents as well as other residents from 
across the state. Some were in favor of the bill but the vast majority was not. State 
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Senator George E. Danielson, one of Beilenson’s colleagues on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, reported that his office stopped counting once they had received over four 
thousand letters on the bill.66 Like Beilenson, he also said that the letters had skewed 
heavily in opposition to the proposed measure to liberalize the abortion law. Initially, 
Beilenson and the other legislators could not explain where the wave of opposition to 
abortion reform had come from.  
 This “mail avalanche” was partly the result of the efforts of local Catholic 
parishes. Several people reported to Beilenson that the homilies in church on Easter 
Sunday that spring were devoted to the abortion issue, that the issue was being discussed 
in Catholic schools and hospitals, and that Catholic priests had urged California’s 
Catholics to write their representatives.67 Church bulletins also included updates on 
abortion legislation, letting parishioners know when they should contact their 
legislators.68 The announcements in church bulletins framed the issue in the most serious 
terms and urged immediate action. They asked parishioners, “Did you write your State 
Senator and State Assemblyman urging them to oppose the ‘Inhuman’ Abortion Bill, 
which would legalize Abortion in California? If not, write immediately.”69 They also 
included emotional antiabortion tracts like the fictional diary of an unborn child, 
“Slaughter of the Innocent.” The account documented the experience of a fetus in the 
womb: “October 5: Today my life began. My parents do not know it yet. I am small as 	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the seed of an apple, but it is I already.” It continued, documenting various fetal 
developments before ending on December 28th: “Today my mother killed me.”70 Still 
another church bulletin invoked the Fifth Commandment, perhaps referencing the 
bishops’ 1966 statement “Thou Shalt Not Kill,” and urged parishioners to “oppose the 
Inhuman Abortion Bill.”71 One bishop reported that he had sent eighty thousand letters to 
members of his diocese, telling them to write their State Senator in opposition to the 
bill.72 All these efforts in local parishes combined to create massive levels of individual 
opposition to abortion. They also showed that the Church’s attempts at education and 
outreach on the abortion issue were making an impact at the grassroots level and that 
abortion was a powerful issue that could motivate people to take political action. 
 Moreover, the constituent letters displayed the varied arguments against abortion 
that individuals were already using—many of which would be marshaled again and again 
to oppose abortion and to convince people to join the new right-to-life movement. These 
arguments fit into four broad categories. First, some people argued that abortion reform 
was a slippery slope. What was to stop euthanasia or killing of the mentally or physically 
disabled if states started legalizing abortion? “Why not change the law to read that after a 
child is born if no one wants it or if it is deformed, then kill it,” constituent Frances 
Buchan of Sun Valley asked.73 This argument was often combined with the argument 
that, with legal abortion, America would be “moving stage by stage to something 
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potentially indistinguishable from Hitler’s Germany.”74 Second, other letters invoked 
religion. These letters usually went two directions—either they declared that abortion was 
murder (a violation of the Fifth Commandment, though they often did not get that 
specific) or they said that abortion was a violation of God’s sovereignty, asking, “Who 
are you to play God?” One of Beilenson’s constituents combined the two arguments: 
“Who are you and your misguided partisans to play god of God?...I am unaware that the 
Fifth Commandment has been, or even can be, abrogated.”75 Third, the letters framed 
abortion as a human rights or civil rights issue. These letters often referenced founding 
American documents like the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, arguing 
that the right to life was a fundamental American right. The argument mirrored the rights-
based approach that would be foundational for the right-to-life movement and which 
would be used by the NRLC the following year. One such letter pleaded, “Even the 
unborn child has minority rights despite possible reluctance on the part of the majority to 
admit it.”76 Finally, other letters placed abortion among other signs of American society’s 
eroding morals and the decline of traditional values. Dorothy Messina of Sepulveda 
lamented the bill and remarked, “I fervently pray that our country will soon return to the 
God-fearing, God-loving land our founders intended it to be.”77 
 These arguments are significant because they were enduring and because the 
activity of letter writing would be an entry point into political activism for many right-to-
lifers. The arguments in these early constituent letters were reiterated and reused 
repeatedly even as the right-to-life movement shifted from a local and state orientation to 	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a national one and even as movement demographics shifted with the incorporation of 
many evangelical Christians in the late 1970s. Letter writing would also be a major 
strategy of early right-to-life groups. Such actions not only made legislators aware of the 
growing opposition to abortion but also encouraged individuals to form or join new right-
to-life organizations. Writing letters to representatives was a stepping-stone to greater 
involvement in activism. For example, Marian Banducci of Fremont, who became very 
active in California’s right-to-life movement, recalled her own letter writing endeavors 
when she wrote her memoir after twenty years of activism. Banducci remembered that 
after hearing about the Therapeutic Abortion Bill of 1967 she immediately “had to 
express [her] anger in some way” and “began writing letters to the editors of 
newspapers.”78 Though it would be two more years before she was involved in a right-to-
life organization, letter writing provided her with her first foray into abortion politics. It 
was low risk and low cost activism—anyone could sit down and write a note to their 
representative or local newspaper. But it helped the right-to-life movement reach a much 
broader audience and hone in on the arguments against abortion that would be its most 
powerful and compelling arguments in the years to come.  
 The massive campaign of letter writing helped the bill gain wide publicity, and 
many people began speaking out publicly both for and against the bill. Finally, a hearing 
on the bill was scheduled for April 27, 1967, and both sides began lining up speakers to 
argue their case. Hundreds of people turned up to hear each side argue their position, and 
the hearing lasted for six hours.79 The proponents of abortion reform went first. They 
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argued that legalized abortion before the twentieth week of pregnancy was in line with 
“sound medical practice.”80 In addition to the doctors testifying in favor of abortion 
reform, several clergymen spoke out in support of the bill as well as a number of 
members of abortion rights organizations. The supporters of the bill wrapped up their 
testimony shortly after eleven that evening. The opposition was less cohesive with no 
clear leadership, but they still presented a range of speakers including a Lutheran 
minister, a pastor of a local community church and representative of the Right to Life 
League, Bishop Bell of the Catholic Church, and Professor John T. Noonan, who was 
“one of the best speakers all evening.”81 Similar to those in favor of the bill, the 
opponents included several doctors and lawyers to testify in regard to the legal and 
medical ramifications of abortion. The hearing finally ended around two in the morning, 
and one of the senators at the hearing commented that it had been “one of ‘the greatest 
speaking marathons I have ever witnessed.’”82 The abortion rights supporters felt they 
had achieved a major victory with their compelling and well-organized testimony. The 
legislators must have agreed because they passed Beilenson’s bill, and despite some 
reservations, Governor Reagan signed it into law.83 
 In spite of its defeat, the opposition did not die down once the Therapeutic 
Abortion Bill was signed into law in 1967. Indeed, some right-to-life activists noted that 	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the 1967 Therapeutic Abortion Bill was just the start of their political activism and only 
further mobilized the opposition to abortion in California. In a similar way to other 
abortion decisions, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, the 1967 
Therapeutic Abortion Bill loomed large in the minds of right-to-lifers in California. 
Activist Marian Banducci said that the 1967 bill came as a shock to her, and she was no 
longer able to ignore the abortion issue. In her memoir, she recalled the passage of the 
1967 Therapeutic Abortion Bill as “the event that would change my life forevermore.”84 
Sr. Paula Vandegaer, who joined the Right to Life League following the passage of the 
bill, recalled a similar feeling: “I thought it was such a ridiculous thing. That law would 
never pass. When it did pass, I was shocked. I didn’t know what to say.”85 After the 
passage of the bill, some of these people immediately turned their ire against Governor 
Reagan. Groups like the Right to Life League of Southern California urged its leadership 
and members to write Reagan and tell him to oppose any amended bill that came to his 
desk; soon after, Reagan’s office reported that he was receiving nearly five hundred 
letters and telegrams a day, most of which opposed any amended bill.86 
 The Right to Life League and other California right-to-life groups tried to marshal 
this fervor and continued to grow and strengthen in the wake of the 1967 legislative fight. 
Right to Life Leagues had been started in both the northern and southern parts of the state 
in 1967, and other groups formed after the passage of the Therapeutic Abortion Bill. 
Following the bill’s passage, members of the Right to Life League of California also 	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organized more letter writing campaigns and developed their own pamphlets and 
literature in both English and Spanish, which proclaimed their belief in the fundamental 
right to life in America’s founding documents and in its laws.87 Marian Banducci joined a 
local antiabortion group organized by women at her church in 1969. They called 
themselves the Voice for the Unborn and met regularly at their priest’s home. Looking 
back, Banducci recalled it as “the beginning of a spiritual awakening!”88 These groups 
met and operated at the local level and served as a place for right-to-lifers to remain 
involved in political activism and to develop new strategies following their legislative 
defeat. 
 The camaraderie in these early groups as well as news of the existence of similar 
organizations in their state and across the country invigorated early right-to-life activists 
and cemented their commitment to the cause. Banducci described the feeling, “A whole 
new world began to open up for me as I…came to realize that people all over the country 
felt just as I did and that pro-life groups were forming all over.”89 The mobilization of 
activists in California also attracted the attention of right-to-lifers in both Minnesota and 
New York, who sought inspiration from right-to-life strategy in the state. Minnesota 
Citizens Concerned for Life even invited Father Charles Carroll, an Episcopal priest and 
leading figure in California’s right-to-life movement, to speak in their state several times 
in the late 1960s.90 However, despite their efforts at organizing to stop the liberalization 
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of California’s abortion laws and their respected status among right-to-lifers in other 
states, California’s right-to-lifers failed to achieve their objective of reversing reform—
the 1967 Therapeutic Bill withstood their protest and in 1970 the state’s Supreme Court 
struck down the abortion law completely, paving the way for legal abortion without 
restrictions.91 
 The story in California is one of both successes and failures, showing the halting 
start of the right-to-life movement before Roe v. Wade. Right-to-lifers failed to stall 
abortion reform, but the Church and local groups in California were able to mobilize 
thousands of Californians to take part in massive letter writing campaigns and to speak 
out publicly in opposition to reform—a stark change from previous years. Despite the 
failure to halt reform in California, there can be no doubt that right-to-life opposition was 
a potent force, and this early mobilization was vital to later organizing efforts in the 
state.92 Individuals became aware of the abortion issue, educated on the various 
arguments against abortion, and mobilized to act. But despite this mobilization of 
individual Californians, it was not so easy to turn that individual opposition into more 
organized opposition, and the movement had yet to settle on a unified strategy, as was 
evident from its disorganized testimony at the hearing for the bill in 1967. It was 
becoming clear that the right-to-lifers could no longer rely solely on experts like doctors, 
lawyers, or church officials to argue against abortion on their behalf, and letter-writing 	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campaigns could only get them so far. Moreover, arguments in favor of abortion were 
beginning to change to favor the repeal of abortion laws rather than reform and public 
opinion was turning in favor of the issue. Right-to-lifers had to counter this swell of 
support for abortion reform (and now repeal) by forming local and state organizations 
that could effectively raise awareness, implement a clear strategy, and mobilize more 
people at the grassroots level.  
1.4 New York: The Catholic Church and a Right-to-Life Strategy for the States 
 New York became a focal point for both sides of the abortion debate when the 
state legalized abortion in 1970, but as in California and Minnesota, opposition to 
abortion began to coalesce in the state in the late 1960s. This process in New York was 
slower than in California and Minnesota, partly because New Yorkers had not yet faced 
serious challenges to the state’s abortion law. Abortion reform was introduced but easily 
defeated three years in a row from 1966 to 1969.93 For the most part, the state’s Catholic 
bishops and a small group, the New York State Right to Life Committee, coordinated the 
opposition in the state. In contrast to California, New York’s right-to-life strategy was 
much clearer and more precise, perhaps because the threats of reform were less urgent in 
the state. This allowed the Church to develop a comprehensive plan to mobilize the 
state’s parishes to oppose abortion reform. The development of a right-to-life movement 
in New York provides an example of attempts to implement the Church’s plan, which 
had been discussed at the NCWC meetings in 1966 and 1967, at the state level. It was the 
realization of a grassroots strategy for the new movement, meant to mobilize individuals 
in the states and then organize them to sustain long-term action. The Church’s plan also 	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allowed the movement in New York to test out new strategies and laid the foundation for 
a strong right-to-life presence in the state. Starting in 1970, the state’s lay Catholics 
would lead a passionate and fierce fight against a new liberalized abortion law and make 
New York one of the preeminent models of right-to-life organizing. 
 As with Minnesota and California, abortion reform was on the agenda for New 
York legislators throughout the 1960s. But New Yorkers who opposed abortion were 
somewhat surprised when reform legislation was introduced in 1967, not because they 
had no idea abortion reform was being considered but because they assumed no new 
legislation would be introduced that year and that there would be no hearings on the 
issue.94 Assemblyman Albert H. Blumenthal had introduced the bill to liberalize the 
state’s abortion law, and it was immediately contentious, splitting the legislature as well 
as dividing the governor and lieutenant governor. Governor Nelson Rockefeller 
supported the measure while his lieutenant governor, Catholic Malcolm Wilson, came out 
publicly in opposition.95 Like California, New York also had heated hearings over the 
proposed bills. In these hearings, Blumenthal faced intense questioning by opponents 
about whether he favored euthanasia, if he was committed to atheism, and whether or not 
he believed in the Ten Commandments.96 In 1969, the hearings were once again heated, 
and the legislature debated the proposed measure for five hours before it was defeated.97 
As in other states, abortion reform in New York could not escape the intense controversy 
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that surrounded the issue. Yet, despite this intense debate and repeated attempts to 
introduce reform legislation, no measures managed to pass. 
 This failure was partly due to the state’s Catholic bishops. In New York, the 
bishops led the fight against abortion as the opposition’s public face in the 1960s. They 
were fierce critics, delivering sermons and making public statements against abortion. 
For example, in an unprecedented move, the bishops of New York made a joint public 
statement against abortion when the reform bill was introduced for 1967.98 Their public 
criticism of abortion was so extensive that supporters of abortion reform even protested 
outside St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City in March 1967.99 However, the Church 
defended its actions. When other religious leaders accused the Catholic Church and right-
to-lifers in New York of “lacking the proper attitude in an ecumenical age” because they 
refused to compromise on abortion, Father James McHugh defended the Church’s 
position and reaffirmed his belief that the Catholic Church was speaking for the moral 
position of both Catholics and non-Catholics.100 Despite its critics’ complaints, the 
Catholic Church in New York would not back down from the abortion issue, and the 
state’s Catholic bishops, priests, and local parishes led the fight against legal abortion.  
 What stood out about Catholic activism in the state was its coherent and 
organized strategy. According to Msgr. James Murray, the Church in New York was 
taking action on abortion in five specific and calculated ways and, in developing such a 
comprehensive plan, it was setting important precedents for how the Church would 
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handle the issue at the state level in the next few years.101 Much of the work in New York 
included implementing ideas that had been discussed in the NCWC meetings in 1966. 
First, the state’s bishops organized a priest in each diocese as well as a statewide 
coordinator to mobilize lay people. This action ensured that they reached every parish in 
the state and that all parishes adopted the same plan for right-to-life activity. Second, they 
urged people to get in touch with their legislators—a strategy similar to the one employed 
by the Catholic Church and right-to-life groups in California. Third, the bishops 
organized lay people to speak out against the issue at legislative hearings. Fourth, they 
worked to increase broad-based support for the right-to-life cause by encouraging the 
formation of independent organizations like the New York State Right to Life 
Committee. Finally, the bishops wrote a pastoral letter for the state’s Catholics. These 
were all important pieces of right-to-life strategy designed to reach as broad an audience 
as possible, mobilize individuals, and center lay activism in the fight to stop abortion. 
Furthermore, this plan informed how the Catholic Church and right-to-life groups in 
individual states would organize throughout the coming decade, as these five steps 
remained pillars of right-to-life strategy. In this way, the fight over abortion reform in 
New York served as a testing ground for the Catholic Church and right-to-lifers to 
develop new workable strategies and explore what strategies and arguments were most 
compelling. The plan also provided a path to mobilize lay people to take concrete action 
to oppose abortion, whether it was writing their state representative, speaking at a hearing 
on abortion, or joining a local right-to-life committee. 
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 Grassroots mobilization was at the core of the plan, and local dioceses and 
parishes were central in developing and implementing the Church’s strategy. Priests and 
bishops used local diocesan newspapers to disseminate information on abortion reform 
and to publish their sermons on abortion. As in California, they often urged parishioners 
to write to their legislators when there was pending legislation or an upcoming hearing.102 
Many Catholics throughout the state got the message and responded en masse, putting 
pressure on Catholic legislators and urging them to stand in opposition to the abortion 
reform legislation. Local diocesan papers also helped New York’s Catholics keep track of 
right-to-life activity in other states. These papers reported on efforts across the country—
whether or not activists had succeeded in stopping legislation and what abortion reform 
looked like in other legislatures. They even reprinted the 1966 antiabortion statement 
released by California’s Catholic bishops.103 In addition to tracking abortion reform out 
of state, the diocesan papers tracked how their districts’ legislators voted on abortion 
reform. This was another way to hold legislators accountable, and it was similar to the 
ways other right-to-life organizations tracked candidates’ positions on the abortion issue 
to guide voting.104 The papers also issued dire assessments about abortion in the United 
States. A 1969 article warned that “abortion on demand is the ultimate objective of the 
pro-abortion forces,” a statement that mirrored the slippery slope arguments made by 
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Californians in their letters to Beilenson.105 The range of topics the diocesan papers 
covered sent the message that American Catholics needed to be ever vigilant for attempts 
to change abortion laws and needed to be ready to take action at any moment. 
 The actions of the Catholic Church and grassroots organizing among New York 
right-to-lifers led to successful hearings to oppose abortion reform. In fact, abortion 
reform bills failed to pass three years in a row in New York.106 The hearings in the state 
legislature were useful for an additional reason: they provided a place for lay activists to 
meet each other, exchange ideas, and take center stage in right-to-life activism. In a 1967 
hearing, doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, priests and religious were joined by a number of 
lay organizations and parents to testify at a public hearing on proposed reform legislation. 
The opponents of the legislation were in agreement: “An unborn child is entitled to the 
full protection of our social order from all direct attacks.”107 In accordance with the 
Church’s plan, the testimony at these hearings featured lay people as the main speakers. 
In 1967, seventy-five out of seventy-eight people who testified at one of the public 
hearings on abortion reform were lay people. And their speeches made a noticeable 
impression. Leaders in the church contended that it was “the impact of a broad base of 
citizen support at the public hearings and also the letter writing campaign” that killed the 
bill.108 In New York, lay people were the ones driving the action—they had no real 
obligation to respond to the Church’s plea beyond perhaps writing a letter to their 
legislator, but many still showed up at hearings and joined or started right-to-life groups. 	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Building off the Church’s five-step plan, this early grassroots activity gave the right-to-
life movement a firm foundation of grassroots mobilization to build upon once abortion 
was legalized in New York in 1970. 
 In addition to learning the value of featuring lay speakers at legislative hearings, 
right-to-lifers and the Catholic Church learned how to testify strategically and use the 
media to their benefit. In the first hearing in New York in 1967, right-to-lifers had been 
outmaneuvered by supporters of the bill. The bill’s proponents made sure their supporters 
spoke first, timing it so the media would cover their testimony but not the testimony of 
right-to-lifers in the second half of the hearing. It was a Friday evening, and members of 
the media were anxious to end the workweek and start their weekend. The media heard 
the supporters of the bill speak and then packed up to head home for the weekend. The 
bill’s opponents spoke but had little coverage in the media. By the third hearing, the 
right-to-lifers had learned their lesson and “got somebody on at the very beginning who 
just kept going on and on while we were lining up our people before the TV cameras 
downstairs.”109 They were determined to make their case and have the media publicize 
the opposition to abortion. It may also have helped that the Church had hired a public 
relations firm in the meantime to help with press releases and public appearances.110 
These were savvy strategic maneuvers and show the important lessons right-to-lifers 
were learning in their organizing efforts in the states in the late 1960s. Moreover, like 
many of the strategies New York’s right-to-lifers were already trying out, clever use of 
the media, alongside contentions that the media refused to fully cover the right-to-life 
movement, would become vital strategies for activists in the 1970s. 	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 Finally, in another attempt to implement the Church’s plan, right-to-life 
organizations emerged throughout the state. In 1967, for example, Edward Golden 
decided to start the New York State Right to Life Committee (NYRTL) after receiving 
encouragement from the Catholic bishops.111 Like many early right-to-lifers, Golden, a 
construction foreman, had little awareness of abortion politics prior to the introduction of 
abortion reform legislation, and he only decided to form NYRTL after hearing about the 
1967 Blumenthal Bill. The group started off small with a budget of only $400 and very 
limited plans of action.112 But its influence would spread. As in Minnesota, the group 
formed committees in other towns and cities around the state, such as in Rochester in 
1969.113 The initial purpose of the new groups was to “alert diocesan laity about attempts 
to liberalize New York State’s abortion laws.”114 NYRTL also reached out to the newly 
formed NRLC looking for more information and material on opposing abortion.115 Like 
the other right-to-life approaches and strategies in the state, these diocesan groups were 
prototypes for later right-to-life organizations and encouraged lay people in the state to be 
aware and active on the abortion issue. More importantly, they provided vital experience 
in activism for people, like Golden, who would help develop the national right-to-life 
movement in the early 1970s. 
 Despite the well-organized activity by the state’s Catholic bishops, their efforts 
ultimately failed. In 1970 abortion became legal in New York up to twenty-four weeks of 
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pregnancy. Nevertheless, a clear strategy was emerging, which privileged grassroots 
activism, encouraged bold political action, and was starting to produce savvy activists.116 
Because of this foundational work done in the late 1960s and the Church’s clear strategy 
in New York, right-to-lifers in the state immediately took up intense lobbying and 
organizing efforts to reverse the 1970 decision, and in the early 1970s, New York became 
a model for right-to-lifers across the country as the fight over abortion in the states only 
became more and more contentious. The strategy in New York was put to the test and 
nearly succeeded. Through a flurry of activism, New Yorkers voted in a right-to-life 
majority in their state legislature and rallied against the liberal abortion law—only the 
governor’s veto prevented the state’s legislature from overturning legal abortion in the 
state.  
1.5 Minnesota: The Power and Potential of State Right-to-Life Organizations 
 In Minnesota, individual mobilization and bold right-to-life strategies coalesced, 
and a dedicated group of activists formed Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life 
(MCCL), which soon became a powerful force in state politics and in the national right-
to-life movement. Not only did right-to-lifers organize MCCL, but they also developed a 
range of political and educational strategies meant to reach a variety of Minnesotans, 
build a broad-based movement, and sustain activism in the state long-term. In the years 
preceding MCCL’s formation, discussion about changing the state’s abortion law 
occurred sporadically, in a similar manner as in California and New York. As early as 
1962, Msgr. Richard T. Doherty warned Minnesota’s Catholics of proposed changes to 
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the state law in an editorial for the Catholic Bulletin.117 He urged Catholics and 
Protestants in the state to find common cause in recognizing the unborn’s right-to-life. 
Bills were introduced in the legislature periodically; however, unlike California and New 
York, Minnesotans managed to successfully oppose the proposed changes to state laws, 
and abortion only became legal in Minnesota with the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
1973. Thanks to their success and passionate organizing in the state, members of MCCL 
would take center stage in the planning and formation of the national right-to-life 
movement in the early 1970s. With its diverse political tactics, aggressive lobbying, 
diverse lay leadership, and statewide outreach efforts, the movement in Minnesota 
showed the true potential and power of grassroots right-to-life organizing in the states in 
the 1960s. 
 As in many other states, the pace of abortion reform picked up in Minnesota in the 
late 1960s. Legislators introduced a new bill to reform the state’s abortion law in 1967, 
and abortion rights groups, such as the Minnesota Council for the Legal Termination of 
Pregnancy (MCLTP), worked to convince Minnesotans that abortion reform was 
necessary. Minnesota’s current state laws allowed abortion in some cases to save a 
woman’s life, but as with abortion reform across the country, lawyers, doctors, 
legislators, and ordinary citizens in Minnesota were beginning to wonder if the cases for 
legal abortion should be expanded. In response to these attempts at reform, a few 
Minnesotans decided to form their own right-to-life organization—MCCL—in 1968. In 
its institutional history, MCCL noted that the 1967 bill was the impetus for MCCL’s 
formation because “the strength of the anti-life push told those who valued life that they, 	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too, must organize.”118 Some Minnesotans realized this by reading the news, by 
encountering abortion in their professions, by attending legislative hearings, or by talking 
with their neighbors.  Alice Hartle, an early leader and mainstay of MCCL and the NRLC 
into the 1980s, heard about a legislative hearing on abortion and immediately got to 
work, using “her kitchen table as the platform for building the first stages of the pro-life 
movement.”119 Fred and Marjory Mecklenburg, also prominent early figures in the 
movement, joined MCCL after attending a Alice Hartle’s neighborhood meeting on 
abortion.120 However they were mobilized into the movement, these Minnesotans took 
quick and decisive action to oppose abortion reform. MCCL members immediately 
decided to make a statement about their priorities by choosing Dr. Fred Mecklenburg as 
their first president. The Mecklenburgs were both liberal Methodists, and Fred 
Mecklenburg, a physician, was a member of the local Planned Parenthood and a 
proponent of birth control.  
 Choosing the Mecklenburgs, liberal Protestants who promoted alternatives to 
abortion and the use of contraceptives, as their early leaders helped set the tone for 
MCCL’s opposition to abortion into the 1970s. It suggested that MCCL prioritized 
making the right-to-life movement broad-based, representing Minnesotans from a variety 
of political and religious backgrounds with a variety of approaches to the abortion issue 
itself and challenging its opponents’ contentions that the Catholic hierarchy coordinated 
the entire movement. In addition to Dr. Mecklenburg’s involvement with Planned 
Parenthood, some other members of MCCL also had a slightly more relaxed view on 
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abortion and supported some minor exceptions in abortion law to allow for legal abortion 
in cases where a woman’s life was in jeopardy. MCCL’s early policy statement 
emphasized its opposition to “abortion on demand,” which meant the organization 
opposed legal abortion with no restrictions. MCCL favored “amending” the state’s 
abortion law to require that abortions be performed by a doctor in a hospital and 
approved by a hospital committee.121 Even so, MCCL was still cautious about therapeutic 
abortions. In one of its early policy statements, MCCL questioned the need for such 
abortions given recent “scientific advances.”122 Instead, the group emphasized “a 
positive, constructive approach to the abortion issue, namely recognition of the right to 
life of both mother and child.”123 The flexible stance on abortion allowed MCCL to 
appeal not only to Catholics but also to Protestants and other Minnesotans who were 
concerned about abortion but did not believe it should be made illegal in all cases. It also 
allowed them to develop other strategies besides simply opposing reform, such as 
promoting alternatives to abortion—programs and policies that were meant to help 
pregnant women get the social services they needed in order to have a child rather than 
choose abortion. MCCL would promote this emphasis on a “positive, constructive 
approach” when its leaders helped form a national right-to-life movement in the early 
1970s.  
 After its formation in 1968, MCCL very quickly developed a broad and 
impressive range of strategies. They initially went on a two-front offensive: building a 	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strong lobby in state politics and mobilizing individuals in towns and cities across the 
state. First, MCCL’s members actively engaged in state politics to combat any attempts 
to repeal or reform Minnesota’s existing laws on abortion. Their political activity 
involved organizing speakers for legislative hearings, keeping their members and the 
public abreast of any new legislative developments and of how their legislators voted on 
the issue, and making legislators aware that there were Minnesotans who opposed 
abortion reform through lobbying efforts at the state capitol. Within a few months of 
officially organizing, MCCL had already sent out a questionnaire to every legislative 
candidate in the state in order to ascertain each candidate’s stance on abortion. And 
MCCL’s leaders defended this tactic when MCTLP accused them of trying to intimidate 
state politicians. MCCL claimed its activity was “perfectly fair and honorable under our 
democratic system.”124 MCCL also started to work within political parties in the state, an 
activity that would be vital and contentious during the 1970s as both parties fought over 
the place of abortion policy in their party platforms. 
 Their second front in right-to-life activism involved educating and mobilizing 
ordinary Minnesotans. Initially, MCCL relied on experts and professionals to animate 
this aspect of its work, a typical response in other states as well as in the Catholic Church. 
Both sides of the debate were still treating abortion as a public health issue rather than as 
a rights issue (though this too was changing). And it made sense for MCCL to focus on 
abortion as a medical issue given that the group had a large cohort of doctors in its ranks 
and had chosen a physician to be its first president. MCCL’s early literature also 
portrayed the organization as concerned with safe and ethical medical practice, citing the 	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positions of various medical associations, including the American Medical Association, 
to bolster their opposition to abortion on demand.125 However, unlike the Catholic 
Church during this time, MCCL soon pivoted to broader outreach efforts. 
 MCCL quickly expanded beyond a reliance on experts, engaging in a grassroots 
campaign to reach as diverse a range of Minnesotans as possible. Through the end of 
decade, MCCL members organized meetings, debates, and speaking events at the local 
level across the state of Minnesota. MCCL members met in churches, on college 
campuses, and in high schools, and spoke to civic organizations.126 By 1969, the two-
front strategy paid off. When MCLTP followed up the 1967 bill with a proposal for an 
even more liberal abortion law in 1969, MCCL put this two-front approach to good use. 
First, its members undertook “intensive lobbying” to ensure the bill’s defeat in the 
legislature, relying on the connections they had made and tactics they had developed in 
their first year of organizing.127 Second, they reached out to the Minnesotans they had 
engaged with on the issue, and they made sure their supporters knew how legislators had 
voted—listing those who voted for and against proposed abortion bills—so that 
individual Minnesotans could hold their legislators accountable.128 The legislation failed 
to pass. 
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 MCCL and its members succeeded because they worked quickly to increase their 
scope of action to target all Minnesotans and to get them involved in opposing abortion 
reform. Rather than remaining a single chapter in a metropolitan area, MCCL decided 
that the organization should expand across the state, especially to larger rural towns.129 
This strategy, in turn, would help the group put more pressure on the legislators that 
represented rural communities. To organize in these communities, MCCL used its 
strategy of holding speaking events and debates in rural towns.130 MCCL also tried to 
diversify its strategy by reaching out to right-to-lifers in other states. Its members were 
anxious to learn about tactics from other state groups and even invited leaders of different 
organizations to events in Minnesota, including people like Charles Carroll, an Episcopal 
priest and prominent right-to-life activist in California, and John E. Archibold from 
Colorado, which had recently legalized abortion. The two men headlined a panel entitled 
“The Abortion Distortion.”131 MCCL also subscribed to the National Right to Life News, 
the NRLC’s newsletter, as a way to “find out what other organizations similar to MCCL 
were doing in their cities and the different types of ideas and programs they are 
developing.”132 The group’s members could also keep up on the abortion debate in other 
states thanks to articles in local newspapers on the debate in Colorado, California, and 
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New York.133 Through these means, MCCL spread its message across Minnesota and 
stayed engaged in right-to-life activities across the United States. 
 In addition, MCCL began to consider supporting alternatives to abortion, a 
strategy that was meant to diversify its arguments against abortion and broaden its 
political aims. If social services were in place to help women and children, MCCL 
believed the group could argue that legal abortion was unnecessary in most cases. In 
1969, Marjory Mecklenburg first pitched the idea that MCCL should support Birthright, 
an organization that provided social services to pregnant women. Birthright’s main 
assertion was that “every woman has the right to carry a pregnancy to term,” and it 
offered social service support as a way to keep women from choosing abortion.134 
Mecklenburg believed that Minnesota should offer the same services. She proposed that 
the Minnesota branch of Birthright would be independent of MCCL, though MCCL 
could offer financial support and volunteers. While this strategy was only a minor goal in 
MCCL’s first several years of existence, it would become even more important in the 
early 1970s as state groups tried to work together and formulate a successful strategy in 
national politics. Marjory Mecklenburg relentlessly pursued alternatives to abortion 
programs even as she took on leadership roles in several national organizations. The 
notion that the right-to-life movement should pursue positive solutions, rather than 
simply opposing abortion, was a vital strand of Marjory Mecklenburg’s and MCCL’s 
early strategy and political goals. 	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 To further strengthen their arguments and to attract new members, MCCL 
members engaged in vigorous debate with abortion rights organizations, such as the 
MCLTP, throughout these years. The debate over abortion raged not only in the 
legislature but also in the state’s newspapers, churches, schools, and professional 
organizations as both MCCL and MCLTP tried to win over Minnesotans to their side. 
The groups clashed repeatedly. For example, in 1968, Robert McCoy, co-founder of 
MCTLP and Rev. William Hunt of MCCL debated the abortion issue in front of an 
audience at a local Catholic Church in the town of Fridley, a suburb of Minneapolis.135 
The debate received coverage in the local papers as well as in the Minneapolis Tribune. 
This discussion continued into the next year. In 1969 when another bill was reintroduced 
in the state legislature, a local paper commented on the strides made by both opponents 
and supporters of abortion reform since the last bill had been introduced in 1967. The 
paper noted, “This time it will bring a broader discussion, which is good…Continuing 
learned debate in a matter as sensitive and important as abortion is to be welcomed by a 
confused citizenry.”136 Debates like the one between McCoy and Hunt helped ensure an 
active and engaged public and strengthened both sides of the abortion debate in 
Minnesota. 
 This flurry of activity sustained MCCL even when no abortion legislation was 
pending and helped it quickly gain several thousand members. MCCL and its members 
throughout the state developed robust strategies, a strong central organization, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 “Abortion Pros, Cons will be Debated,” Columbia Heights, July 29, 1968, Reel 1, MCCL Newspaper 
Clippings; Irene Parsons, “Abortion Panel Ponders; Finds ‘No Easy Answers,’” St. Anthony Sun, August 5, 
1969, Reel 1, MCCL Newspaper Clippings; Legalized Abortion Debated in Fridley, Minneapolis Tribune, 
August 3, 1968, Reel 1, MCCL Newspaper Clippings. 
136 “On with abortion debate!” Mankato Free Press, January 29, 1969, Reel 1, MCCL Newspaper 
Clippings. 
  61  
beginnings of a broad-based coalition, thanks to the involvement and leadership of liberal 
Protestants like the Mecklenburgs. MCCL had successfully turned individual opposition 
to abortion into more organized and sustained opposition. Thanks to this early activism, 
MCCL and its members would become leaders in building the national movement at the 
start of the 1970s. And as the decade came to a close and the organization celebrated its 
first anniversary, MCCL started planning for the future of this new initiative. “We have 
won the battle, but the war will go on,” the group noted in 1969, “Some experts project 
this issue as a 25-year controversy.”137 At another meeting that same year, Dr. John 
McKelvey warned that MCCL “should be prepared to eventually take their cause to the 
Supreme Court” and that “Preparation for such action would be best organized on a 
national basis.”138 These Minnesotans did not yet know how accurate these statements 
would become in a few years, but they show that MCCL and its members were aware 
that the fight over abortion would not be confined to state politics. MCCL’s members 
acknowledged that their fight would be a long one, perhaps even decades long, and in the 
late 1960s they were starting to realize that it might require cooperation beyond their 
local and state organizations—a cooperative effort that could truly marshal the growing 
individual opposition to abortion and turn it into a strong and formidable national right-
to-life movement. 
Conclusion 
 In just a little over a decade, the abortion issue transformed from a taboo 
subject—in the media, in government, and in daily life—into a divisive and public issue. 
Abortion reformers championed new liberalized laws in several states, yet clashed with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 MCCL, “MCCL is Throwing a Party,” 1969, Box 3, Folder MCCL 1968-1973, Taylor Papers. 
138 MCCL, Notes and Comments taken on the Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. Meeting, held 
Monday June 16, 1969…” Box 2, Folder MCCL Clippings and Other Papers, Taylor Papers. 
  62  
both opponents of abortion reform and with people who were coming to believe that the 
only solution to the abortion issue was the total repeal of all abortion laws. Right-to-lifers 
struggled to mobilize sustained opposition to abortion reform, though they did have some 
success. The organizations formed during this period, like MCCL, the New York State 
Right to Life Committee, and the Right to Life League of California, were the future of 
the movement, along with a host of other organizations that developed in states across the 
country. Though their successes were at times minimal and they had yet to recruit large 
numbers of supporters, these early right-to-lifers were already planning for the years to 
come and developing and perfecting the strategies that would form a movement that has 
lasted for nearly five decades. They were also slowly developing a vision for a broad-
based movement that incorporated Americans of all religious faiths and political 
persuasions and stood up for the rights of the unborn, rights they believed were evident 
not only in divine law and in the Bible but also in the nation’s founding documents. 
 In fostering this broad-based movement, right-to-lifers had already started debates 
about the nature of the movement that would carry over into the 1970s. These debates 
revolved around the demographics of right-to-life activism and the involvement of the 
Catholic Church hierarchy. While the Catholic Church hierarchy performed an important 
function as the facilitator and funding source for much of the early right-to-life action in 
the 1960s, ordinary Americans—of many religious faiths and denominations—were the 
main driving force that sustained the movement. They were the ones writing letters to 
their legislators, showing up at speaking events, debates, and public hearings, talking 
with their neighbors and coworkers about the issue, and organizing local right-to-life 
groups. It was ordinary people like Fred and Marjory Mecklenburg, Alice Hartle, Charles 
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Carroll, Ed Golden, and Marian Banducci who were pioneers of the national right-to-life 
movement and would be on the front lines of the abortion fight in the 1970s. 
 Perhaps most importantly, the right-to-lifers involved in abortion politics at the 
local and state level were practicing the rhetoric and strategies that would be the 
foundation for the right-to-life movement throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.  They 
privileged local, grassroots action to mobilize support for their movement, organizing 
speakers, debates, and presentations to educate people, and emphasizing the impact 
ordinary Americans could make by opposing abortion. They tested out arguments to see 
what resonated with people, and they persisted in the belief that if Americans only knew 
the truth about abortion, as the right-to-lifers understood it, they would immediately and 
easily come to oppose abortion as well.  
 With these tactics, right-to-lifers in California, Minnesota, and New York, as well 
as in the Catholic Church, successfully turned individual opposition to abortion into 
organized and unrelenting grassroots action. Moreover, many right-to-lifers recognized 
the need to build on this local and state level activism to create a national right-to-life 
movement. In the early 1970s, that recognition would develop into a series of competing 
plans for what tactics to use in national politics and how right-to-lifers across the country 
could overcome their differences to work together. In all of this action and debate, the 
experience in the 1960s remained foundational. The lessons right-to-lifers had learned on 
the ground in their towns, cities, and state legislatures in the late 1960s would shape their 
activism in the 1970s and build the momentum necessary to enact a bold and aggressive 
strategy in state and national politics and to oppose abortion once it was legalized 
nationwide. 
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2.0 Battling it out in the States: The Movement Goes on the Offensive 
 
Introduction 
In April 1971, Michael Taylor, Executive Secretary for the NRLC, described an 
important shift that had taken place within the right-to-life movement in the last year. 
“Last Spring and Summer a consensus emerged from the Right to Life groups,” he 
reported, “that we should go on the offensive, legislatively and otherwise.”139 Heartbeat 
International, an organization promoting alternatives to abortion, was also optimistic 
about this new attitude: “Good people have at last been aroused to counteract the 
destruction and dehumanization of human life. A wave of awakening sweeps across the 
country and beyond its borders.”140 After working to build up right-to-life organizations 
in towns and cities in many states in the late 1960s, activists in the early 1970s met the 
challenges they faced with renewed vigor and passion and more assertively promoted 
their agenda in state politics. They were not going to let abortion rights supporters win 
the repeal of abortion laws without a fight, and they would no longer use only defensive 
strategies to try to stop reform and repeal. Instead, the right-to-life movement developed 
a strong strategy to try to enact its own measures to protect the unborn and to convince 
new people to join the cause.  
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It seemed the pivot in strategy worked. In the next two years, commentators were 
noting a shift in momentum and wondering if perhaps the “tide was turning.”141 As early 
as April 1971, MCCL took account of the progress made that year in several states and 
wondered “Is the Pendulum Swinging?” in favor of the right-to-lifers.142 In December 
1972, the Religious News Service asserted, “The pendulum of support in the nation 
seems to have swung, at least for the present, to the side of those ‘opting for life.’”143 
What was responsible for this changing momentum? Right-to-lifer Joseph Stanton 
credited “the dedicated effort of individuals and small groups” in potentially shifting 
public opinion against abortion, despite the fact that these groups were often out-funded 
and out-organized by the abortion rights movement.144 Americans United for Life (AUL), 
a small national organization that emerged during this time, agreed with Stanton’s 
assessment, “The pro-abortionists have the foundations, we have the people.”145 
According to these observers, grassroots organizing was paving the way for the success 
of the movement in the early 1970s and for its dynamic and more aggressive approach to 
local and state politics.  
Thanks to their earlier work, at the start of 1970 the right-to-lifers had the basic 
apparatus for the movement in place. They did not yet have a strong national 
organization, but organizations in the states had been practicing and developing the 
strategies and rhetoric the movement would use in the early 1970s as it became more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 William F. Buckley, Jr. “Tide May be Slowly Turning Against Abortion,” Ogdensburg Journal 
(Ogdensburg, NY), August 6, 1972, http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org. 
142 MCCL, “Is the Pendulum Swinging?” MCCL Newsletter, April 1971, Box 2 Folder MCCL 1968-1973, 
Katherine Wood Taylor Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN (hereafter cited as Taylor 
Papers). 
143 Religious News Service, “Has Abortion Tide Reversed?” Courier-Journal (Rochester, NY), December 
6, 1972, http://nyshistoricnewspapers.org. 
144 Joseph Stanton to Edward D. Lewis, February 7, 1972, Box 4, Folder 4, Williams Papers. 
145 George Huntston Williams to Friend of the Unborn, Americans United for Life fundraising letter, 
August 10, 1972, Box 5, Folder 4, Williams Papers. 
  66  
assertively involved in state politics and started planning for a national organization. For 
example, in New York, local groups began holding Marches for Life. In Minnesota, 
MCCL continued to argue for positive solutions to abortion such as greater access to 
social services to help pregnant women. And in California, presentations of graphic 
abortion images and fetal development helped right-to-lifers mobilize new recruits into 
their organizations. In this chapter, I will continue tracing this grassroots organizing in 
California, New York, and Minnesota. But rather than examining the organizing efforts 
in each state individually, I will highlight how the pivot to an aggressive strategy took 
place across four main areas—in state politics, in the growth of interstate right-to-life 
networks, in outreach to new demographics, and in innovative framing of the abortion 
issue. 
Starting in 1970, right-to-lifers in many states decided it was time to “get 
political,” as the New York right-to-lifers put it, and boldly promote their legislative 
agenda. Consequently, their focus turned more fully to state politics. In New York, 
Minnesota, and California, right-to-lifers developed and deployed a new range of 
strategies to aggressively combat attempts at abortion reform. Some groups, especially in 
Minnesota and New York, became more aggressive in supporting right-to-life candidates 
and pushing for legislation that would restrict legal abortion to very narrow 
circumstances. These organizations also encouraged their individual members to be more 
involved in local and state politics in the party of their choosing. Some right-to-lifers 
even took to the streets and began using mass demonstrations and direct action to 
promote and push their political agenda. Prioritizing state politics quickly bore fruit, and 
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in New York, right-to-lifers nearly succeeded in repealing the 1970 law that had legalized 
abortion in their state. 
As part of these increased efforts in state politics, right-to-life groups also spent 
more time developing connections with organizations in other states. Activists used these 
connections to continue to build up their political strategy. In the 1960s, right-to-lifers 
had been generally aware of each other’s existence and eager for information on activism 
in other states. But in the early 1970s, right-to-life leaders began meeting at national 
conferences on abortion and also traveling to speak at events in other states. These 
leaders actively shared strategies that worked in their own states and helped each other 
formulate new plans of action. Furthermore, the state leaders began discussing the need 
for a stronger right-to-life presence in national politics. All in all, the movement’s 
political playbook became much more developed and sophisticated in the early 1970s. 
These shifts in strategy would not have been possible without new members, and 
during these years new allies, primarily women and young people, bolstered the cause 
and allowed right-to-life organizations to successfully implement their new political 
strategies. Women had always been a part of the movement but in the early 1970s, they 
began to take on new and more prominent roles in both leadership positions in 
established organizations as well as in starting their own groups. Marjory Mecklenburg 
became president of MCCL, while Rose Polito assumed leadership of the Right to Life 
League of Southern California. Women in New York started their own right-to-life 
groups and sustained local protests. And some women began to argue that pro-life 
feminism was possible and ultimately founded their own organization, Feminists for Life, 
in 1972. In addition to women assuming leadership roles, young people—high school and 
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college students—also became vital parts of right-to-life activism, forming their own 
organizations and bringing new strategies and energy to the movement. Women and 
young people brought a new dynamism to the movement along with innovative ideas for 
activism. 
All of these changes in the movement took place at the same time as a reframing 
of the issue, which situated abortion in a broader societal framework. Abortion was not 
an isolated issue but a symptom of larger problems in society—the most pressing of 
which was the issue of violence and America’s desensitization to it. One way right-to-
lifers chose to combat this decline in values and the desensitization to the violence of 
abortion was through shock tactics such as using graphic images and descriptions of 
abortion. It was a controversial tactic but one that was responsible for mobilizing many 
new recruits in the early 1970s. Another group of activists took the connection of 
abortion to violence in a different direction. These right-to-lifers, some of them pacifists 
and feminists, began clearly connecting abortion to other life issues and especially to the 
violence of the Vietnam War. They developed a view that would eventually be articulated 
most clearly by Joseph Cardinal Bernardin of Chicago in the early 1980s—the consistent 
ethic of life. The connection of abortion to violence and to a society desensitized to 
violence was at the heart of many arguments against abortion during this time. The shift 
in framing helped right-to-lifers justify and sustain their shift to a more aggressive form 
of politics in the states and helped them recruit new members to broaden their base of 
support. 
If the abortion rights supporters had underestimated their opposition before, the 
actions of the right-to-lifers from 1970 to 1972 ended any such assumptions. By 1973, the 
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right-to-life movement was firmly established and, though abortion rights supporters 
tried, it could no longer be characterized as simply an extension of the Catholic Church 
hierarchy. The dynamism of the right-to-life political strategy during these years, their 
attempts to broaden their base of support, as well as their reframing of the abortion issue 
in terms of violence seemed to turn the momentum toward the right-to-lifers. During the 
early 1970s, NARAL even began producing literature specifically on its opposition and 
how to counter it. Yet, despite the pivot in strategy to a more aggressive posture and an 
abortion rights movement now on the defensive, the right-to-lifers would find that it was 
ultimately not enough. Nevertheless, the work they did in this period to broaden their 
membership base, develop a dynamic and diverse strategic repertoire, and turn their 
members into skilled political actors would prove tremendously advantageous following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade in 1973 and as the right-to-lifers built a 
national movement and pursued a pro-life agenda in all three branches of the federal 
government. 
2.1     State Politics: A Dynamic and Aggressive Approach 
State politics had been an important aspect of right-to-life strategy in the 1960s. 
Catholic bishops weighed in on abortion legislation, groups kept track of candidates’ 
voting records, and right-to-lifers spoke at hearings and inundated their legislators with 
letters opposing abortion legislation. Letter writing was an especially easy entry point 
into political activism—constituents could write a letter in their spare time from the 
comfort of their own home. Going into the 1970s, right-to-life organizations across the 
country decided to try something new: to be more active and aggressive in state politics 
and to encourage and train their members to do the same. It was a decisive and self-
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conscious shift but one the right-to-lifers felt was necessary if they were going to be able 
to turn the tide on abortion reform. Now, organizations in states were asking more of 
their members. They were asking them to get involved in candidates’ campaigns, become 
active in state political parties, and even show up at mass demonstrations to take part in 
direct action.  
Looking back on the 1960s, leaders in the movement acknowledged that they 
needed a new path forward. Following a legislative defeat in 1970, Ed Golden and other 
New York right-to-lifers lamented their political naiveté: “That’s when we realized we’d 
been steamrollered. The people who had been conducting the campaign in favor of 
abortion had done their work in the corridors of the Legislature, and we hadn’t. We’d 
been counting on education to win the issue, but now we knew we’d have to roll up our 
sleeves and really become political.”146 Thomas St. Martin, the new president of MCCL, 
also acknowledged that the movement was at “the end of the beginning” and “now 
entering a period of consolidation and growth.”147 That fall, while speaking at a 
conference in California, Marjory Mecklenburg echoed these sentiments, “We will never 
get anywhere solely on the educational front; we must be political.”148  
The right-to-lifers were responding in part to changes they perceived in the 
abortion rights movement. In the early 1970s, the pace of abortion reform accelerated, 
and as noted in Daniel Williams’ book, the terms of the debate on the abortion rights side 
also seemed to change to emphasize the repeal of all antiabortion statutes rather than the 
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reform of state laws. Moreover, many right-to-lifers were most disturbed by the push for 
what they termed “abortion on demand.”149 While some had been supportive of 
exceptions that allowed for abortion in very limited circumstances, most right-to-lifers 
were horrified to think a woman might be able to get an abortion at any time during 
pregnancy for any reason. They called such policies “abortion on demand” or “abortion 
by request.” In the early 1970s, they warned people that this was the ultimate goal of 
reproductive rights’ supporters.150 Legislation in the states during this time confirmed 
their fears. In 1970, the New York legislature passed a liberal abortion law that legalized 
abortion, and women could get an abortion in the state even if they were not residents.151 
Hawaii had passed a similarly liberal bill though it only applied to residents of the 
state.152 California too was considering an even more liberal measure than the 1967 
Therapeutic Abortion Act. The right-to-lifers viewed these changes with dismay, and 
their fight took on a new sense of urgency and determination.  
Their method to enact this shift in strategy remained firmly rooted in grassroots 
action—in the local and state right-to-life organizations that had emerged in the 1960s as 
well as in the many new groups that were being formed across the country. The Catholic 
Church argued that these local lay groups were the most effective and recommended that 	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they be established in every state in order to carry out the “day-to-day campaign” against 
abortion.153 It was a sentiment echoed by many right-to-lifers across the country, and they 
immediately got to work making it a reality. From lobbying, to mass demonstrations, to 
direct action, and to activism at local and state party caucuses, right-to-lifers turned their 
passion for the abortion issue into savvy political activism in the early 1970s rooted in 
local right-to-life groups. After the movement in New York managed to get an 
antiabortion bill through the state legislature, journalist Fred Shapiro noted the 
divergence in strategy between the two sides of the debate. While the abortion rights 
supporters gave money to the cause, “the antiabortionists send campaign workers and 
canvassers.”154  
State politics and state political parties proved prime ground for mobilizing right-
to-life activism. Right-to-lifers tried to gain influence in their state’s party structures, and 
some political parties began to recognize the right-to-lifers as a potential voting bloc. The 
right-to-lifers also worked more intensely to elect pro-life candidates to their state 
legislatures. In New York, right-to-lifers were less focused on specific party affiliation 
and more concerned with where each individual candidate stood on the issue. They 
promised to back any candidate who opposed abortion, regardless of their positions on 
other issues.155 Candidates responded by highlighting their stance on abortion. For 
example, Tom Hanna, a Republican candidate for the New York State Assembly, noted 
that he was “Your Only Right-to-Life Candidate” in a campaign ad that ran in a local 	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paper. The ad featured no other campaign issues aside from abortion.156 Likewise, Harry 
M. O’Brien, a Democratic candidate for New York State Senate, assured voters that he 
was “unilaterally opposed to the present law,” which had made abortion legal, and that he 
supported its repeal.157 And Democratic candidate John E. Cheevers indicated he was 
resolute in his stand on abortion: “My personal conviction as to the value of life, both the 
born and those awaiting birth, transcends the possibility that my stand may cost me the 
election.”158 These candidates acknowledged just how central the abortion issue had 
become in New York politics. 
In California, the state’s political parties tried to woo voters based on the abortion 
issue. An article in Commonweal noted an unexpected episode at a few local Catholic 
churches in the state. In the fall of 1970, parishioners arrived at church to find “a battery 
of voting registrars seated at tables in front of the church.”159 The priest proceeded to 
preach a homily that day during which he asked all parishioners who were registered 
Democrats to switch “their registration to Republican to protest the adoption of an 
‘abortion on demand’ plank” that had been added to the Democratic Party’s platform at 
the recent state convention.160 In the end, it seemed that the whole endeavor had been part 
of the state Republican Party’s attempts to see if abortion could be an issue that would 
allow them to lure Catholic voters away from the Democrats. In fact, the state’s 
Republican Party had sent voter registrars to fourteen Catholic churches that Sunday to 
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see if the tactic might work.161 Already, right-to-lifers were forming a new single-issue 
voting bloc and drawing the attention and interest of some state political parties.  
In Minnesota, MCCL targeted the state’s main political parties starting at the very 
grassroots level. In the 1960s, MCCL’s leaders had made a point to keep records on 
where candidates stood on the abortion issue, though they left the voting and participation 
in party politics up to individual members’ discretion. In an early 1970s’ pivot in 
strategy, MCCL sought to “increase their voice in both the state’s major political 
parties.”162 Its members did this first by targeting local precinct caucuses for the 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL), the state’s Democratic Party, as well as the 
Republican Party. This was the most basic level of party politics in the state. Minnesota’s 
political parties relied on this caucus-convention system to decide their party’s platform, 
make candidate endorsements, and send delegates to the state and national 
conventions.163 The local precinct caucus was where all eligible party voters could attend 
and take part in the process to decide the makeup and platform of the state party. Thus, 
MCCL encouraged all its members to attend their party’s precinct caucuses in hopes of 
electing pro-life delegates to the state convention, proposing pro-life planks for the party 
platforms, and opposing any attempts to include planks that favored legal abortion.  
MCCL succeeded in this shift in strategy by its meticulous approach to local party 
politics. The leadership sent detailed instructions to their members on how local precinct 
caucuses operated as well as regular notices in their newsletter about upcoming 	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caucuses.164 In February 1972, MCCL contacted pro-life leaders across the state, urging 
them to take part in the precinct caucuses of the state’s political parties. Their main goal 
for this round of caucuses was to elect delegates to take part in county and district 
conventions and to stop parties from accepting resolutions that supported legal abortion. 
They believed achieving these goals would “result in a strong pro-life voice being heard 
in both our political parties.”165 The mailing also included detailed step-by-step 
instructions on how to take part in a precinct caucus. MCCL urged its members to 
participate in the caucus of either party and, most importantly, to gather their friends and 
neighbors to do the same. MCCL hoped to reshape the parties from the ground up. The 
precinct caucuses also served as an entry point to get MCCL members further involved in 
right-to-life activism and politics at the local and state levels. 
The efforts of MCCL in the early 1970s set up a battle within the state’s parties 
that would play out over the next decade. Nowhere was it more contentious than in 
Minnesota’s Fifth Congressional District, which covers Minneapolis as well as parts of 
several surrounding suburbs. In this district, MCCL-affiliated right-to-lifers seized the 
opportunity to fight for an antiabortion party platform and influence in the DFL, 
especially as Vietnam became less of a contentious issue within the state’s party in the 
early 1970s and abortion began to take its place.166 The right-to-lifers had enough 
influence in precinct caucuses that abortion featured prominently, alongside Vietnam and 
busing, at the 1972 DFL state convention.167 And though the right-to-lifers were 	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ultimately disappointed with the party platform developed at that convention, it did spur 
them on to further action and to continue fighting to make the DFL a pro-life party. In his 
history on the DFL and right-to-lifers in Minnesota, Christopher Anglim contended, “The 
strongest Pro-life group within a state Democratic Party was being born in small 
meetings throughout the state.”168 The MCCL turn to aggressive involvement in state 
party politics in the early 1970s laid the groundwork for right-to-lifers to organize and 
attempt to influence the party in the decade ahead, and MCCL’s activists were pleased 
with the results. At the end of 1972, Alice Hartle, one of MCCL’s founding members, 
reported, “We have seen our members demonstrate effective participation in professional 
and church organizations and in partisan politics from the precinct caucuses to the 
national convention…Our members have worked in their candidates’ political 
campaigns…We have helped elect an overwhelmingly pro-life Legislature.”169  MCCL’s 
efforts established the organization as a formidable force in state politics in the early 
1970s and gave its members valuable experience in effective political strategy. 
The fight within the state’s political parties was only one of the ways right-to-
lifers pivoted to a more aggressive strategy in state and local politics. In New York, right-
to-life organizations led the way in this shift, thanks in large part to a plethora of smaller 
local groups that were popping up in the state in the early 1970s. When New York Right 
to Life held its first statewide caucus of right-to-life organizations, Ed Golden was 
impressed to find local groups already established across the state. These groups included 
a chapter organized by a college sociology professor in Plattsburgh in upstate New York, 
as well as a group from Brooklyn organized by Marie Bianco in the basement of her 	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home “without any coordination with statewide Right to Life.”170 Members of such local 
groups were now taking concrete steps to be effective political actors and learning what it 
took to get what they wanted in local and state politics. They concerned themselves with 
“practical politics,” as Celebrate Life, a group from Long Island, termed it. Practical 
politics meant encouraging ordinary New Yorkers to take up some sort of activism to 
support right to life politics, whether it was writing a letter, attending a protest, running 
ads in local media, or even visiting their assemblyman and senators every week during 
the 1972 legislative session.171 According to Celebrate Life, right-to-lifers in the 1960s 
were hopelessly naive about the nature of politics.172 In fact, they were a little too nice 
about the whole thing. But in the early 1970s, the right-to-lifers realized the need to get 
tough and to figure out “the pragmatism of politics.”173  
The pivot in strategy led to the development of an aggressive single-issue 
approach to counter abortion reform in New York politics. Ed Golden articulated this 
strategy in an interview with the New York Times in 1972:  
 To our way of thinking, any legislator who doesn’t respect human life and  protect 
 it at all stages…is unfit to sit as a representative, and we would look for a man 
 to replace him, and it didn’t matter to us whether he was Democrat, Republican or 
 independent, or how he voted on any other issues.174  
 
New York right-to-lifers focused solely on the abortion issue, and their only goal was 
repealing the state’s liberal abortion law. They knew the fight to pass the law had been a 
close one and believed that they could reverse it by targeting lawmakers on this one issue 	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and by letting them know it was unacceptable to have any other position on abortion 
besides total opposition. Around the state, local groups focused on the repeal of the state 
law with a single-minded ferocity.175 Ann O’Grady, who had started her own group in the 
Bronx, said, “We do most of our speaking in living rooms but we’ll go wherever they’ll 
have us, and we’ll talk to anybody who’ll listen.”176 In Rochester, the local group ran an 
ad in their Catholic diocesan paper, explaining that they were in the process of working to 
elect officials who would reverse New York’s new abortion law. “This law passed the 
Assembly by one vote,” they explained, “It can be changed by the same margin.”177 In 
Goshen, local right-to-lifers focused all their work on convincing their fellow citizens 
that the law needed to be repealed, planning speaking events, presentations of slideshows 
on abortion, as well as telephone and direct mail campaigns.178 These right-to-lifers were 
willing to do whatever it took, talk with people about abortion in their homes, churches, 
or schools, and take the issue into the streets if need be. 
Local town boards, city councils, and abortion clinics soon became a target for 
these newly political activists. Contentious debate over abortion clinics in local 
communities began during the early 1970s and would become a defining feature through 
the rest of the decade. On Long Island, townspeople showed up at a Huntington Town 
Board meeting and debated a local law to prohibit abortion in the town.179 The local 
right-to-life group had begun pushing for the ordinance in November 1970 after abortion 	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became legal in the state. The right-to-lifers also took the protest to the potential clinic 
site. A group of women showed up at the clinic, which was still under construction, with 
signs to show their opposition to any abortion clinic in their town. The local paper 
described the scene: “Many pushed baby strollers, others held preschoolers by the hand. 
Youngsters and adults alike carried signs with various slogans… ‘No abortion factory in 
this town’… ‘Jesus Loves the Little Children.’”180 The following month, seven hundred 
people turned up at the town board hearing, and the board passed the measure 5-0, 
preventing the clinic from opening.181 Similar protests were taking place in California as 
well, with members of the Right-to-Life League of Southern California showing up to 
picket an abortion clinic in Los Angeles. A few even got into a small scuffle with a 
woman there to show support for the clinic.182 
These smaller protests signaled a turn to more confrontational politics among 
right-to-lifers at the state and local levels. Some right-to-lifers were no longer content to 
simply pursue legislative change by voting, getting involved in party politics, or 
supporting right-to-life candidates. Thus, state groups focused their energy on a new 
political tactic for the movement: direct action involving mass demonstrations, rallies, 
and even nonviolent civil disobedience in a few cases.183 While the letter-writing 
campaigns continued, especially in New York and California, state groups also 
encouraged their members to take even more dramatic steps to fight against abortion. In 	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California, Kenneth Mitzner distributed a handbook to teach right-to-lifers how to 
organize demonstrations and protests in order to make the news and gain publicity for the 
movement.184 Young people from Minnesota’s Save Our Unwanted Life (SOUL) along 
with other young people of the National Youth Pro-life Coalition (NYPLC) burned their 
birth certificates—a tactic drawn directly from the antiwar movement’s burning of draft 
cards.185 This shift in strategy gave the movement its more aggressive and sometimes 
militant tinge during the early 1970s.  
New York right-to-lifers embraced this style of politics wholeheartedly and 
proved especially effective at mass demonstrations and lobbying. Throughout 1970 and 
1971, they sent thousands of people to Albany to protest the new law and to pressure 
legislators to support its repeal.186 In April 1971, hundreds of people converged on 
Albany for a rally coordinated by local right-to-life groups in Long Island as well as 
upstate New York.187 They carried signs reading “Abortion Law Equals Hitler’s Ovens” 
and “100000+ Killed in New York.”188 Another rally a few weeks later drew more than 
two thousand people to the capitol to present petitions signed at a recent Right-to-Life 
Sunday in the state’s Catholic churches.189 Right-to-lifers also held public rallies and 
marches in New York City. In April 1972, they organized a March for Life in New York 
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City they claimed twenty thousand people attended.190 The march was coordinated by a 
variety of local groups—Metropolitan Right to Life, the Long Island Coalition, Hudson 
Valley Right to Life, and Brooklyn Right to Life.191 In Huntington, right-to-lifers 
organized protests at town board meetings and at abortion clinics themselves. Several 
even protested at a lecture by William Baird, a prominent reproductive rights advocate.192 
New York was the perfect place to test these strategies out in the legislative 
process itself, especially given the recent law that had legalized abortion in the state. 
With these new confrontational measures—direct action, intense single-issue 
campaigning in state electoral politics, aggressive lobbying of state legislators, and 
unrelenting local activism—the right-to-lifers came close to repealing the 1970 law. 
Almost immediately after the measure passed that year, they got to work. They targeted 
any legislators who had voted in favor of the law and worked to elect right-to-life 
candidates instead. The New York State Right to Life Committee (NYRTL) recalled, “In 
the political arena, a legislator or candidate for public office had to pronounce respect for 
human life at all stages, despite infirmities, in order to obtain prolife support in the 
November election of 1970. Other issues were ignored.”193 Once a repeal bill was 
introduced in the legislature, called the Donovan-Crawford Act, NYRTL threw its full 
lobbying power behind it, making sure legislators were aware of the right-to-life support 
in the state. The Long Island group, Celebrate Life, put together a lobbying kit that they 
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gave to anyone who visited Albany and urged their members to visit their legislators in 
person.194 Their dogged pursuit of this strategy reaped impressive results. New York’s 
right-to-lifers successfully defeated some candidates who refused to support their 
position, including Democrat George M. Michaels who had cast the decisive vote in 
favor of the 1970 law.195 Republican Vincent R. Balletta, Jr., who had also voted in favor 
of the liberalized law, encountered “Abort Balletta” posters throughout his district and 
also lost his reelection bid.196 Right-to-lifers also made sure “at least one RTL group was 
at the Capitol each working day” during the 1972 legislative session in order to keep on 
the pressure.197 These activists reinforced this lobbying by making sure New Yorkers 
continued writing to their legislators and also by showing up to protests and rallies at the 
capitol in Albany—a physical reminder for the legislators of the right-to-life pressure on 
them. In the end, the Donovan-Crawford Act passed the state legislature though Governor 
Rockefeller immediately vetoed the bill as he had promised to do—a fact that right-to-
lifers would hold against the man for years to come.198 Still, the right-to-lifers celebrated 
their aggressive, single-issue lobbying and the work of many ordinary New Yorkers.  
Indeed, the right-to-lifers saw the defeat as a near miss at a major legislative 
victory, and they recognized the great potential in their defeat—the strength and energy 
they had mobilized in order to come so close to repealing the abortion law. Their work 	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would serve as inspiration for right-to-lifers in other states, and several leaders were even 
invited to speak about their strategies and efforts in the state at the 1972 National Right to 
Life meeting in a panel on legislative strategies.199 For right-to-lifers across the country, 
the success achieved in New York was monumental. Looking back, the NYRTL 
reflected, “The 1972 legislative victory highlighted the grassroots pro life movement in 
the state and will long be remembered as what can be done.”200 They framed the fight as 
the scrappy grassroots pro-lifers facing off against the elites in the state and in the 
abortion rights movement. Despite Rockefeller’s almost immediate veto of the bill, right-
to-life leaders in the state insisted, “We have just begun to fight.”201 
The groups in Minnesota, New York, and California had begun to see the benefits 
of their shift to a more aggressive political strategy in the states. They had turned a 
movement that had been small, mostly focused on education, and politically ineffective 
into a thriving movement built at the grassroots level that engaged in dynamic political 
strategies and had begun to diversify and grow its membership. These were welcome 
changes to the leaders who had started it all in the 1960s. In reflecting on MCCL’s 
activism in the early 1970s, Marjory Mecklenburg praised MCCL and its members, “One 
of the greatest joys of working in the pro-life movement…is the bond that develops with 
your fellow crusaders. The understanding, warmth, and respect that grows between 
conservative and liberal, protestant, catholic, Jew, and agnostic, young and old, rich and 
poor, black and white.”202 For right-to-life leaders, the time was right to start thinking 	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about expanding the movement—by fostering connections with their fellow activists 
across the country, encouraging the participation of new groups of people, and reframing 
and expanding their rhetoric around the abortion issue itself.  
2.2     Building Interstate Right-to-life Networks 
In addition to building up an aggressive and extensive repertoire of political 
strategies in state politics, right-to-lifers also created a stronger network between states, 
paving the way for a national right-to-life movement. Interactions between various state 
groups had taken place sporadically in the mid to late 1960s. Most often, right-to-life 
groups looked for news about what other groups were doing in their respective states. 
The NRLC facilitated this activity, providing state groups with news and information on 
right-to-life activities across the country; however, in the years immediately preceding 
Roe v. Wade, this interstate activity and organizing took on even more importance. For 
example, right-to-lifers began gathering each year at a national conference organized by 
the NRLC. These conferences also provided state groups a place to exchange ideas and 
strategies for creating right-to-life organizations and engaging in politics at the state 
level. In addition, prominent right-to-life leaders, such as Fred Mecklenburg of 
Minnesota and Charles Carroll of California, began traveling out-of-state and speaking to 
allies in other states much more frequently than they had in the 1960s. The increased 
emphasis on interstate cooperation served to tighten the bonds between activists around 
the country, helping state groups mobilize more people, develop new strategies, and 
eventually achieve enough coordination to begin discussing plans to form a national 
right-to-life organization.  
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In 1970, the NRLC held its first national conference in Chicago. Though sparsely 
attended, the conference soon became an important annual tradition for the movement 
and provided right-to-lifers a place to network, meet leaders from other states, and learn 
about various approaches to political activism. The conferences usually featured a 
keynote address by a prominent right-to-life leader as well as smaller panels and seminars 
where right-to-lifers could learn new strategies, view new pro-life films or slideshows, or 
learn about organizations that provided alternatives to abortion. There was also 
considerable discussion of the political situation across the country—updates on 
legislation, court cases, as well as national policy.203 Thus, the conferences covered a 
broad range of topics, reflecting the diverse approaches to abortion among right-to-lifers 
during this time and the scope of strategies they were considering. For example, the 1972 
conference featured a keynote address by Senator James Donovan, who sponsored the 
repeal bill in the New York State legislature, as well as panels on alternatives to abortion, 
pro-life feminism, state organizing strategies, and film presentations.204 At these 
gatherings, conference organizers wanted right-to-lifers to have the opportunity for “in-
depth discussions of organizational methods, fund raising, public relations, legislative 
strategies on state and federal levels, youth organization and high school education.”205 
Part of these conferences was explicitly about building a national network of 
right-to-life organizations. At the 1970 conference, the NRLC put together a directory of 
right-to-life groups that included updates on the legislative situation in each state. NRLC 
told the groups, “It is sent to you so that you will be able to see where there are situations 	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similar to those in your own state, and will be able to contact directly those who are 
involved in the legislative campaign.”206 The conference seminars provided further 
opportunity for fostering connections among right-to-lifers from around the country. 
These seminars often paired together prominent right-to-life leaders, allowing them to 
work together and get to know each other. At the 1972 conference, Paul Andreini of 
MCCL chaired the panel on “Developed Strategies” which also featured Joseph Lampe 
and Marjory Mecklenburg of MCCL as well as Jean Doyle of the Florida State Right to 
Life and Gloria Klein from a Michigan group. Other right-to-life groups and alternatives 
to abortion groups also held national conferences during these years that allowed right-to-
lifers to meet other activists and continue their cooperative approach.207  
As is evident from the conference set-up and their featured panel speakers, the 
conferences encouraged activists and organizations to share their strategies for state 
politics and for building state groups. The 1972 NRLC Conference included seminars on 
“State Organization: Developed Strategies” and “Basic Principles of State Organization.” 
Delegates from MCCL as well as other states were able to explain what worked for their 
organization and how they had built up right-to-life activism in their home states. At the 
same conference, their counterparts from New York, including Ed Golden of the NYRTL 
and Senator James Donovan, led a seminar on “Legislative Strategies: Offensive 
Programs” meant to “outline key elements of the more complex and more difficult 
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offensive legislative program.”208 The conferences promoted these successful groups as 
models to imitate in other places. The NRLC hoped that right-to-lifers could take what 
they learned at these panels and apply it in their own states, perhaps pursuing more 
assertive legislative strategies and implementing new political tactics based on the 
successful models tried out by other state groups.209 
Connections made at the NRLC conventions soon carried over into regional 
action. Following one convention, MCCL proposed convening a regional meeting of 
right-to-lifers in the Midwest and reached out to activists in Minnesota, North and South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Wisconsin. “Conversations with many of you at the 
National Right to Life meeting in Philadelphia revealed an interest in extending the 
cooperation between pro-life groups in our region…We in Minnesota Citizens Concerned 
for Life would be very pleased to initiate and cooperate in such a venture,” Marjory 
Mecklenburg and Joseph Lampe wrote to their fellow Midwesterners in the summer of 
1972.210 They were encouraged by the “overwhelmingly favorable” response to their 
suggestion.211 MCCL asked each state to send five or six delegates to a meeting in 
Minneapolis in December where they could continue sharing ideas and talking over new 
strategies. In the upcoming year, when discussion within the movement turned to forming 
a national organization, MCCL would be a major proponent of this regional approach, 	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believing the NRLC should rely on regions to decide what strategies worked best in their 
part of the country.  
These connections and conversations between right-to-lifers spurred discussion 
about the possibility of a truly independent national organization. The NRLC was doing 
good work but many activists felt that more needed to be done. They were also beginning 
to worry about the NRLC’s overt connection to the Catholic hierarchy. It was still under 
the oversight of the Family Life Bureau of the USCC during this time. In July 1972, 
Marjory Mecklenburg and Joseph Lampe informed Father James McHugh and Michael 
Taylor, who were in charge of the NRLC, of MCCL’s desire for a change in direction at 
the national level. They wrote, “Our conversations with you, with Fred [Mecklenburg] 
and with Right to Life activists in other states have convinced us that some steps toward 
independence should be taken at this time.”212 MCCL’s leaders submitted a plan for a 
national organization in hopes that something might come out of these discussions with 
right-to-lifers in other states. Ed Golden of NYRTL would also take part in the 
discussions about the trajectory toward an independent NRLC. These discussions were 
ongoing throughout 1972, but Roe v. Wade would force the state leaders to make a 
decision and officially sever the NRLC’s ties to the Catholic hierarchy, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. In the meantime, the networks of leaders and state organizations 
built in the early 1970s started to form the foundation for an independent national right-
to-life movement, and it was through these activists’ discussions that the plans for an 
independent NRLC took shape.  
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In addition to the conferences where right-to-lifers gathered to meet each other 
and share ideas, many more right-to-life speakers began traveling around the country, 
offering their wisdom to fellow activists and speaking to local right-to-life groups or 
religious groups. For example, as of December 1971, Fred Mecklenburg had spoken 
about abortion in Washington, Illinois, Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Wisconsin and 
was planning an upcoming trip to Canada.213 Most prominent among these speakers were 
Jack and Barbara Willke of Ohio who traveled the country promoting their new book, 
Handbook on Abortion.214 The book detailed fetal development and the methods of 
abortion through graphic descriptions and photographs. It was quickly becoming the 
premier tool for right-to-lifers in arguing that abortion was murder. Throughout the early 
1970s, the Willkes traveled around the country speaking against abortion and promoting 
their book.215 Many local groups enthusiastically adopted the book and encouraged their 
members to share it with friends and family. The NRLC also made plans to encourage its 
affiliate groups to use the book and distribute it in their local churches, schools, and 
libraries.216 Activists now had a shared handbook to draw on, one that could make the 
rhetoric and strategies more uniform across the movement and strengthen ties between 
right-to-life groups.  	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Right-to-life speakers like the Willkes not only educated people on fetal 
development and abortion, but they also promoted the shift to a more aggressive political 
strategy in their speaking events across the country. In 1971, Marjory Mecklenburg 
traveled to California for the Pro-life California Convention. At one point, as the 
attendees discussed various legislative and judicial activity in the state, Mecklenburg 
jumped in. “I’ve been sitting here getting increasingly more frustrated,” she said, “I must 
speak out. You people have got to organize politically.”217 After detailing the steps 
MCCL had already taken in Minnesota on this front, she reiterated her main point, “We 
will never get anywhere solely on the educational front; we must be political.”218 The 
following year, Father Charles Carroll spoke to the National Youth Pro-life Coalition—a 
new youth pro-life group that was holding its first conference in Washington, D.C., and 
trying out some new political tactics.219 He encouraged the young people to think about 
right-to-life activism in new and dynamic ways and to let their activism extend to other 
life issues as well. As is evident in these examples, the aggressive political shift happened 
on the ground in local and state groups but also spread along these new right-to-life 
networks. 
As right-to-lifers met at national conferences, speakers crisscrossed the country 
speaking to different groups, and leaders developed manuals to train new organizations, 
the movement developed an extensive network of right-to-lifers and sustained an 
interstate dialogue about strategies for activism. The network of right-to-lifers also 	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shaped the trajectory of the movement by accelerating discussions about the need for a 
strong national right-to-life organization. By the end of 1972, it was clear that the NRLC 
would become independent in the near future. The right-to-lifers just needed to decide 
what the newly incorporated organization would look like. The plans for a national 
organization would be further accelerated at the start of 1973 with the Supreme Court 
decision in Roe v. Wade. But the connections formed between state right-to-life groups in 
the early 1970s laid the foundation for the new NRLC, and the network of state leaders 
ultimately hashed out exactly what the movement should look like in a series of 
contentious meetings in 1972 and 1973.  
The right-to-life movement had managed a pivot in strategy and taken more direct 
and decisive action in state politics. Its activists were also building a network of state 
organizations, sharing ideas and strategy for becoming more effective political actors in 
state politics, and encouraging one another to adopt the more aggressive political 
approach. Strategy was important but the movement also needed to sustain this grassroots 
momentum with an enthusiastic and motivated base of support. While a number of 
factors contributed to sustaining and building their base, two factors were particularly 
important for right-to-lifers in the early 1970s. First, the movement garnered more 
support from new segments of the population, especially young people and women. 
Young people, particularly college students, and women not only joined existing groups 
but also started their own right-to-life groups during this time. Second, the movement 
started framing abortion as the most serious symptom of a violent and degenerating 
society. The shifting demographics of this coalition and new framing of the abortion issue 
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ultimately worked in mobilizing more people to take part in right-to-life activism and 
reshaped the movement for years to come.  
2.3     Reaching Young People and Women 
Building networks between state organizations and actively engaging in state 
politics were vital shifts in right-to-life activism in the early 1970s. Yet, the movement 
also benefited from the active engagement of new groups of people to broaden its base of 
support, a major goal of the right-to-life movement during this time. In the 1960s, the 
core activists were often white, middle-aged, usually Catholic men and women, though 
there were some liberal Protestants and Jews involved as well. In addition, the leaders of 
early groups were often male professionals or clergy, such as Dr. Fred Mecklenburg of 
MCCL, Father James McHugh of the NRLC, and the many diocesan priests who 
coordinated right-to-life activity around the country. In the early 1970s, two important 
groups joined the cause in unprecedented numbers: women and young people. Women 
not only formed their own groups, but also took on leadership roles in state and national 
organizations.220 Young people formed right-to-life groups on their college campuses and 
drew inspiration from the antiwar and civil rights movements as they protested legal 
abortion.  
The two groups became vital parts of the right-to-life movement, and Michael 
Taylor of the NRLC praised their addition to the movement, “Everyone agrees that we 
should continue to broaden the base of the Right to Life movement. Over this last year 
we have seen the emergence of such phenomena as Women’s organizations, the Youth 
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Movement.”221  Through the mobilization of these two groups, the movement added new 
dimensions to its strategy and its arguments against abortion. Women and young people 
brought their own distinct strategies and rhetoric, adding complexity and diversity to 
right-to-life activism. These diverse approaches included anti-feminism, pro-life 
feminism, direct action tactics taken from the civil rights and antiwar movements, and a 
fervent religiosity. 
Women had been involved in right-to-life organizing from its inception in the 
1960s. Women like Alice Hartle and Marjory Mecklenburg in Minnesota, Ellen 
McCormack in New York, and the thousands of women who wrote to Senator Beilenson 
in California were pivotal in early efforts to fight against legalized abortion. 
Nevertheless, the right-to-life movement did not always utilize women to their full 
potential. As historian Daniel Williams has noted, as of the late 1960s, “the pro-life 
movement had not elected women to positions of leadership.”222 This would soon change 
as Marjory Mecklenburg became president of MCCL, Rose Polito took over the Right-to-
Life League of Southern California, and countless other women also took on more 
prominent roles in their state groups. And as tension between right-to-life women and 
women in the abortion rights movement emerged, right-to-life activism provided an 
outlet for these women’s political activity apart from the women’s movement.  
Women not only took on leadership roles within existing organizations but also 
started their own groups that became extensively involved in local and state right-to-life 
activity. In New York, Ellen McCormack and a few other women started a group called 
Women for the Unborn, just one example of the many local groups organized by women 	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during the early 1970s. Women for the Unborn was an especially important group, 
fostering activism and awareness of the abortion issue among women in New York. Their 
main strategy was advertising, and they took their work extremely seriously. Their early 
focus was on the New York Times, in which they wanted to run a sort of public relations 
campaign for the unborn.223 McCormack explained that their work was meant to 
challenge common arguments in favor of abortion. She said those in favor of abortion 
used three main tropes to make their case. Abortion rights advocates presented the public 
with two villains—the Catholic Church and the back-alley butcher. These were the first 
two tropes. For the third trope, abortion rights supporters cast the women of America and 
those fighting for the rights of women as the heroes.224 McCormack and Women for the 
Unborn alleged that all three of these tropes were false and must be combatted. In a move 
that would later become familiar nationwide through the work of people like Phyllis 
Schlafly and other anti-ERA activists, McCormack offered an alternative narrative to that 
of the abortion rights movement and the women’s movement.225 Women were not heroes 
because they supported legal abortion but because they defended unborn children. 
Women for the Unborn explicitly challenged the current feminist narratives. And they 
presented their members with concrete steps to take to combat the abortion rights 
narrative, including making contact with local media, planning marches, running 
advertisements, and asking for fair time on radio and television to present the right-to-life 
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case.226 In doing so, Women for the Unborn offered women a way to get involved in 
right-to-life politics and organize to oppose abortion in their local communities. 
Women for the Unborn viewed their work as vital and worked to make their 
voices heard both in the right-to-life movement as well as within the Catholic Church. In 
1972, Diane Arrigan, the president of Women for the Unborn, wrote a letter to Bishop 
Joseph Bernardin of Cincinnati.227 Arrigan detailed how their group challenged the 
narrative offered by women who favored abortion by taking out advertisements in 
newspapers “to be an effective voice for unborn children.”228 At the end of the letter, 
Arrigan asked for a meeting with the bishops in order to inform them of her group’s 
strategies and to encourage the bishops to take further action. The women feared that the 
bishops had been meeting with women to talk about the women’s rights movement but 
were neglecting pro-life women.229 Bishop Bernardin met with the group in the spring of 
1972, and the women held nothing back, making a range of recommendations and 
demands. They told Bernardin that there needed to be a nationwide Right to Life Sunday, 
that on that Sunday there should be a special collection to fund right-to-life activism, and 
insisted that the other bishops needed to be informed about Women for the Unborn. In 
addition, they requested help with fundraising and also urged the bishops to add more 
education on abortion in Catholic schools as well as in CCD and adult education.230 This 
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was not an isolated incident.231 Women were not just a fringe of the movement but were 
making vital contributions and demanding that their work be taken seriously. They 
viewed their activism as central to the right-to-life movement, and they pursued a range 
of initiatives—from running advertisements in newspaper and radio, to lobbying, to 
organizing and attending protests. 
While Women for the Unborn positioned themselves as the direct opposition to 
the abortion rights and women’s rights movements, some women began to connect their 
opposition to abortion to feminism, developing their own pro-life feminism and aligning 
themselves with the broader goals and ideals of the women’s movement. These women 
argued that abortion was only another way for men to exploit women and control 
women’s reproduction. Thus, they believed abortion was actually the antithesis of 
feminism. Pro-life feminists argued that abortion showed that society would only allow 
women to be equal if they conformed to the masculine ideal.232 These new pro-life 
feminists pledged to fight both for the full equality of women as well as for the rights of 
the unborn.233 Ultimately, some of them founded Feminists for Life in 1972, an 
organization that still exists today.  
The arguments of pro-life feminists began to make a broader impact within the 
right-to-life movement. Their arguments were even featured at national conventions and 
were also distributed by some state groups. In an article circulated by MCCL and the 
NRLC, Sidney Callahan argued, “In my feminist view, every abortion represents an 	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abandonment of women and children…The spread of a distinctly masculine type of 
selfishness, aggression and uncommitted sexual freedom has also turned women away 
from children.”234 The 1972 NRLC conference included both a talk by Callahan as well 
as a separate seminar on women’s rights, which featured more discussion of Callahan’s 
talk as well as the women’s rights amendment and the creation of organizations for pro-
life women.235 The pro-life feminist approach also had an impact on activism at the 
grassroots level. Groups like Save Our Unwanted Life (SOUL), an organization for pro-
life college students, echoed their rhetoric about abortion as a sign that society had failed 
women. At one demonstration in 1972, SOUL’s members explained that they protested 
because they did not want women to be “regarded as sex machines to be periodically 
vacuum-cleaned of hated parasites.”236  
The addition of pro-life feminism to the right-to-life repertoire was vastly 
important, especially when considered alongside the simultaneous involvement of women 
who were wary of or opposed to the feminist movement. Both approaches helped broaden 
the base of the movement and offer women another avenue of involvement in right-to-life 
activism. They also showed that there was room for opposing viewpoints in the broader 
movement at this time. Sidney Callahan, pro-life feminist, could be just as involved as 
Ellen McCormack, who was wary of feminism. In the early 1970s, the movement was no 
monolith but rather a mass of divergent strategies, rhetoric, and approaches to the 
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abortion issue. And women continued to be a vital pillar of right-to-life activism both 
within state and national organizations as well as in their local communities. 
Young people proved to be another important source of dynamic energy and 
political activism for the movement during these years. Across the country, right-to-life 
groups formed at high schools and colleges. In some ways, this change was the byproduct 
of legwork done by right-to-lifers in the 1960s, who had often sent speakers to give 
educational presentations on the abortion issue to high school students and college 
campus groups. One of the most important youth groups was Save Our Unwanted Life 
(SOUL), which started at the University of Minnesota in 1971. SOUL would rise to 
national prominence, in a similar way as MCCL, and would help found the National 
Youth Pro-life Coalition (NYPLC). SOUL’s members focused on educating their fellow 
college students on abortion and mobilizing them into right-to-life politics. They also 
started affiliate groups in other states, such as right-to-life youth groups in the Rochester 
area in New York.237 College students and high school students in California could join 
Youth for Life, an organization similar to SOUL and also an affiliate of the NYPLC.238 
The young right-to-lifers were persistent in reaching out to their fellow young people, 
even if it meant spending their summers passing out pro-life literature at rock festivals or 
manning booths at local fairs.239 
In many ways, the political activities of these young right-to-lifers drew on the 
antiwar, civil rights, and women’s rights movements. They incorporated elements of 
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nonviolent direct action and mass protests and also highlighted the work of people 
involved in those various movements. For example, during their Life Days program at the 
University of Minnesota in 1971, SOUL included Bud Philbrook on a panel on 
alternatives to abortion. The first line of his credentials: Conscientious Objector.240 
SOUL’s members also engaged in various acts of protest, such as counter-picketing 
women’s liberation protesters in December 1971 and organizing large rallies including 
one of over four hundred people at the state capitol in May 1972.241 Moreover, the young 
people started making connections between abortion and war, feminism, and other 
causes. For young right-to-lifers, all these issues went hand-in-hand. For instance, SOUL 
mimicked the language of pro-life feminists.242 And during their Life Days program in 
1971, the group highlighted “positive alternatives to abortion” as well as “The 
Consistency of Respecting all Life.”243 At a fair for teenagers in April 1972, Youth for 
Life even set up a booth connecting abortion to environmental issues: “Attached to the 
colorful background were pictures of living babies in utero and healthy living animals as 
well as animals killed by environmental and human contamination and babies killed by 
abortion.”244 In linking a variety of issues to abortion, these young right-to-lifers were 
pioneers for what would later become the consistent ethic approach to the abortion issue. 
Pro-life youth groups for high school students also formed during this time in 
both California and New York. These groups mostly worked within their own schools, 	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educating fellow classmates on abortion. In New York, groups organized in Catholic high 
schools. One group, for example, focused on encouraging Catholic spirituality, and it 
argued that opposition to abortion was a central pillar to one’s Catholic spirituality and 
identity. The students called themselves the Students for Prevention of Abortion (SFPA) 
and had formed in response to their bishop’s call for the involvement of young people in 
the right-to-life movement in New York. Their main activities involved prayer and 
penance for the sins of abortion.245 Students also raised money and used it to purchase 
copies of the Handbook on Abortion, send a donation to Women for the Unborn, and 
offer mass once a month for the repeal of the state’s abortion law. Here, young people 
were trained to connect abortion to their spiritual practice and also learned important 
lessons about political activism and abortion in state politics. In California, high schools 
students could join the ranks of Youth for Life and also took part in letter-writing 
campaigns to their state legislators. Several reminded Senator Beilenson that they were 
“future voters.”246 All these activities initiated young people into political activism in 
their schools, local communities, and states. 
The work of SOUL and other pro-life youth groups across the country culminated 
in the formation of the NYPLC and an annual national youth conference called 
Thanksgiving for Life. These conferences further educated young people on abortion and 
right-to-life politics and urged them to take action in their hometowns and home states. 
NYPLC held their first conference in Chicago in 1971. The theme of the conference was 
“Educate to Action,” and the young people in attendance were encouraged to “return to 
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their youth groups and implement the programs and to proclaim to the country that there 
is no human life not worth living.”247 These conferences would be an important gathering 
place for young pro-lifers, and the movement, in turn, recognized the vital role the 
NYPLC could play in mobilizing young people and opposing abortion. In 1972, the rally 
featured Richard Neuhaus and Charles Carroll, who spoke against abortion, racism, 
euthanasia, and the Vietnam War.248 At this conference, these young right-to-lifers would 
also draw on direct action tactics from the antiwar movement of the 1960s. Instead of 
burning draft cards, though, they burned their birth certificates in a symbolic protest of 
the evils of abortion.249 In 1973, George Huntston Williams of the national group AUL 
spoke at that year’s conference and emphasized the central role young people could play 
in the right-to-life movement. He told the young people in attendance, “In these crucial 
hours for mankind, let each of us be unafraid and unfailing in this noble and historic 
effort to restore in this land the right to continuing life of every human life, born and 
unborn.”250 In the upcoming years, NYPLC and SOUL would educate and mobilize 
young people into the movement, reaching countless college and high school students 
and encouraging dynamic direct action and political activism on behalf of the unborn.  
Without mobilizing these new populations, the right-to-life movement might not 
have had the same success it did in the early 1970s. Women and young people brought 
new ideas and energy to the movement and offered new avenues for people to get 
involved in politics. Women especially accomplished much of the political work in the 	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movement, working as lobbyists, running advertisements, and showing up for protests. 
Young people helped connect the movement to the civil rights, antiwar, and feminist 
movements, appropriating direct action tactics and rhetoric as well as recruiting new 
members. Furthermore, the work of both these demographics enriched right-to-life 
activism and enabled the shift to a more aggressive approach to state politics as well as 
adding their own new approaches. In mobilizing a broader right-to-life base, young 
people and women provided the grassroots support necessary to sustain the movement. 
They recruited new right-to-lifers and created a new generation of activists. 
Consequently, right-to-life organizations were no longer just for clergy or professionals 
but also for ordinary high school students, college students, and women who were 
approaching right-to-life activism in new, dynamic ways. 
2.4     Reframing the Issue: Abortion and Violence in a Declining Society 
While activists in state and local groups took quick action to mobilize new 
populations and turn the tide in state legislatures and political parties, there was also a 
broader reframing of the abortion issue taking place within the movement. This strategic 
reframing defined abortion in terms of violence—the violence plaguing society, the 
decline of societal values, and the desensitization of people to both these things. To right-
to-lifers, abortion was the ultimate expression of this societal decline into violence. In 
1971, MCCL itself indicted what it saw as a “pervasive climate of violence” in the United 
States.251 Young people at the “Thanksgiving for Life” also noted this violence and 
argued that America was “a society that promotes peace and justice while tolerating the 
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violence of destroying the unborn child in the womb.”252 Others lamented that Americans 
had forgotten their core values, both religious and political.253 Many right-to-lifers 
believed that because of this pervasive violence, Americans had been desensitized to 
violence itself, and this desensitization helped explain their ready acceptance of abortion, 
or so right-to-lifers argued.  
The shift in the framing of the issue had a huge impact and enabled the turn 
toward an aggressive strategy in politics as well as in mobilizing new recruits. The 
reframing of rhetoric, and, in turn, strategy had two main parts. First, right-to-lifers began 
using graphic photographs and descriptions of fetal development and of the abortion 
procedure itself. Daniel Williams has described this “escalation” extensively and notes 
that in the early 1970s, thanks in large part to books such as the Handbook on Abortion, 
the movement started to emphasize the graphic nature of abortion and use pictures of 
fetal development and abortion in their publications and protests.254 The second part of 
the shift was the connection made between abortion and the Vietnam War. These right-
to-lifers argued that if a person opposed the Vietnam War they also must oppose abortion 
and vice versa. Both involved horrible acts of violence that destroyed innocent life. In 
both cases, the root of the issue was violence and American society’s seemingly easy 
toleration of it. In the early 1970s, right-to-lifers decided to attack the problem of 
violence and abortion, and this major shift in rhetoric fit in perfectly with their more 
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aggressive political strategy during these years—a provocative and in-your-face approach 
to shock and offend people enough that they might come to oppose legal abortion.  
The use of graphic images and descriptions was meant to evoke the humanity of 
the fetus and to convince people that abortion at any point of pregnancy was murder. 
Right-to-lifers hoped to wake people up from their desensitization to violence by 
shocking them with images of the violence and horrors of abortion.255 Right-to-lifers had 
employed such shock tactics in the 1960s though only to a limited extent, such as when 
Dr. McKelvey brought the preserved fetus to the legislative hearing on abortion in 
Minnesota. But, for the most part, right-to-lifers stuck to arguments based on rights, the 
Bible, or warnings that abortion was one step removed from America becoming the next 
Nazi Germany. In the early 1970s, however, the use of graphic images and language 
became much more prolific at all levels of the movement. One of the clearest examples of 
this shift was the popularity of Jack and Barbara Willke’s new book Handbook on 
Abortion.256 The Willkes’ book aimed to give people a clear explanation of abortion and 
fetal development, including sections on when life begins and methods of abortion.257 
Nationwide, the book became extremely popular among right-to-lifers and was promoted 
by the NRLC, many state right-to-life groups, and in the Willkes’ many speaking events 
across the country.  
Shock tactics and the use of graphic images and descriptions began to appear in 
all areas of the movement, from the grassroots to the national level and in major 
publications as well as in local protests. Writers described abortion as a “ghastly and 
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murderous crime.”258 They related stories of experimentation on live fetuses or what they 
saw as the inhumane disposal of fetal remains.259 Others played on tropes such as 
comparing abortion to Nazi Germany, reminding people of “the anti life smoke now 
rising from chimnies [sic] in hospitals in several states in our land of the free. It rises 
from the incinerated remains of thousands of embryonic Americans.”260 The New York 
bishops spoke out against their state’s abortion law, charging that “some…have been 
heard to cry as they were dropped into surgical trash cans.”261  One source circulated in 
California was entitled “How a Child is Aborted” and included such details as “The child 
inside is cut into pieces and pulled or scooped out limb by limb” and “At about five 
months, or shortly after, the child is capable of making feeble cries. They make them 
when they’re being destroyed sometimes.”262 Right-to-lifers not only used graphic 
images and descriptions in their literature but also in their protests. Graphic displays 
turned up in a storefront display in Seneca, New York, courtesy of the Finger Lakes 
Right to Life Committee, which set off a flurry of debate in the local newspaper.263 And 
in one memorable protest, members of Celebrate Life, the Long Island Right to Life 
Committee, and Women for the Unborn showed up at William Baird’s lecture on birth 
control and abortion. Eugene McCabe, a local father, attended the lecture “dressed in a 
death mask and black shroud” with a sign that read “Abortion is Murder.” During the 
lecture, he “occasionally squeezed the stomach of a doll he held on his lap. The toy cried 	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out ‘Mama.’” Towards the end of the lecture, McCabe slowly dismembered the doll. 
Another woman, Mary Jane Tobin, brought three jars with her that she claimed held the 
remains of “aborted babies” to give to Baird, which she did during the lecture to the great 
consternation of many in the audience.264 Clearly, using shock tactics was no longer 
taboo but rather a favored strategy at all levels of the movement. 
While these tactics angered many opponents, they proved effective on the ground. 
In interviews of right-to-lifers in California, conducted by sociologist Kristin Luker in the 
1980s, several activists described how they became involved in right-to-life activism in 
the early 1970s only after seeing slideshows or presentations on fetal development and 
abortion, often in their local churches. One activist recalled attending a pro-life 
presentation at her church in 1972, “when I saw those slides, that was it…I knew I had to 
get involved. It just convinced me that I couldn’t be apathetic.”265 Likewise, another 
activist remembered attending lectures on abortion methods: “I heard doctors speaking on 
all methods, and I hadn’t known the methods and that they were painful methods.”266 The 
lasting impact of the Handbook on Abortion is also indicative of the success of shock 
tactics. Right-to-lifers rushed to purchase it, distribute it to local libraries, and relied on it 
for years to come. According to Daniel Williams, “by 1972, [the Willkes] were speaking 
to a combined total of 70,000 people a year and giving 150 radio and television 
interviews.”267 To improve their effectiveness, the use of images and presentations on 
abortion was often tied to calls for political action. For example, in August 1971, Eleanor 
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Tener, a leader of the local group Long Island Right to Life, traveled to upstate New 
York to present slides showing “fetal development and the results of abortion.”268 She 
ended her speech calling on local right-to-lifers to “wage a terrible fight” against New 
York’s abortion law. The use of graphic images and graphic descriptions of abortion 
might have seemed tasteless to opponents, but right-to-lifers loved them. They felt the 
presentations and publications on abortion methods and fetal development showed the 
human cost of abortion. And they believed that confronting people in this way was the 
most effective means to mobilize people and turn them into right-to-life activists.  
The impact of the shock tactics was also evident in constituent letters as graphic 
images and descriptions and the rhetoric of violence began appearing in the many right-
to-life letters sent to politicians. While the letters to Senator Beilenson in the late 1960s 
had characterized abortion as murder, only a few referenced graphic descriptions of 
abortion. By the early 1970s, letters routinely referenced these things. Dale Berven of 
Pleasanton, California, relayed the impact of fetal images on her own opinion: “I read 
Lennart Nilsson’s photographic work A Child is Born and couldn’t help but feel that 
human life is present from the moment of conception.”269 Vivienne Devlin of Santa 
Barbara sent Beilenson a copy of the graphic article “How a Child is Aborted.”270 Ann 
Bilpusch of Buena Park also sent an article describing the grisly details of abortion: 
“Sometimes it manages a pathetic cry like a kitten; then after a few minutes it dies an 
asphyxial death and lies coldly in a stainless steel bowl.”271 Reverend Ira Howden, a 
Baptist minister from Martinez, California, called abortion the “wholesale and mass 	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slaughter of innocent little lives.”272 Still another letter expressed horror at the supposed 
plan of an abortion clinic in London “to sell live fetuses.”273 For right-to-lifers, the 
rhetoric and images they received from the right-to-life movement were not just stories or 
photographs but real events and real children. For them, it further proved that abortion 
killed an innocent person, that abortion was the most egregious form of murder, and that 
society did not care. 
For other right-to-lifers, the issue of abortion and violence resonated only when 
they connected abortion with other “life issues,” as they called them. These activists 
invoked the Vietnam War and abortion as the most compelling current examples of the 
violence plaguing society. People like Gordon Zahn, Sidney Callahan, and the young 
people of SOUL and the NYPLC wondered how right-to-lifers could oppose abortion yet 
ignore the killings in Vietnam. This connection between abortion, violence, and other life 
issues was the very start of what would become the consistent ethic of life, articulated 
most forcefully by Bishop Joseph Bernardin and others in the early 1980s. And though 
the activists in the early 1970s were not yet using the language of the consistent ethic of 
life, they were formulating and articulating its main tenets—that calling oneself pro-life 
entailed concern for a broad range of life issues, from abortion to capital punishment to 
war. Father Charles Carroll, an Episcopal priest, summed up this early view of the 
consistent ethic in a speech at a conference on alternatives to abortion. He wondered, 
“Can we be involved in the abortion debate if we’re not involved in the debate for civil 
rights throughout the world, if we’re not involved in the struggle for social justice among 
men? Can we be selective in our witness and choose to witness in here but deny out 	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there?”274 These right-to-lifers were beginning to understand that their opposition to 
abortion was inseparable from these other issues. Gordon Zahn articulated the antiwar, 
pro-life position most forcefully. In an article for Commonweal, he argued: 
 In the past, I have criticized ‘establishment’ Christians…for their 
 hypersensitivity to the evil of killing the unborn and their almost total 
 disregard of the evil of ‘post-natal’ abortion in the form of the wholesale
 destruction of human  life in war. The argument works both ways and with 
 equal force: those of us who oppose war cannot be any less concerned about the 
 destruction of life in the womb.275 
 
The violence of war and the violence of abortion were inseparable. Both involved the 
destruction of innocent human life and, therefore, right-to-lifers had to oppose both. 
Vietnam loomed especially large in their imaginations in these years. It was a 
refrain critics of right-to-lifers had already picked up. If right-to-lifers opposed abortion, 
why did they not also oppose the war in Vietnam? Some right-to-lifers began to ask the 
same question, connecting the violence they saw and opposed in abortion to the violence 
of the conflict in Vietnam. Some of these activists had been opposed to the war in 
Vietnam all along and found their way into the right-to-life movement following their 
activism in the antiwar movement.276 To them, their opposition to the war led directly and 
logically to their involvement in right-to-life activism. In a critique of abortion combining 
feminism, right-to-life activism, and a critique of the war, Sidney Callahan’s asserted that 
the current iteration of feminism only meant that women would “be able to shoot babies 
and napalm civilians.”277 William Hunt asked, “How can you oppose the war in Vietnam 
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and be non-committal or permissive about such evident violence right here at home?”278 
The national group, Americans United for Life, also compared abortion to violence 
against Vietnamese children: “A baby destroyed by salt solution injected into the womb 
is burned to death just as surely as a Vietnamese infant destroyed by napalm dumped 
onto his home.”279 Many constituent letters compared the killing in Vietnam to the act of 
abortion. The killing in Vietnam was bad, but the violence of abortion was “10x 
worse…because it is on the most innocent life in the world.”280 The subject also featured 
prominently at the NYPLC’s rally in 1972 where Richard Neuhaus, a founder of Clergy 
and Laity Concerned about Vietnam, noted the similarities between the Vietnam War and 
abortion, and Charles Carroll criticized President Nixon who he said, “rightly reverences 
life in the womb, but not in Vietnam.”281 The violence of the Vietnam War and the 
violence of abortion were the same in these right-to-lifers’ minds and reflected troubling 
societal attitudes about violence. Most importantly, both demanded action and active 
opposition from Americans.  
For both the right-to-lifers using graphic images and those developing a consistent 
ethic of life, the easy acceptance of abortion was related to a decline of morality in 
society as a whole. Right-to-lifers painted a dismal picture of the state of the world. John 
Falls, an Episcopalian doctor from Minnesota, argued, “The society which encourages 
optional destruction of its offspring is not liberal, progressive or enlightened. It is instead 
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hedonistic, self-centered and sick.”282 Still for others, the violence of abortion signaled a 
darker, more apocalyptic turn. MCCL laid out this position in their newsletter in 
September 1971:  
 Daily, we are confronted by the obvious physical violence of war, racial 
 discrimination, police repression, and hooliganism, and there is the less 
 obvious, but equally real, violence of mass propaganda, psychological 
 manipulation, bureaucratic regimentation, economic exploitation, and social or 
 economic competition. Tragically, however, many people cannot,  or will not, 
 admit the obvious kinship between abortion and these other manifestations of 
 dehumanizing violence.283  
 
Abortion was the most serious symptom of a larger problem, that of “dehumanizing 
violence” in society and people’s desensitization to it. In a sermon at a local Episcopal 
church in 1971, Thomas St. Martin, the president of MCCL, also argued that abortion 
signified the degradation of society and its violent turn. He told the congregation, “The 
welfare of society is an issue because of the social deterioration which is likely to occur 
when human life is cheapened. Abortion is a violent and ugly practice which, like war, 
tramples on civilized sensibilities.”284 Explaining abortion in such terms made the fight 
against abortion take on a new importance. Right-to-lifers fought to save babies but also 
to save society from its own violence. Abortion was not just a legal or legislative matter 
but also an issue of reshaping the foundational values of American society.  
Though they approached the issue in a variety of ways, in the early 1970s right-
to-lifers hewed to the common theme of abortion as a violent and gruesome act—one that 
showed that there were serious issues at the core of American society. Whether they 
approached the issue from the point of view of pro-life feminism, pacifism, liberal human 
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rights, or the recognition of the graphic methods of abortion, right-to-lifers agreed that 
violence and the desensitization to it were some of the foundational issues in the trend 
toward legalizing abortion. Despite their varied arguments against abortion, what 
mattered most to right-to-lifers was one’s commitment to the belief that abortion was 
murder and the willingness to take action in the local community or state to stop it. 
Articulating their arguments in such a way might have angered and disturbed their 
opponents but it paid off for the right-to-lifers. It convinced a variety of people to join the 
movement, helping to broaden their base of support. And it gave the right-to-lifers new 
strategies and rhetoric that provided a foundation upon which to build and strengthened 
their aggressive strategies in state politics.  
Conclusion 
By the early 1970s, the right-to-life movement seemed to be moving in a positive 
direction. Right-to-lifers had lost the fight in New York and in a few other states but the 
narrow losses only bolstered their resolve to keep fighting abortion. In all of this, the 
right-to-lifers had managed to build a dynamic and diverse movement on the ground in a 
number of states. At its core, this movement was about grassroots action, mobilizing 
individuals to join organizations and fight against abortion in their towns, cities, and 
states. The abortion issue and the dynamic grassroots activism of the movement 
resonated with all sorts of people—women, college students, high school students, 
lawyers, doctors, and professionals, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. Many of them 
worked out of their own homes to develop political strategies and to encourage their 
friends and neighbors to take action. Instead of low-cost and low-risk activism, such as 
the letter-writing campaigns of the 1960s, right-to-lifers now fully engaged in political 
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activism in state politics. They lobbied their state legislatures, worked on candidates’ 
campaigns, showed up at mass demonstrations, protested at town board meetings, ran 
graphic advertisements on abortion, and burned their birth certificates.  
Thus, when the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, the movement was 
primed for action, having already mobilized ordinary Americans, turned them into savvy 
political operatives, and developed an arsenal of strategies to use to fight legalized 
abortion. Right-to-lifers had also articulated a worldview that placed violence and 
abortion at the center of the societal decline they believed America was experiencing. 
Building on the strategies they had developed on the ground fighting abortion in the 
states as well as on the network they had built of experienced activists across the country, 
right-to-lifers were ready to respond quickly and decisively to fight legalized abortion at 
the national level. They were also ready to mobilize the new energy unleashed after Roe 
v. Wade.  
The aggressive pivot in strategy did not succeed in the short term, but it paved the 
way for a quick and aggressive response in the immediate wake of Roe v. Wade. The 
most important step here was the decision to make the NRLC fully independent of the 
Catholic Church. This transition was facilitated by the discussions that had already been 
going on among state groups as well as the energetic base of support these organizations 
had built in their home states, a base that they had mobilized and educated to be bold 
political actors. By 1972, MCCL boasted several thousand members. New York Right to 
Life had somewhere between fifty and seventy affiliated right-to-life groups across the 
state.285 In the wake of Roe, many more would join and be influenced by those who had 	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already spent the 1960s and early part of the 1970s opposing abortion. The New York 
right-to-lifers were right in their 1973 assessment of the movement.286 They had only just 
begun to fight.  
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3.0     Black Monday: The Right-to-Life Movement and the Aftermath of  
Roe v. Wade 
 
Introduction 
Near the end of 1972, Dr. Robert Koshnick sent a dire warning to Lawrence 
Lader, the president of NARAL, about right-to-life activism in Minnesota. As the 
Supreme Court considered several cases related to abortion, Koshnick carefully observed 
MCCL, and he did not like what he saw. He warned Lader: “The opposition here has 
indicated: 1) it expects an unfavorable ruling from the Supreme Court; 2) it is planning an 
allout [sic] push for a Constitutional Amendment to achieve their goals.”287 Though it 
was just a small aside in a letter otherwise devoted to NARAL’s work in Minnesota and 
North Dakota, Koshnick’s words were a prescient and ominous warning. The right-to-
lifers thought the Supreme Court would rule against them and legalize abortion. This 
should have been good news for NARAL, but, as Koshnick indicated, the right-to-lifers 
did not plan on accepting the ruling. Instead, they were already gearing up for an all-out 
assault on legal abortion.  
In 1973, Koshnick’s prediction proved correct. On January 22, 1973, the Supreme 
Court handed down two decisions that legalized abortion nationwide—Roe v. Wade and 
Doe v. Bolton. Though the scope of the decisions shocked some right-to-lifers, many 
others had been aware of the possibility that abortion might become legal in all fifty 
states, given the changes in public opinion on abortion since the 1960s and several 
pending federal court cases. And, just as Koshnick had warned, state leaders like Marjory 	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Mecklenburg and Alice Hartle of Minnesota and Ed Golden of New York had planned 
for this contingency, anticipating that a major legislative or judicial decision might come 
down against them. Thus, while the Supreme Court’s decision took some right-to-lifers 
by surprise, for others in the movement, it was no surprise at all.  Thanks to their 
planning in 1971 and 1972, right-to-lifers quickly overcame their shock and dismay at the 
Court’s decision and resumed their fight against abortion, orienting their message more 
strongly toward all Americans and reorienting strategies they had developed for state 
politics toward the national political scene.  
In this chapter, I will explain how the movement prepared for the possibility of 
legal abortion nationwide in the year before Roe v. Wade, reacted to the Supreme Court 
decisions in 1973, and tumultuously transformed into a national political crusade 
throughout that year and into early 1974. In 1972, some state leaders had begun 
discussing plans to form their own national right-to-life organization, and they hoped to 
make the NRLC fully independent of the Catholic Church. Right-to-lifers had already 
developed an effective and aggressive strategy at the local and state levels, and now the 
movement’s leaders thought they could accomplish even more in national politics. Some 
also believed the movement should be preparing in case abortion became legal 
nationwide. Thanks to these efforts in the early 1970s, right-to-lifers were in good shape 
to respond to Roe v. Wade and to begin to reorient their aggressive state and local 
approaches to the national arena. And they were able to do so quickly, thanks largely to 
the grassroots energy of the movement and to talented and experienced state leaders like 
the Mecklenburgs, Alice Hartle, Ed Golden and others. By the end of 1973, the 
movement had a national organization—the newly independent NRLC—and a plan in 
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place for achieving their ultimate goal: a human life amendment that would reverse Roe 
v. Wade. Right-to-lifers accomplished all this even as they continued to expand their 
activities in their local towns and states.  
Despite this intense activity in the states both before and after Roe, the literature 
has too often focused solely on the idea of backlash to Roe v. Wade as the impetus for the 
right-to-life movement of the 1970s and 1980s. Along with the narrative of backlash to 
Roe, many scholars have also privileged the idea of a more generalized conservative 
backlash at the heart of their narratives of both the right-to-life movement and the 
Religious Right. Scholars like Kristin Luker and Robert O. Self have argued that right-to-
lifers were reacting against the new ideas of the sexual revolution and the women’s 
movement, whether it was defending idealized notions of motherhood or of the 
traditional family. Either way, these arguments contend that Roe woke American 
conservatives up and spurred them to political action.288 Conservative evangelical leaders 
themselves tell a similar origin story—their horror at legalized abortion caused them to 
become involved in political activism for the very first time.289 Moreover, these 
narratives suggest some sort of unified conservative backlash to Roe v. Wade, presenting 
the movement as if it were a conservative monolith.290 However, conservative backlash to 
Roe v. Wade helps explain only one small aspect of the movement in the wake of the 
Supreme Court decisions.  
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First, the conservative backlash narrative does not fit because, as I have shown in 
the previous two chapters, the movement was already on firm footing by the end of 1972, 
with many of its most enduring strategies and rhetoric already in place. More specifically, 
in the two years leading up to Roe v. Wade, right-to-lifers were anticipating the 
legalization of abortion in all fifty states and preparing strategies should they need to 
combat legal abortion nationwide. Certainly some right-to-lifers were reacting against the 
excesses they perceived in the sexual revolution of the 1960s and among abortion rights 
supporters—they had been doing so since the end of the 1960s. But Roe itself was not the 
impetus for the movement’s political awakening; rather it simply served to accelerate the 
plans for a national strategy that right-to-lifers had already been considering. In the early 
1970s, state leaders not only crafted a strong political strategy but were also planning 
how they might implement that strategy and push a pro-life agenda at the national level. 
The clearest examples of this early pivot to a nationwide strategy were the formation of 
an independent NRLC and the decision to pursue a human life amendment. As early as 
1970, right-to-lifers in the states were lobbying for an independent NRLC, one that was 
not a subdivision of the Catholic Church’s Family Life Bureau, and was not funded 
entirely by the Catholic Church, and by the end of 1972, the official decision had been 
made to reorganize the NRLC within a matter of months. Right-to-lifers were also 
discussing the idea of pursuing a human life amendment in the years before Roe, and this 
strategy quickly became their prime focus in 1973.   
Second, in the wake of Roe v. Wade, there was no unified conservative backlash 
because the right-to-life movement itself was in no way unified. This was no monolithic 
movement but one made up of religiously and politically diverse people who agreed that 
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abortion was wrong but disagreed on almost everything else. In fact, in 1973 and 1974, 
latent tension between Protestants and Catholics in the movement erupted into a 
sometimes vicious fight between Catholic and Protestant leaders of the movement, many 
of whom were now in leadership positions in the new NRLC. Liberal Protestant activists 
fought with the Catholic hierarchy, while Catholics defended their role in right-to-life 
politics. NRLC’s leaders could not agree on the image, organization, and strategy of the 
movement. In addition, the right-to-lifers could not even convince evangelical Christians, 
who would later be some of their most stalwart conservative allies, to join the movement, 
despite a determined outreach campaign targeting evangelicals in 1973 and 1974. When 
we look closely at the inner workings of the right-to-life movement in the aftermath of 
Roe v. Wade, the conservative backlash narrative breaks down. Different factions of 
right-to-lifers barely agreed with or even tolerated one another, and the NRLC was failing 
to bring conservative allies into the fold. 
In spite of the disarray in the new NRLC, the movement at the state and local 
level persisted, and this grassroots energy and mobilization sustained and propelled the 
movement in the wake of Roe. Led by state groups and leaders who had honed their 
strategies in their states and local communities, the movement now shifted gears. State 
leaders reoriented their approach and capitalized on the grassroots energy they had built 
in the early 1970s. They also used the new momentum after Roe v. Wade to get people on 
the ground excited about new national strategies in right-to-life politics. Because they had 
a network of state groups in place, had trained and experienced state leaders and local 
activists, and had practiced a wide range of strategies at the local and state levels, right-
to-lifers were able to pivot easily to the national arena and connect the grassroots work 
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being done in the states to the bigger picture, encouraging and empowering local activists 
to stay committed to the movement and engaged in local and state politics. 
3.1 Developing a National Strategy Before Roe v. Wade 
As 1972 progressed, right-to-life leaders lauded achievements in their states and 
towns and dreamed of what they could accomplish in the upcoming years.291 They had a 
lot to be happy about. State groups continued to grow and were proving quite effective in 
state politics. National right-to-life conferences were attracting more attention and 
building stronger networks of activists across the country. New groups of people were 
becoming interested in joining the movement. Nevertheless, even as the leaders 
celebrated their progress in the states, they also began to consider what the movement 
might accomplish with a unified, nationwide strategy and to plan for various 
contingencies should their efforts fail in the states. Some sensed that public opinion was 
turning against them and might affect court cases or legislation in the future. Others 
wondered if they should start pursuing a human life amendment to be added to the 
Constitution to keep abortion illegal, a tactic that could settle the debate once and for all. 
Still others argued that the best path forward was a stronger national right-to-life 
organization that was actively engaged in promoting the movement’s agenda in national 
politics. The significance of this foresight and planning among the national leadership 
and state groups in the years preceding Roe is that it laid the groundwork for a quick and 
decisive pivot to a unified national strategy after the Supreme Court’s decision in January 
1973. Thus, while Roe initially shocked much of the general public, the core leadership 	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quickly set out to enact the plans they already had in place for this exact contingency and 
focus grassroots energy on their new strategies for national politics.  
With grassroots organizing on firm footing by 1971, state right-to-life leaders 
began lobbying for a stronger national organization that could fight against legalized 
abortion at the national level and more effectively coordinate activity between the states. 
The NRLC during the late 1960s and early 1970s had served mostly to consolidate and 
distribute information on abortion politics and right-to-life activities in the states, but it 
was not overtly active in national politics. Moreover, the NRLC was still part of the 
Catholic Church, a branch of the Family Life Bureau of the NCCB. The Family Life 
Bureau even continued to fund and staff the NRLC.292 This close connection to the 
Catholic Church was becoming a concern among right-to-lifers as they fought stereotypes 
that the Catholic hierarchy was solely responsible for their activism in the states. It was 
also problematic as the movement tried to broaden its base of support among non-
Catholics.  
As early as August 1970, following the first NRLC convention, right-to-lifers 
were requesting an independent national organization.293 Their calls only increased in the 
next two years, thanks in part to the growing network fostered by state leaders and 
national right-to-life conferences.294 In July 1972, following discussions at yet another 
NRLC convention, Marjory Mecklenburg wrote a letter to Father James McHugh and 
Michael Taylor of the NRLC informing them of “a growing desire to build a more 	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independent, increasingly effective, representative national pro-life organization.”295 She 
indicated that there had been ongoing discussions about this possibility and now was the 
time to develop and execute a plan for a national organization. State leaders recognized 
the need for the movement to do more to promote its agenda in national politics, and 
Mecklenburg insisted the NRLC take action as soon as possible, arguing, “some steps 
toward independence should be taken at this time.”296 The topic had been discussed in 
detail at the convention in Philadelphia that summer, and many groups had expressed 
interest in developing and submitting plans for a national organization.297 The NRLC 
itself as well as the NCCB also supported the decision. 
But Mecklenburg and her fellow MCCL members were not content to simply 
meet to discuss the possibility of a reorganized NRLC. Along with her letter to McHugh 
and Taylor, Mecklenburg submitted a detailed plan for a national organization that she 
and several other Minnesota leaders had developed. Their main goals for the movement 
were clear: “that the pro-life movement have an effective national voice in public policy, 
that this voice reflect insofar as possible the consensus of the various state 
organizations…that the national pro-life organization be funded independently, that the 
state pro-life organizations cooperate to effectively accomplish these ends while at the 
same time maintaining freedom of action for the state organizations.”298 MCCL wanted a 
national organization that would have strength and influence in national politics, lobbying 
for the pro-life agenda at the highest levels of government while also representing the 	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movement as it existed at the grassroots level. Their plan was based in state and regional 
right-to-life groups, with a “national house of delegates” that would meet annually and 
serve as “a grass roots representative body.”299 But, for MCCL, the very foundation of 
the national organization was a “coalition of pro-life groups” that were already in place in 
each state.300 With this plan in mind, MCCL continued to insist that right-to-life leaders 
gather as soon as possible to finally organize a new national group.  
Discussions continued through the summer and fall. Finally, in November 1972, 
Michael Taylor, the Executive Secretary of NRLC, sent a letter to the NRLC Board of 
Directors as well as other pro-life leaders calling for a meeting to discuss the national 
organization. These leaders would leave strategy, legislation, and education off the table 
to channel all their energy into developing a plan for forming a more effective national 
organization. And they would pool their years of experience in organizing in their states, 
towns, and churches to try to agree on a suitable set up for the new group. Taylor 
summed up the plan, “Undoubtedly in the last 11 months Right to Life Organizations 
have continued to grow in strength and experience, on both the state and the national 
levels. So as to best utilize this gathered experience at the upcoming meeting the agenda 
will be limited to only national organization.”301 He invited all interested pro-lifers to 
attend and asked them to consider what a national organization should look like, what 
resources it would need, and what the timeframe could and should be for forming such a 
group.  
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The main plan for the meeting was to spend time discussing these issues as well 
as the two specific plans for a national organization—one submitted by MCCL and the 
other by Taylor himself. Taylor proposed a loose organizational structure that would 
allow more autonomy for grassroots groups and eschew the tight national organization 
and “representative association” of the MCCL plan.302 Taylor’s plan also highlighted two 
new concerns. First, the current NRLC was having trouble keeping up with the 
burgeoning right-to-life movement in the states. Because of this, Taylor thought a looser 
confederation of state groups would be more effective and successful. Second was the 
issue of “democratic participation.” As Taylor put it, “There is the fear…that after a 
substantial amount of work on the local or state level the whole pro-life cause will ‘go 
down the tube’ on the national level. To help offset this possibility the local and state 
organizations want input/control vis-a-vis the national organization.”303 The central issue, 
then, was to promote national activism but not at the expense of the vital work being 
done at the state and local levels. At the December meeting, the state leaders and current 
NRLC leaders would have to decide how to make the NRLC as effective as possible 
while also balancing the concerns of state groups which were in the midst of aggressive 
campaigns against abortion reform in their respective states. 
Before the NRLC and other right-to-life leaders met in Washington, D.C., to 
discuss these plans, there was already some disagreement on how best to proceed.304  It 
was still unclear whether the national organization would be a reorganized NRLC or a 
brand new group. In a November 1972 letter following Taylor’s call for the December 
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meeting, Marjory Mecklenburg seemed to think the right-to-life movement might need a 
brand new organization with the NRLC continuing to serve as an advisor and 
information-gatherer.305 Joseph Lampe of MCCL worried that Father McHugh and 
Michael Taylor were ignoring the months of discussions on the new organization, but he 
was determined to see the creation of a new national organization. “The November 1st 
letter gives the impression…that the status quo is to be maintained. Of course we all 
know that is not going to happen,” Lampe insisted, “I look forward to working with you 
and other right to life activists in creating a bigger and better National Right to Life 
Committee.”306 Despite these tensions and questions lingering in the background, the 
state leaders and NRLC staff gathered in Washington, D.C., agreeing at the very least that 
they needed to take some steps toward a stronger national organization. 
They met on December 9th and spent the entire day discussing both plans for 
national organizations and their potential problems. Paul Andreini presented MCCL’s 
plan, arguing that they believed there had been “apparent consensus at the June, 1972 
National Right to Life Convention in Philadelphia that a definite plan for broadening the 
base of pro-life activities was needed…to stimulate idea exchange as well as increase 
political effectiveness.”307 He believed the MCCL plan reflected that consensus. Taylor 
then presented the NRLC plan, which he argued allowed for more flexibility and growth 
of grassroots right-to-life organizations. Throughout this discussion, various leaders 
expressed a range of concerns with forming a new national organization. Jack Willke was 
concerned about the NRLC’s connection to the Family Life Bureau. He worried about 
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“continued ‘Catholic’ labeling of Right to Life groups by opposition” should the national 
group keep the same name. Juan Ryan, then president of the NRLC, stressed that they 
should not stifle the grassroots momentum of the national movement and argued that any 
national organization needed to encourage continued grassroots activism.308 After much 
discussion, the group moved to discuss finding a compromise between the two plans, 
recognizing the urgency of reaching a decision that day. They all agreed that the new 
NRLC needed to be doing more in politics, needed to hire more people, and needed to 
expand if it were to be successful, but beyond those things they could not agree on what 
form the organization should take.  
After a full day of deliberation, including a lunch hour discussion where Michael 
Taylor, Paul Andreini, Marjory Mecklenburg, Judy Fink, Father McHugh, and a few 
others hammered out the final details of the compromise, the group finally reached a 
decision: “that the NRLC Board of Directors legally constitute itself as soon as possible, 
but no later than April, 1973.”309 They would solicit state groups to become members of 
the new NRLC and to contribute money to help get the organization off the ground. The 
movement would have an independent national organization in just a matter of months. 
Thus, when Roe surprised some others just a month later, it simply motivated the NRLC 
and its affiliates to expedite the process of fully incorporating the new NRLC, making it 
completely independent. The new NRLC was vital in coordinating activity at the 
grassroots level and in national politics, allowing the movement to continue its effective 
activism and to mobilize behind new national strategies.  
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In addition to planning for the national organization, right-to-lifers also began 
considering bigger solutions to the abortion issue that could be pursued at the national 
level—in particular, they began to discuss the possibility of pursuing some sort of 
constitutional amendment that would state that life began at conception and make 
abortion illegal in all fifty states. This discussion of national strategy and the human life 
amendment was another sign that right-to-lifers were starting to think about what it might 
look like to push for their agenda not only in the states but in national politics as well.  
Though their main focus remained on local and state politics, many right-to-lifers in the 
early 1970s had begun paying attention to what was happening in federal policy and in 
the federal court system, especially as the courts considered various cases related to 
abortion.310 There was a sense that while the local and state right-to-life activity was 
valuable, the movement needed to do more. It was in this context that the idea for a 
human life amendment started gaining traction in 1971 and 1972.  
Some right-to-lifers were initially wary and saw no pressing need for a human life 
amendment. They believed that the political strategy in the states was more effective and 
sufficient for achieving the movement’s goals and that shifting direction to pursue a 
constitutional amendment would be too difficult and a waste of time and resources. The 
Westchester Right-to-life newsletter in June 1972 described the growing push for a 
human life amendment, noting that “some Right to Life Groups have advocated a 
constitutional amendment to safeguard the rights of the unborn.” But that same newsletter 	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pointed out that “achievement of a constitutional amendment is a long, drawn out 
process,” indicating their hesitance about pursuing such an amendment at that time.311 
And when Robert Gallagher of New York proposed the idea of a human life amendment 
to the NRLC and the NCCB that summer, both the NRLC and NCCB rejected it.312 The 
Legal Advisory Board at the NRLC convention even voted against the proposal 28-2. 
McHugh justified the reaction against Gallagher’s proposal with a similar hesitance as the 
Westchester right-to-lifers: “Our position then is that legally the amendment is not a 
present necessity, and politically it is an unwise course to embark on at this time.”313 At 
this point, the movement’s leaders did not see a human life amendment as a feasible or 
prudent course of action, especially given the success they were having in the states. 
Thus, they made the strategic decision that the movement’s resources would reap more 
benefits if spent in other areas of state politics.  
Despite this initial hesitance about using the amendment as a national strategy, 
right-to-lifers quickly supported a human life amendment in the wake of Roe v. Wade. In 
fact, it became the central strategy at the national level for years to come. In this way, the 
discussions about the amendment in 1971 and 1972 were vital. Pursuing a human life 
amendment was in the movement’s arsenal of strategies prior to Roe v. Wade and shows 
that, in the early 1970s, right-to-lifers were already considering a pivot to a national 
strategy to combat legalized abortion. Given that they had already planned for such a 
contingency and were discussing the amendment both among the bishops and state 
leaders and in the movement more broadly, right-to-lifers immediately mobilized to 	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support a human life amendment after Roe. In fact, the human life amendment garnered 
support at all levels of the movement, from grassroots activists to the Catholic bishops to 
Congressmen.   
The early 1970s were pivotal years for the movement. Even as right-to-lifers 
worked fervently at the state level to oppose new abortion reform and promote their own 
agenda in their home states, they were already considering the ways they might engage in 
national politics and promote a pro-life agenda nationwide. And there was already a sense 
among some right-to-lifers that judicial decisions could, and probably would, go against 
them in the coming years. In order to plan for such a contingency, right-to-lifers worked 
to build an effective and independent national organization and to develop new strategies 
that they could use in national politics. For MCCL and its members, who were working 
on extensive plans for a national organization and were one of the most formidable state 
right-to-life groups, their planning for various contingencies was so impressive that their 
opponents took note. It was why Dr. Koshnick felt the need to warn NARAL about 
MCCL’s actions.314 Abortion rights supporters hoped a Supreme Court decision in favor 
of legal abortion would put the issue to rest, but right-to-lifers in the states were not so 
willing to let the issue go and were already planning to continue the fight in all three 
branches of the federal government if need be. By the end of 1972, the right-to-life 
movement was ready to take its activism to the national stage. It put right-to-lifers in the 
perfect position to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision at the start of 1973, to 
continue their mobilization efforts in the states, and to pivot their aggressive strategy 
toward national politics in an attempt to enact their agenda in all fifty states. 	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3.2 Black Monday: Roe v. Wade and its Immediate Aftermath 
January 22, 1973, would live on in the right-to-life imagination as “Black 
Monday.” For most right-to-lifers, the scope of the decision was a shock—some even 
called it a “bolt from the blue.”315 Many had anticipated that it was a possibility but few 
had imagined a decision that would immediately make abortion legal in all fifty states. 
Yet, the movement only entered crisis mode briefly before returning to the political 
strategy and legislative agenda that they had developed in the early 1970s. The right-to-
lifers in the states, who already had several years of experience in politics, immediately 
got back to work. As before, grassroots politics was the mainstay of the movement in the 
weeks and months after Roe. The momentum right-to-lifers had built in the early 1970s 
propelled state groups to continue their political activism and education campaigns. 
These groups kept the abortion issue in the public spotlight, educated people about the 
issue and about their activism, and encouraged their members to become even more 
involved in state and national politics. State leaders also agitated for decisive action to 
fully incorporate the NRLC in the weeks after Roe. Rather than settling the abortion 
debate once and for all, as abortion rights supporters hoped, Roe v. Wade encouraged 
right-to-lifers in the states to take the strategies and networks they had developed in the 
1960s and 1970s and turn their attention to national politics. 
State groups took the lead in urging people to take action and respond to the 
Supreme Court decision. As they had done in the early 1970s, these groups continued 
their push to make right-to-lifers politically active. Less than two months after Roe, 
MCCL held a public meeting on March 12, 1973, to discuss what MCCL could do to 
counter legalized abortion. Fred and Marjory Mecklenburg offered critiques of the court’s 	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decision as well as plans of action, including outreach and education, encouraging the 
development of more family planning and sex education programs, as well as working 
toward a constitutional amendment.316 Marjory Mecklenburg offered a number of 
concrete steps Minnesotans could take, including speaking to professional groups or even 
friends and family, writing their members of Congress, protesting at hospitals, and 
supporting the new national organization. According to one observer, she ended on a 
determined note: “I cannot promise you that we will win, but I think we will.”317 Later 
that year, Celebrate Life and Women for the Unborn, two local New York groups, 
released a Practical Politics Kit, hoping to help right-to-lifers across the country respond 
to Roe. They implored activists to become even more involved in politics than they 
already were: “The necessity of political activity has become painfully evident since the 
Supreme Court decision of January 22, 1973.”318 For both these groups, the answer to 
Roe was relying on strategies they had tried in the last few years, encouraging people to 
be politically engaged but with more urgent attention to what could be accomplished in 
national politics. 
Other local groups worked to keep abortion on the agenda and in the public 
spotlight, continuing the flurry of local activity that had characterized the movement in 
the early 1970s but now with a renewed determination. Students at Wadhams Hall 
Seminary-College in upstate New York erected a large billboard on their campus along a 
local highway, reading “Help save life, protect the unborn.”319 In an article covering the 	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new sign the students acknowledged that this action was directly related to Roe v. Wade 
and that they had “greatly increased their efforts toward promoting the right to life of all 
human beings since the Court’s decision.”320 Students at Canisius College in Buffalo, 
New York, defended their right to organize and protested after their signs were torn down 
in the fall of 1973. One of the group’s members wrote to the school newspaper defending 
their fight against abortion: “These students who oppose abortion and are willing to join 
together and fight have what it takes in today’s world—guts to stand up for the rights of 
the forgotten, shoved aside, unspoken for and defenseless on in our society: the 
unborn.”321 In Minnesota, MCCL continued its work with little interruption. At their 
March 1973 annual meeting, MCCL members reelected Marjory Mecklenburg as 
president, along with three other women, keeping their leadership the same as it had been 
for 1972 and indicating a desire to stick with a tried and tested trajectory.322 Meanwhile, 
California right-to-lifers made plans to make major inroads in state politics and spent 
over $60,000 on pro-life educational material such as films, booklets, and posters to 
distribute across the state.323  
Many groups were buoyed by jumps in membership following Roe v. Wade. 
Joseph Lampe of MCCL noted that the group’s membership had increased to fifteen 
thousand after Roe, an almost 50 percent increase.324 MCCL was also able to finally pay 
off its debts in March 1973 thanks to a wave of donations.325 The group’s leaders also 
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noted higher attendance at their public events, such as when a huge crowd—over six 
hundred people—showed up to the Mecklenburgs’ presentation in March 1973.326 SOUL, 
too, was optimistic about activism after Roe and looked to “establish as large a 
membership as possible and to develop new leaders at all levels.”327 Following Roe, the 
group was able to hire Doug Dahl to work full-time as the SOUL coordinator, traveling 
across the region to recruit college and high school students for pro-life activism. Near 
the end of 1973 he reported that there was “a tremendous upsurge of interest” among 
young people, and SOUL continued to expand and start new chapters throughout the 
state.328 In California, right-to-lifers welcomed nearly seven hundred people to their state 
convention in 1973.329 And a record number of activists turned out for the NRLC 
convention in June 1973—nearly fifteen hundred pro-lifers from across the country.330 
Even as local groups worked to sustain the grassroots momentum of the 
movement and keep the abortion issue in the public spotlight, questions lingered about 
the status of the national right-to-life organization. The Catholic Church and the NRLC 
reacted quickly and decisively to shift their pro-life work to the national scene and 
expedite plans for the NRLC’s official separation from the Catholic Church, but activity 
soon stalled. Roe v. Wade had sparked much discussion among the Catholic bishops 
almost immediately with responses targeted toward lay Catholics and the general 
American public. Several bishops and cardinals released official statements denouncing 
the decision as one of the gravest mistakes ever made by the court. John Cardinal Krol 	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remarked, “It is hard to think of any decision in the 200 years of our history which has 
had more disastrous implications for our stability as a civilized society.”331 The bishops 
also reminded lay Catholics that they were obligated to obey church law over secular law. 
The NCCB Committee for Pro-life Affairs warned the nation, “Although as a result of the 
Court decision abortion may be legally permissible, it is still morally wrong, and no 
Court opinion can change the law of God prohibiting the taking of innocent human 
life.”332 By January 25, the bishops were already discussing their plans of action for 
responding to Roe v. Wade.333 One of the first things on their agenda was making the 
NRLC officially independent of the Catholic Church. But though McHugh and the 
NCCB were supportive of the decision to make the NRLC independent of the Family 
Life Bureau, they now expressed some hesitance about rushing into it too quickly before 
adequate plans were in place.334  
While Catholic Church officials expressed support for the NRLC’s move to full 
independence, it was state right-to-life leaders that actually executed the plan when it 
seemed McHugh and church officials might try to stall the process. On February 11 and 
again a month later in March, a group of leaders gathered in Chicago to discuss strategy 
and the response to Roe. The meeting agenda included four main items: Supreme Court, 
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State Legislative Efforts, a Constitutional Amendment, and national organization.335 
Several prominent state leaders attended the meeting, including Marjory Mecklenburg, as 
well as fellow MCCL members Alice Hartle, Joseph Lampe, Fred Mecklenburg, and Paul 
Andreini. Ed Golden, president of New York State Right to Life, Diane Arrigan of 
Women for the Unborn, and Rose Polito, president of the Right to Life League of 
Southern California, were also at the meetings. After discussing the national organization, 
the leaders decided to “expedite” the incorporation of the NRLC, which had stalled in 
recent weeks, and planned to ask state groups to help with the initial funding of the new 
group.336 McHugh was not happy with this decision and expressed concern that the state 
leaders were rushing it too quickly. A day after the February 11 meeting, he informed 
Cardinal Cody, “Some of the people in Minnesota, Chicago and Western Pennsylvania 
have decided to hurry things a bit.”337 McHugh also worried that these right-to-lifers were 
too focused on a human life amendment. He suggested that the bishops should be careful 
in their dealings with the new organization and should try to diversify their pro-life 
activity rather than only supporting the NRLC.338 But the state leaders were determined 
to make the NRLC independent and make it effective in national politics, regardless of 
what McHugh and the NCCB thought. With the push from these right-to-lifers in the 
weeks immediately following Roe, the NRLC would soon be fully incorporated with a 
new Board of Directors and a new office in Washington, D.C.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 Agenda, Ad Hoc National Right to Life Strategy Meeting, February 11, 1973, Box 4, Folder 11, ACCL 
Records; NRLC, Minutes, National Right to Life Committee Board of Directors Meeting, March 11, 1973, 
Box 5, Folder 5, ACCL Records. 
336 Minutes, Ad Hoc National Right to Life Strategy Meeting, February 11, 1973, Box 4, Folder 11, ACCL 
Records. 
337 James T. McHugh to Cardinal Cody, “Additional Items for Your Information,” February 12, 1973, Box 
62, Folder NCCB: Ad Hoc Committee Pro-life Activities January-February 1973, USCCB Records. 
338 Ibid.  
  136  
The ongoing grassroots activity, the increase in membership, and the steps taken 
toward a national organization led many right-to-lifers to an unwavering and optimistic 
stance in the immediate aftermath of Roe v. Wade. Six months after the court’s decision 
Randy Furst of the Minneapolis Star Tribune interviewed Joseph Lampe of MCCL. Furst 
observed their determination firsthand, commenting “Lampe is optimistic, though he says 
the law won’t be changed overnight.”339 Similarly, at their 1973 state convention, 
California pro-lifers discussed how the NRLC was “optimistic about getting a 
constitutional amendment within a couple of years” and planned what Californians could 
do in their state to help make that happen.340 And by the end of 1973, some abortion 
rights supporters felt that legalized abortion was already “severely threatened” by the 
right-to-life campaign.341 Thanks to the groundwork from their early 1970s activism, 
right-to-lifers, both the leaders of the movement and activists on the ground, were able to 
quickly take action to oppose abortion both in their local communities and increasingly at 
the national level, sustaining their grassroots activism, even increasing its intensity, and 
turning their attention to national politics. 
3.3 Forming a National Movement 
With the ongoing grassroots support for the movement assured, the leaders of 
state groups needed to figure out how to combat abortion in national politics, particularly 	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in Congress and in electoral politics. These leaders also had to connect that national 
strategy to the grassroots activism in their towns and states and get right-to-lifers excited 
about what the movement might accomplish in national politics. They undertook this 
project through 1973 and into the first part of 1974. The first, and most urgent, issue to 
address was the lack of any powerful, unified national organization that could unite right-
to-life efforts across the country. Though the movement’s leaders had agreed to make the 
NRLC independent at the end of 1972, they had not yet executed their plan. Judy Fink, a 
leader from Pennsylvania, recognized the challenge they faced here: “Wide divergences 
in political views characterize our ‘constituency’; theological interpretations show some 
variances, and methodology in implementing prolife action programs varies widely not 
only from state to state but from group to group.”342 Building a national coalition of such 
divergent people and groups would not be easy, though the majority of right-to-lifers felt 
it was an absolute necessity.343 Then there was the question of strategy once the national 
organization was in place. Ultimately, passing a human life amendment became the 
movement’s prime focus at the national level and took on particular urgency as right-to-
lifers saw it as the only way to fully reverse the Supreme Court’s decisions.  
In the months following Roe, many state leaders as well as Father McHugh and 
other Catholic Church officials focused much of their attention on organizing the new 
NRLC. As discussed earlier, following Roe v. Wade, McHugh cautioned right-to-lifers 
about rushing too quickly to make the NRLC independent. Nevertheless, a core group of 	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leaders insisted that the new NRLC must be organized as soon as possible.344 One thing 
both sides agreed on was that the new organization must not quash grassroots organizing 
in the states. Judy Fink detailed their struggles in getting a national movement off the 
ground,  
 One central thrust has been to direct the thinking of the Executive Committee 
 members toward a constant awareness of the prolife organizations springing up 
 like mushrooms in every state in the nation. All of us have been heavily involved 
 with our own state’s organizations, and have had to shift to ‘thinking national’ 
 almost overnight.345 
 
Other right-to-life leaders worried about the logistics of running the NRLC. Rose Polito, 
president of the Right to Life League of Southern California, worried that funding might 
not be sufficient for the new group, and she was also concerned about maintaining the 
NLRC’s relationship with the NCCB. Like McHugh, she worried about rushing along too 
quickly. “Without clarification of these problems,” she informed another state leader, “I 
feel the venture is doomed to failure at the outset.”346  
At the National Right to Life Convention in Detroit in the summer of 1973, the 
first major gathering of pro-life activists from across the country since Roe v. Wade, this 
new organization finally came together. As in years previous, state leaders gathered to 
discuss the state of the movement as well as new strategies. Most importantly, the 
activists finalized details of the new NRLC and elected a new Executive Committee and 
Executive Director so they could start setting up the NRLC’s new national office in 
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Washington, D.C., and decide on strategies to implement.347 The decision was a quick 
and easy one to make, with little fanfare—unsurprising given that these right-to-lifers had 
been discussing the new organization for nearly a year and planning to make the split 
from the Family Life Bureau official for over six months. When asked about the new 
NRLC by a reporter for the Minneapolis Tribune, Joseph Lampe simply commented, 
“The panic is over now and we are at work again.”348 Here, too, state leaders took the 
lead, and the new group got to work quickly, joining in the frenzy of activity already 
taking place at the state and local levels. Ed Golden, leader of New York State Right to 
Life, was elected president of the new organization, and Marjory Mecklenburg was 
chosen to be the chairman of its Board of Directors. The NRLC also organized a number 
of committees, perhaps none more important than the Intergroup Liaison Committee, 
whose job was to reach out to other groups and organizations that might be interested in 
joining the movement.349 The new NRLC’s first newsletter in November 1973 brimmed 
with news of right-to-life activism across the country, from human life amendments 
introduced in Congress to a pro-life rally attended by thirty thousand people in St. Louis 
to the next NYPLC conference.350 
With the NRLC now in place, the other important item on the right-to-life agenda 
was what national strategy to pursue. A human life amendment soon became the 
movement’s prime focus—both in the NRLC and at the grassroots level. The idea for a 
human life amendment had been one of the contingencies right-to-lifers considered in 	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1971 and 1972, and now they urgently worked to get one passed in Congress. And 
though they could have left this strategy to the politicians, lobbyists, or the new NRLC, 
right-to-life leaders instead focused on connecting grassroots activism to supporting the 
amendment. Through 1973 and into 1974, state groups, the NRLC, and the Catholic 
Church channeled the majority of their time and energy into passing some sort of human 
life amendment and convincing people on the ground that this was the best strategy to 
pursue.351  
On the ground, the process of building grassroots support for a constitutional 
amendment banning abortion closely resembled the aggressive strategies that had been 
part of the right-to-life agenda for the last few years. State groups reoriented these 
strategies toward national politics and the human life amendment. For example, 
California right-to-lifers continued tracking the stances of their state representatives on 
the abortion issue and also mounted a massive educational and letter writing campaign in 
support of a human life amendment, which closely resembled the ways right-to-lifers first 
got Californians involved in activism in the late 1960s.352 In Minnesota, this meant 
continuing the emphasis on electoral politics and working in both state parties in hopes of 
influencing state as well as national party politics. MCCL placed such enormous weight 
on participation in state politics that at the start of 1974 its newsletter told MCCL 
members that attending a precinct caucus was “the most important thing you can do for 
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the pro-life cause during 1974.”353 The group’s ultimate goal and the path to achieving it 
were clear. As one New York group put it: “To pass a Human Life Amendment by 
creating enough ‘people pressure’ regarding the Life issue that the individual legislator 
will feel compelled to vote Pro-Life.”354   
Thus, the reorientation toward the national political process was not an abstract 
strategy, disconnected from activity in states and local communities. Rather, it was firmly 
rooted in grassroots action. Across the country, local and state groups remained the 
centers for right-to-life politics, and now they were the center of activity for the push for 
a human life amendment. Local groups took this role seriously, providing effective and 
smart leadership for local activists. Celebrate Life and Women for the Unborn 
encouraged them to prepare for the fight in national politics and reminded right-to-lifers 
of their role in returning “America to the land where all God-given human life is 
respected and protected equally.”355 Their Practical Politics Kit made the connection 
plain for right-to-lifers in New York and across the country. The group laid out a number 
of ways people could get involved in politics, including writing letters to their members 
of Congress, visiting Congressional offices, bringing educational material to their 
legislators and staff, and putting pressure on potential presidential candidates eyeing a 
run in 1976. A human life amendment was the ultimate target of these activities. The 
group provided clear explanations of how bills went through Congress and detailed 
instructions on how to initiate a letter-writing campaign specifically to lobby legislators 
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for a human life amendment.356 Here, again, they reoriented a strategy they had 
developed in the 1960s and early 1970s and now targeted it toward national politics. In 
addition to literature dealing explicitly with political strategies, updates also regularly 
appeared in these groups’ newsletters, making sure local right-to-lifers knew what was 
going on in Congress and in other states as they tried to work for a Constitutional 
amendment.357  
Right-to-lifers in California and Minnesota also used grassroots political activism 
to support the fight for a human life amendment. For example, when MCCL encouraged 
its members to take part in precinct caucuses in February 1974, the group connected 
participation in local caucuses to working toward a human life amendment. As MCCL 
noted, “…if we are to make any progress toward the passage of an amendment to protect 
all human life, we must work through the political process. That process begins with the 
caucus—and success at the caucus begins with you.”358 As California groups geared up to 
work for a constitutional amendment that the NRLC supported, they emphasized the need 
for state groups to work together and looked to other states for inspiration: “A unified 
effort for the constitutional amendment is vital. We hope to use ideas from other states, 
adapted to California’s situation.”359 Existing state groups worked to get their members 
on the ground excited about and engaged in the fight for a human life amendment. 
Likewise, young people in the movement also pivoted their activism to support 
the human life amendment. At the NYPLC youth convention in 1973, young pro-lifers 
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attended a seminar on the human life amendment led by their lobbyist, Tom Mooney, as 
well as Dennis Horan, a law professor who was also advising the Catholic Church and the 
NRLC on the human life amendment. Young pro-lifers were encouraged to stay active 
and vigilant in politics, and Mooney “detailed the kind of grassroots organization 
necessary to put a pro-life amendment into effect.”360 In early 1974, SOUL became 
involved in the political process as well and encouraged their young members to attend 
their precinct caucuses.361 Tad Jude, a SOUL member who was also a representative in 
the state house, reiterated the importance of electoral politics to SOUL members. He 
wrote, “I feel it is the responsibility of citizens who are interested in their community and 
the conditions with which they live to become active in the political party he most 
identifies with. This is the place where we can grab a hold of our public officials and 
communicate to them the public interest.”362  
The grassroots approach reaped benefits for the movement, and the human life 
amendment strategy resonated with people on the ground. One man from California, 
Gilbert Durand, started a campaign to get “20/25 million Americans affirming their love 
of life.”363 He proposed sending an “action package” to nearly thirty thousand Catholic 
groups in order to foster a “unified, nation-wide, efficient and economical program to 
effect Constitutional reform.”364 A local Minnesota pro-lifer created his own list of easy 
political activities that citizens could take part in—the very first suggested action on his 
list was contacting elected officials to let them know about grassroots support for a 
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human life amendment. He plainly laid out the high stakes in the abortion fight and the 
individual responsibility of right-to-lifers, as he understood them: “If I do nothing, I 
deserve the harsh condemnation history now accords the Germans for not opposing 
Hitler’s barbaric treatment of Jewish people.”365 Minnesotans also responded to MCCL 
and SOUL. In May 1973, about 250 people showed up in the small town of Marshall to 
hear several speakers at a pro-life rally organized by the local chapter of MCCL. Their 
Congressional representative, John Zwach, emphasized his strong support for a human 
life amendment, saying such a measure was “the most important thing before the 
country.”366 MCCL and SOUL members also turned out in large numbers for the 
February 1974 caucuses. Following the caucuses, MCCL celebrated its success: “Pro-
lifers turned out in record numbers for the February 26 caucus across the state…Before 
the caucuses, the MCCL office and the DFL and GOP Pro-life Committees were deluged 
with requests for information and offers to help further the pro-life cause.”367 Clearly, 
state groups succeeded in getting people excited about the human life amendment and 
engaged in the political process, and the amendment remained a popular topic of 
conversation at various pro-life gatherings throughout 1973 and 1974.368  
Despite the grassroots energy surrounding the passage of a human life 
amendment, the task itself was not an easy one and in the years to come, it would prove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Hal Sweet, “I don’t like the Anti-life decision of the Supreme Court, rendered on January 22, 1973, But 
what can I do about it?” January 28, 1973, Box 4, Folder 11, ACCL Records.  
366 Steven London, “U.S. Rep. Zwach predicts passage of a new anti-abortion amendment,” May 7, 1973, 
Reel 3, Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life Newspaper Clippings Microfilm Collection, Minnesota 
Historical Society, St. Paul, MN. (hereafter cited as MCCL Newspaper Clippings). 
367 MCCL, Newsletter, March 1974, Box 2, Folder MCCL 1968-1973, Taylor Papers. 
368 California Pro-life Council, “Minutes of Business Session, Pro Life Convention, Fresno, September 30, 
1973,” September 30, 1973, Box 8, Folder 5, ACCL Records; NRLC, “Resolution #8,” July 10, 1973, Box 
4, Folder 13, ACCL Records; Nellie Gray to Board of Directors, NRLC, “A Human Life Amendment,” 
December 8, 1973, Box 5, Folder 12, ACCL Records; NRLC, Untitled Press Release, Spring 1973, Box 6, 
Folder 2, ACCL Records. 
  145  
divisive as right-to-life leaders such as Marjory Mecklenburg questioned the 
effectiveness of focusing so single-mindedly on an amendment, while other right-to-lifers 
became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of change. Many amendments were 
proposed in 1973 and 1974 but few gained much traction in Congress, despite some 
“very nice ‘pro-life’ people” who were picketing Congressional members’ offices 
everyday.369 And even in 1973 and 1974, right-to-lifers could not agree on what type of 
amendment to support. Some supported a human life amendment that would make 
abortion totally illegal. Others supported an amendment that would allow a few 
exceptions for legal abortion. Still others believed the best option was some sort of states’ 
rights amendment that would allow each state to decide the abortion question on its own.  
For example, in early February 1973, after Ed Golden asked Robert Bryn to analyze both 
these options for him, Bryn concluded, “a mandatory amendment, which repudiates the 
jurisprudence of Wade in its entirety, is, it seems to me, the only safe and acceptable 
answer to Wade.”370 While shortly after Roe, Russell Shaw, who had worked with the 
bishops and the NRLC for several years, warned, “There is no evidence of such a 
consensus on abortion…it seems more likely that the majority view is more or less pro-
abortion…This suggests that a major effort on the part of the Church to secure such an 
amendment would result in failure.”371 His recommendation was that they pursue 
legislative efforts in the states in order to mitigate the damage done by Roe v. Wade. 
However, despite disagreements on the human life amendment, right-to-lifers kept it as 
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their prime national focus for the next several years and successfully used it to generate 
and sustain grassroots support. 
In the year following Roe v. Wade, the right-to-life movement quickly pivoted 
their focus to national politics and a national strategy largely thanks to the legwork done 
in the years preceding Roe v. Wade. And just as it had been in the early 1970s, grassroots 
action was the mainstay of the movement as right-to-lifers made this transition. As state 
leaders worked to form a new national organization, state groups continued much of the 
work they had already been doing in the early 1970s. They were also the ones who 
worked to mobilize grassroots support for a human life amendment. It was this grassroots 
support that would sustain the right-to-life movement as the new NRLC encountered 
some of the biggest obstacles it had yet faced, struggling to unite the broad coalition of 
right-to-life groups into a unified national crusade. 
3.4 The NRLC in Disarray 
Almost as soon as the NRLC became independent, it encountered two big 
problems that threatened to derail the movement. First, Protestants and Catholics in 
leadership positions in the NRLC faced off against one another. For much of 1973 and 
1974, intense arguments over the nature of the movement embroiled some of its core 
leaders, particularly as the right-to-lifers tried to figure out the place of religion in the 
movement and how to develop the “broad-based” coalition that the leadership all claimed 
they wanted. In a movement that still had a Catholic majority, Protestant leaders worried 
that the Catholic Church hierarchy’s large share of influence in right-to-life politics might 
overshadow and overpower non-Catholic voices and opinions. They also argued that if 
the public face of the movement were overtly Catholic, it would play into stereotypes that 
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the movement was only for Catholics and might alienate potential non-Catholic allies. As 
the Protestant leaders expressed these concerns, lay Catholics as well as Church officials 
defended their role in right-to-life politics and sometimes accused the Protestant leaders 
of anti-Catholic bias. Second, the NRLC implemented plans to reach out to various 
religious groups to build a broad-based movement, but failed in its attempts to recruit one 
of its main targets, evangelical Christians. Both these examples highlight the fact that, 
rather than a monolithically conservative movement in the wake of Roe, the right-to-life 
movement in the mid-1970s was rife with tension and disagreements, made up of a 
diverse group of people with differing opinions about the nature of the movement and 
struggling to recruit new allies.372 
At the center of all of this tension was the goal of a “broad-based” movement, 
which most right-to-life leaders wholeheartedly supported. Such rhetoric had been 
common within the movement throughout the early 1970s. It usually applied to religious 
affiliation and the right-to-lifers’ belief that people from America’s big three religions—
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—could unite around opposing abortion. From the early 
1970s, many right-to-lifers in a number of different organizations had reiterated visions 
for a broad-based movement. In 1972, Dr. Joseph Stanton told members of Americans 
United for Life that he had “pleaded for a broad-based committee organized regardless of 
race, creed or color, that would seek out the broad area of general agreement among men 
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of good will in opposing the attack on life.”373 He professed his confidence that such an 
organization was the only way to achieve success and overcome in-fighting. In December 
1971, Michael Taylor, Executive Secretary of the NRLC, wrote about a broad-based 
coalition as if there were consensus about it amongst most right-to-lifers. He noted, 
“Despite a successful 1971, it is apparent that the challenges of the pro-life cause will 
continue for many years. Everyone agrees that we should continue to broaden the base of 
the Right to Life movement.”374 Here too was the belief that building a broad-based 
movement was the only way forward. This approach was not just a matter of reaching 
more people but also of developing the strongest and most effective strategy. In early 
1974, Marjory Mecklenburg stated this position decisively: “The strongest possible kind 
of organization is one composed of concerned citizens rather than separate organizations 
of concerned Catholics or concerned Baptists…Acting from a broad base an organization 
multiplies its appeal and its possibility to be an effective voice.”375  
As it worked toward a more broad-based movement in 1973, the NRLC tried to 
make plans to mitigate any potential areas of conflict between the religious groups and 
denominations the group hoped might join the cause. After reconstituting the NRLC, its 
new leaders formed the Intergroup Liaison Committee to deal with reaching out to other 
organizations and religious groups and promoting the creation of a broad-based coalition. 
One of the committee’s tasks was to “under take an analysis of potential ideological 
conflicts within the larger prolife movement, and attempt to head off clashes that could 
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be destructive by identifying them in advance if possible.”376 Its other role was reaching 
out to various denominations and religious groups. The NRLC planned to bolster the 
movement’s ever-increasing religious diversity, broadening its base of support and 
bringing new religious groups into the movement to boost its numbers. 
Yet in organizing the Intergroup Liaison Committee, NRLC’s leadership failed to 
consider the problems brewing within their own ranks. The tension among the new 
leadership team became apparent following Roe v. Wade and reached its zenith in the 
second half of 1973. Issues of leadership, organizational style, fundraising, varying 
stances on birth control, and other issues plagued the movement into 1974. The 
leadership of the Catholic hierarchy was another big issue. Though the NRLC was now 
officially independent from the Catholic Church, some of the Protestant leaders worried 
the Catholic Church might try to undermine their new organization. As early as June 
1973, Edward Hannify received reports from the 1973 NRLC convention and observed, 
“Unfortunately, the right-to-life movement is now split and divided probably beyond 
remedy.”377 Though he blamed the issue of birth control for the division, these problems 
ultimately boiled down to a fierce disagreement between Catholic and Protestant 
leaders—both of whom felt their position and influence in the movement were being 
threatened. 
Shortly after the NRLC was incorporated, disagreements emerged in the 
executive committee. Initially it was over leadership and funding, but it quickly devolved 
into a disagreement between Catholics and Protestants. Warren Schaller, an Episcopalian 
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minister from Minnesota, had been chosen to be the executive director of the NRLC, in 
charge of running the new office in Washington, D.C. According to Mecklenburg, despite 
hiring Schaller, McHugh continued to work against him, seeking instead to propose a 
new candidate of his own choosing for executive director.378 She also worried that 
McHugh was dividing the executive committee into factions—those who supported him 
and those who did not. Mecklenburg noted that this carried over into the treatment 
Schaller was receiving in Washington, D.C. “Warren has been in D.C. two weeks; was 
hired some time ago—still has no signed contract—and has been treated like a leper by 
Ed [Golden] and Mike [Taylor],” she informed a friend in September 1973.379 She also 
sent along a list of handwritten questions, the first of which was “Can the Catholic 
Church as an institution work with an ecumenical, independent organization without 
controlling it, or seeking to control it?”380 Mecklenburg feared the issue with Schaller 
was not that he was unqualified for the position but that he was a Protestant, and 
Catholics like McHugh, Golden, and Taylor would not cede control of the NRLC to him. 
This quickly became a dominant theme among the most influential Protestants in 
the NRLC. The Protestant leadership, including Marjory Mecklenburg, a Methodist, Judy 
Fink, a Baptist, and Warren Schaller, an Episcopalian, wanted to know if Protestants 
would only be non-Catholic fronts in the movement or if they would be given real 
leadership roles in the NRLC. As the reconstituted NRLC took shape, Judy Fink 
complained that the group’s newly formed Policy Committee only consisted of Catholic 
males—“Since the prolife movement must be broad-based and pluralistic if it is to grow 
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to not seat any individuals except male Roman Catholics.”381 She warned her Catholic 
colleagues that changes would have to take place. Marjory Mecklenburg believed the 
problems went beyond the make up of the committees and feared that the Catholic 
hierarchy wanted to retain a large level of influence in the movement. She said that she 
felt “the institutional Catholic church appears to be locked into a power struggle with us 
for control of the organization, the position and the movement.”382  She also relayed the 
following anecdote: 
 One of Fr. McHugh’s confidants recently proposed to a Protestant on the 
 executive committee that if the Catholic church could come up with 20 million 
 dollars and could guarantee they could win an amendment, would the Protestants 
 be willing to be window dressing—no rocking the boat?383 
 
Mecklenburg wondered if it were even possible for the Catholic Church to work with an 
independent organization and if Protestants would ever truly share equal responsibility or 
if they would have to form their own independent, Protestant right-to-life groups. Others 
agreed with her. In July 1973, Paul Andreini, a fellow MCCL member, told Mecklenburg 
that they should be careful. “We should not be used by the Catholic Church, but we must 
use Catholic organizations,” he advised.384 Protestant leaders faced a conundrum. While 
working with McHugh and his supporters might be frustrating, the Protestant leaders 
could not risk breaking off ties with their most important allies.  	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But some of the leaders in the NRLC believed the tension was due to core 
differences between the two sides—differences that might be irreconcilable. In observing 
the battle for control, Schaller commented that he believed it was about fundamental 
differences between Catholics and Protestants, the ways they viewed authority and lay 
people. He wrote,  
 It’s a Protestant thing, you see, that authority rests in the people of God…It is 
 hard for the RC hierarchy, or those who relate well to them, to be comfortable 
 with such a system—it is dynamic and moving but not uniform and predictable… 
 If you don’t understand why I say that it is now just about irreversible that the 
 RTL movement is a RC movement, and why it will be impossible for 
 Protestants to participate in any meaningful way in NRLC.385  
 
Marjory Mecklenburg too pointed to these fundamental differences. Before a meeting of 
the new NRLC Executive Committee in August 1973, she warned the other committee 
members of her concerns: “It is not clear to me whether radically varying philosophies—
one based on control, certainty, conservatism and desire for uniformity, and another 
which is more free wheeling, based on openness, involvement of all comers and 
encouragement of individual initiative—can co-exist in the leadership of an 
organization.”386 Though she did not explicitly name Protestants and Catholics, her 
meaning was clear. Both Mecklenburg and Schaller spoke in coded terms about the 
Catholic influence in the movement, characterizing the Catholic Church as authoritarian 
and controlling, too rigid to effectively lead a right-to-life movement based on a broad 
coalition of Americans.  
 Unsurprisingly, the Protestant leadership’s strong critiques offended some 
Catholics in the NRLC. Randy Engel countered the Protestants’ claims, writing that 
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Mecklenburg used “her Protestantism as a battering ram to hit Catholics over the head 
and cow them into silence.”387 Similar to Mecklenburg, she questioned whether 
Protestants and Catholics could effectively work together to fight abortion. The NRLC, 
and Marjory Mecklenburg specifically, were also criticized in the conservative Catholic 
press, such as The Wanderer. The criticism was so great that one Catholic reader felt the 
need to write in and defend the NRLC and Mecklenburg though she herself did not agree 
with Mecklenburg’s stance on birth control. The reader lamented, “For three years, I have 
patiently ‘endured’ the numerous broadsides of the conservative Catholic press toward 
NRLC…Perhaps it isn’t perfect, but it should at least be given a chance.”388 Though 
Michael Taylor tried to calm the disagreements among NRLC Executive Committee 
members, emphasizing the “need for integrity” and their shared “personal sacrifice and 
plain anguish” for the cause, tensions still simmered and would ultimately cause Marjory 
Mecklenburg and Judy Fink, two of the main Protestant leaders in the NRLC, to start 
their own right-to-life organization in 1974.389   
The NRLC tried to work through this tension by focusing again on strategy for the 
national movement and making some important compromises. The tension had a direct 
influence on right-to-life strategy in two main areas: the public image of the movement 
and the issue of birth control. With the issue of birth control, the NRLC tried to please 
both Catholics, some of whom wanted a policy that explicitly opposed birth control, and 
Protestants, many of whom wanted to actively promote contraception as an alternative to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 Randy Engel to Board of Directors, NRLC, “NRLC – Past, Present and Future,” March 30, 1974, Box 8, 
Folder 4, ACCL Records. 
388 Patricia Goodson, “In Defense of NRLC,” letter to the editor, The Wanderer, Summer 1973, Box 3, 
Folder 3, ACCL Records.  
389 Michael Taylor to Board of Directors, NRLC, Inc. “Current Operational policies of NRLC, Inc.” 
October 24, 1973, Box 5, Folder 9, ACCL Records. 
  154  
abortion. The tension over the public image of the movement was exacerbated as the 
Catholic bishops struggled to figure out their role in right-to-life politics now that the 
NRLC was independent. Again, both Catholics and Protestants in the NRLC agreed that 
they wanted a broad-based movement, but the Catholic Church leadership made several 
missteps during this time in their public activism, which further alienated some of their 
Protestant counterparts.  
In one memorable instance in early 1974 the Senate held a hearing on pending 
abortion legislation but only four Catholic cardinals were invited to represent the 
religious opposition to abortion. Protestant right-to-lifers immediately expressed their 
dismay that no Protestant clergy or lay people were invited to represent the movement. 
Though the cardinals’ testimony was strong, Warren Schaller worried it confirmed “in 
the public’s mind, the ‘truth’ of the pro-abortion strategy, that abortion is a religious, and 
especially a Roman Catholic issue.”390 Jean Garton, a NRLC member and part of 
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, also worried about the movement’s image but blamed 
the press for framing it as a Catholic versus Protestant issue while pro-life Protestants and 
Jews were ignored.391 The cardinals exacerbated the controversy by initially defending 
their decision to speak, arguing that they were not asking the government to abide by 
Catholic teaching but instead promoting precepts in the nation’s founding documents and 
that they were representing all right-to-lifers.392  
The testimony could have been a major pitfall for the movement but thankfully 
the NRLC and the Catholic Church had worked out a compromise and agreed that the 	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right-to-life movement needed to be careful about its public image. The discussion 
surrounding the testimony reflected important changes in the NRLC since the start of 
1974—a more sensitive and careful approach to religious differences in the movement.  
Starting in January 1974, the NRLC reshaped its own organizational policy and urged 
Catholics to be sensitive to Protestant involvement. Their Intergroup Liaison Committee 
gave advice to its Catholic members on dealing with Protestants: “Sit down and examine 
your terminology,” they urged right-to-lifers, “Does it smack of Romanism…Learn some 
of the Protestant terms. Some are so simple and yet so foreign to Catholics.”393 The press 
had noted these changes as well. In February 1974, Marjory Mecklenburg met with 
members of the press on the behalf of the NRLC. She informed them, “We’re very 
concerned about our image in the press,” and emphasized that the movement included 
“Protestants and Jews and persons of little or no religious faith.”394 And after the 
testimony, the cardinals acknowledged the complaints of Protestant pro-lifers, and they 
too expressed concern about the invitation of the four cardinals as a way to continue 
portraying the right-to-life movement as thoroughly Catholic.395 In the future, they would 
encourage greater visibility of Protestant right-to-lifers in Congressional hearings.396  
The other major compromise between Protestants and Catholics in the movement 
was over birth control, and in 1973 and into 1974, the NRLC sought to clarify its position 	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on contraceptives in order to avoid alienating potential Protestant allies. The NRLC 
would ultimately adopt a neutral stance on contraceptives. But this decision only came 
after Judy Fink’s strong statements in favor of excluding opposition to birth control in 
their official organizational policy positions. Fink believed that the abortion rights 
movement would try to capitalize on the NRLC’s opposition to contraceptives if they 
took such a stance. As one of the few evangelical leaders in the NRLC during this time, 
she was also sensitive to any strategy or policy that might alienate her fellow evangelicals 
and recognized the potential power of an alliance with the evangelical base. Thus, Fink 
quickly realized the threat posed by a policy of total opposition to contraception and 
alerted the other NRLC leaders that such a statement would “count out the participation 
of the 12 million Southern Baptists in the nation…the huge rapidly growing Independent, 
Fundamentalist, and Pentecostal Protestant groups…need I go on?”397 The risk was too 
great—the NRLC had to remain neutral on birth control, largely to avoid alienating 
Protestants. If the movement was to be broad-based, as right-to-lifers claimed they 
wanted it to be, they could not take any action that risked alienating evangelical 
Christians. 
Despite these important compromises and efforts to foster a broad-based right-to-
life movement, the NRLC still struggled to recruit new religious groups and 
denominations. Most glaringly, the group could not get evangelical Christians to join the 
cause in any significant way, aside from a few activists, and all this despite a concerted 
recruitment campaign targeting evangelical denominations, pastors, and churches starting 
in 1973. This is significant because evangelicals would later be some of the movement’s 	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staunchest conservative allies, and scholars often point to the involvement of evangelical 
Christians in the right-to-life movement as one of the prime indicators of conservative 
backlash against Roe.398 But in the first few years after Roe, evangelicals were 
conspicuously absent from right-to-life activism. It was not an issue of awareness—
evangelicals were aware of the changes taking place surrounding the abortion issue. For 
example, at Wheaton College’s graduation ceremony in June 1973, C. Everett Koop 
spoke out against abortion in the strongest terms in his commencement address.399 He 
warned the graduates, “The first thing to note is that the decision of the Supreme Court is 
on the opposite side of the fence from the traditional teachings of Judaism and 
Christianity throughout the ages.”400 He also advised them of their Christian 
responsibility to take political action to oppose abortion. But despite the awareness 
among evangelicals, they seemed hesitant to get involved in the movement.  
It was also not for a lack of trying on the NRLC’s part that evangelicals were 
missing from right-to-life activism. Following Roe, the NRLC made a concerted effort to 
bring evangelicals into the fold, and the right-to-lifers of the NRLC firmly believed that 
evangelical Protestants were their natural allies and already opposed to abortion, even if 
they did not know it yet. The belief came up again and again in meetings and 
correspondence in the 1970s. In early 1974, Fink argued, “There is a large and mostly 
silent prolife untapped constituency in the United States and they are ours to teach. We 
have only to do it.”401 In a meeting of the executive committee of the NRLC, the group 	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again agreed that the 25 million Baptists in the United States would “be prolife if fully 
informed.”402 This belief, in turn, shaped the group’s strategy on the ground. For 
example, in discussing the Willkes’ Handbook on Abortion, the NRLC urged right-to-
lifers, “Church groups are frequently interested…Do not dismiss any specific church as 
automatically pro-abortion.”403 The group indicated that evangelical denominations such 
as Baptists, Church of Christ, and “most biblically oriented fundamentalist churches” 
might be the most receptive.404 The NRLC was determined to bring evangelicals into the 
right-to-life movement, and it took decisive action in order to bring them on board. 
The few evangelicals who were part of the movement and other Protestant right-
to-lifers themselves spoke out, indicating that their denominations would be fruitful 
targets. Bob Holbrook, a Southern Baptist, noted, “The Protestant churches have ‘grass-
roots’ support for pro-life but this support is neutralized by a failure to energize and 
mobilize.”405 His report urged immediate action—it had been less than a year since Roe v. 
Wade and right-to-lifers needed to work quickly to mobilize evangelical support. Another 
NRLC report noted that “Protestant Christians can, and must, be brought into the prolife 
movement…Those of us who are Protestants are keenly aware that not only do the vast 
majority of us reject the Supreme Court decision, we reject it on scriptural grounds.”406 
Later on in the report, Fink again reiterated that evangelicals were ready and waiting—all 
pro-lifers needed to do was to reach out to them and work to educate them on pro-life 
issues. These evangelicals confirmed the right-to-life movement’s contention that 	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evangelicals were already on their side and that evangelical denominations could be a 
vital resource and recruiting ground for the movement.  
The NRLC let this belief guide its strategy. Its Intergroup Liaison Committee 
spearheaded an ambitious campaign to recruit evangelicals. The group was supposed to 
focus on reaching out to other churches and organizations that might want to join the 
movement now that abortion was legal nationwide, but much of the committee’s focus 
immediately turned to evangelical Protestants and their denominations, especially the 
Southern Baptists. Its members set their “first priority” as “building bridges with certain 
Protestant religious groups.”407 In January 1974, Fink prepared a report on the group’s 
activities in 1973 and identified a number of recommendations the group intended to 
pursue if they could secure adequate funding. These included running advertisements in a 
variety of religious periodicals, holding workshops for clergy, and sending speakers to 
lead pro-life workshops at seminaries and Bible colleges. By the time the report was put 
together, the committee had already spoken with representatives from the Lutheran 
Church-Missouri Synod, helped form Baptists for Life, met with the project director of 
Americans Against Abortion, a newly formed evangelical antiabortion group, and sent 
over three thousand letters to Southern Baptist pastors.408 Even with this ambitious 
strategy, the NRLC still failed to recruit evangelicals in large numbers. 
What was keeping evangelicals from joining the movement? Most right-to-life 
leaders credited the persistent stereotype that the movement was only for Catholics. Judy 
Fink noted this as the NRLC developed its outreach strategy. She wrote, “They 
[Protestants] tend to see the public battle as Roman Catholic originated and Roman 	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Catholic dominated. They feel…‘What role, if any, should I as a Protestant play in 
this?’”409 Again, the religious divide between Protestants and Catholics was fundamental. 
It was not simply a matter of conflicting personalities among state leaders now trying to 
work together but also was about the very nature of the movement itself and its political 
trajectory. Though right-to-lifers worked to find acceptable compromises to create a 
broad-based coalition, the religion question would plague them through the rest of the 
decade.  
Despite the lingering questions about the role of Catholics and Protestants and 
over the strategy the national movement should pursue, right-to-lifers came together on 
January 22, 1974, to mark the first anniversary of Roe v. Wade, starting an annual 
tradition that has lasted to today. Though they could agree on little else, right-to-lifers at 
least agreed that Roe v. Wade was a terrible mistake, perhaps the most terrible mistake in 
American history. So they gathered in cities across the country to demonstrate 
“‘mourning’ for last year’s infamous decision, with ‘hope’ that the decision will soon be 
reversed by Constitutional Amendment.”410 And despite the controversies within the 
NRLC, the movement was still a formidable force. As one journalist observed the events 
of the first March for Life in Washington, D.C., she warned, “Unless the Right to Life 
movement is recognized for the threat that it is, American women may find, in the not too 
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distant future, that they have lost a war because they did not even realize it was being 
fought.”411 
Conclusion 
The issue of religious differences among right-to-lifers would be an ongoing 
problem for the right-to-life movement in the 1970s, and it was initially unclear whether 
the abortion issue would be strong enough to unite such disparate groups of Americans. 
The movement had experienced several tumultuous years, from its successes in the early 
1970s, to the blow delivered by the Supreme Court, to the tension splitting the movement 
as right-to-life leaders tried to make their way in national politics. Though Roe v. Wade 
provoked a powerful response among right-to-lifers on the ground, the movement still 
struggled to build a strong and united national coalition and did not yet have a clear 
message or image to unite all right-to-lifers.  
This lack of unity in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade is important because it 
challenges some of the conventional narratives about the right-to-life movement and 
American politics in the 1970s. Roe v. Wade did not create the movement as we know it. 
Rather, Roe v. Wade forced right-to-lifers to make their pivot to national politics a little 
sooner than they planned, but as I have argued in this chapter, right-to-lifers had already 
been seriously considering ways to push the pro-life agenda in national politics since at 
least 1971. As they developed their national strategy, the NRLC and right-to-life leaders 
struggled to balance their new national endeavors with the existing grassroots movement 
in the states, where experienced grassroots organizers continued activism that had been 
going on for nearly six years in some places. Furthermore, the conservative backlash 	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narrative cannot fully explain right-to-life organizing in the wake of Roe. As historian 
Mary Ziegler bluntly puts it, “The Roe decision did not create the New Right or the 
Religious Right.”412 Rather than a united conservative front, the movement in the wake of 
Roe was hopelessly divided. Right-to-lifers approached the issue in a variety of ways and 
represented many different political and religious affiliations. Most notably, liberal 
Protestants made up a core group of the leadership while the movement could barely 
convince any conservative evangelicals to join. The NRLC was determined to represent 
this wide swath of diverse Americans, and at least in 1973 and 1974, they were failing to 
do so.  
In spite of the tension and disunity that had become apparent as the right-to-lifers 
tried to put together a national movement, leaders also realized they had tapped into an 
intense energy at the grassroots level. The group Women for the Unborn observed this 
intensity in 1973 and named it the key to right-to-life success:   
 The Right to Life people are prepared to die…in the sense that they are willing 
 to give so much of themselves in defense of the unborn…And this wonderful 
 intensity and conviction – what our critics label ‘fanaticism’ but what I would 
 prefer to call love – this will one day, in the not so distant future, give the pro-
 life movement a power that will be felt throughout the length of this land.413  
 
Likewise, Judy Fink of the NRLC recognized grassroots action as the main strength of 
the movement. “If there is one major point that must not be lost sight of,” she told her 
fellow Pennsylvanian right-to-lifers in the fall of 1973, “it is that the movement is people 
– people who may not always speak the same words in the same accents, or use identical 
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phraseology to describe why they abhor abortion.”414 Though at the national level, the 
movement struggled to forge a strong and united organization, on the ground people were 
excited and engaged in right-to-life activism.  
With this focus on grassroots energy, right-to-lifers began looking confidently to 
the future, eager to expand their influence and make pro-life pressure felt in national 
politics. They even turned their attention to the next presidential election in 1976. By 
September 1973, the NRLC leaders already had a new goal in mind: “the unity of 
response is particularly essential if we are to present America with a Presidential 
candidate by 1976.”415 Not only would the right-to-lifers work determinedly for a 
constitutional amendment to ban abortion, they would also accept nothing less than a pro-
life president. Though they never got their human life amendment, the right-to-lifers did 
get their president, even if the NRLC prediction was four years off. 
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4.0 The Possibilities and Pitfalls of a Broad-based Movement 
 
Introduction 
 Though the NRLC had faced serious internal divisions in the immediate wake of 
Roe v. Wade, its leadership had managed to mostly overcome their disagreements by the 
end of 1974. In fact, from 1974 to 1979, the movement experienced a period of vibrant 
growth and action. To outside observers, it seemed the movement might finally be 
coming of age. Christianity Today described right-to-lifers as “…maturing. No longer 
can they be dismissed as a group of cold-hearted Catholics simply taking orders from the 
Pope.”416 Another reporter noted a new, more moderate approach as these activists 
learned to play politics in Washington, D.C.: “Confrontation has given way to reasoned 
debate…disunity among national right-to-life groups has diminished sharply, leaving in 
its wake a common goal and a combined effort.”417 
 After tense disagreements had almost derailed the national movement before it 
even started, right-to-lifers now put even more priority on building a broad-based 
constituency and avoiding anything that might divide their ranks. They worked to 
mitigate differences between Protestants and Catholics, Republicans and Democrats, 
family planning advocates and opponents of contraception, and any other activists who 
disagreed with one another on tactics or strategy. Right-to-lifers were an odd group, 
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consisting of “Birchers…anti bussers and anti-sex education in the school supporters, 
put-prayer-back-into-the-schools proponents, as well as radic-libs, civil libertarians, anti-
war activists, and not-so-traditional Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.”418 Nevertheless, 
the movement held itself together in the mid to late 1970s and used this diversity in its 
ranks to implement an aggressive and multifaceted strategy on the ground, in Congress, 
and in the White House. That is not to say that the right-to-lifers did not face any issues of 
disagreement among themselves. They still had to deal with much “chaotic, squabbling, 
and uncontrolled movement” and “tough partisan politicking.”419 Yet these activists 
persisted, fostering a movement that was truly broad-based while developing diverse 
political strategies from local politics to the upper levels of federal government. 
 The scholarly literature tends to overlook this period in right-to-life organizing in 
favor of focusing on the 1980 presidential election and the rise of the New Right and the 
Religious Right. Scholars usually point to the early 1980s as the right-to-life movement 
in its prime, due to a convergence of several factors.420 Ronald Reagan was the first pro-
life president, a major victory for right-to-lifers who had been working to elect a pro-life 
president since the mid-1970s. They hoped his election would bring them closer to a 
human life amendment that would make abortion illegal once again. In the 1980s, the 
New Right had also embraced the abortion issue as part of its agenda to the delight of 
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some right-to-lifers and the consternation of others. Regardless, it put abortion firmly on 
the Republican agenda.  And conservative evangelical Christians, whom right-to-lifers 
had been working to reach since 1973, were joining the movement in droves. In light of 
these factors, many scholars see the 1980s as the zenith of pro-life power.  
 Though the right-to-life movement was undoubtedly powerful in the 1980s, in this 
chapter I argue that, during the period between 1974 and 1979, it was at the height of its 
strength. It was closest to fulfilling its goals of creating a broad-based coalition and had 
perhaps the broadest and most diverse support it would ever enjoy in American society. 
On the eve of the formation of the New Right and the Religious Right, the movement 
also had yet to see the stark polarization that would later characterize it. In the 1980s, 
many right-to-lifers took a more hardline conservative stance on abortion, and more 
liberal and left-wing pro-lifers found themselves relegated to the margins. But in the mid 
to late 1970s, there was still room for all these activists in right-to-life politics, and right-
to-lifers pursued an array of political strategies—from lobbying for a human life 
amendment to pushing for greater access to contraception to staging sit-ins at abortion 
clinics. These five years of organizing were the closest right-to-life leaders would get to 
the broad-based movement that they so desired, and the coalition they had created was 
strong.  
 Though there are many examples of this broad pro-life umbrella in the late 1970s, 
in this chapter, I highlight four main examples of the dynamism, diversity, and strength 
of the movement during these years. First, Marjory Mecklenburg and Judy Fink split 
from the NRLC and formed their own organization, American Citizens Concerned for 
Life (ACCL). Though the split between the two organizations might seem like a further 
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sign of discord, it in fact allowed the movement to survive and eased the tension within 
its leadership. Most importantly, it allowed right-to-life leaders to broaden their 
legislative agenda. The NRLC continued to focus on securing a human life amendment, 
while the ACCL focused on pursuing alternatives to abortion legislation, which included 
protections for pregnant women in the workplace and increased funding for family 
planning initiatives, among other legislation. Thus, the right-to-life movement had a 
bigger legislative impact in these years.  
 Second, during the 1976 election, right-to-lifers pursued their agenda in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties. Neither party had yet taken a definitive stand on 
abortion; thus, pro-lifers saw opportunities to promote their agenda in both parties. They 
urged pro-lifers to get involved in the political party of their choosing and to relentlessly 
push the abortion issue in state and local races as well as in Congressional races. The 
right-to-lifers also worked aggressively to make abortion a central issue in the 1976 
presidential election. They dogged Carter in particular, greeting him with protests as he 
campaigned across the country and demanding he take a stronger stance on abortion. In 
addition, one New York pro-lifer, Ellen McCormack, decided to launch her own 
presidential campaign as the Democratic pro-life candidate. By staying away from 
political endorsements and allowing right-to-lifers to be involved in whatever political 
party they chose, right-to-lifers succeeded in making the abortion issue central in the 
1976 election cycle and in making their movement a powerful voting bloc.  
 Third, right-to-lifers worked proactively during these years to avoid polarization 
and discord, both within their own ranks and between the movement and the rest of 
society. They needed to avoid any sort of polarization or dissension in order to strengthen 
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their coalition. These efforts took in place in different ways surrounding the issues of 
religion, race, politics, and strategy. After being almost torn apart over religious tension 
in 1973 and 1974, the movement’s leaders worked hard to promote religious unity and 
emphasize that a person of any religion could join the cause. Though they had 
vehemently disagreed with some Catholic leaders after Roe, Marjory Mecklenburg and 
other Protestant leaders now expressed strong support for the Catholic Church. Following 
the split between the ACCL and NRLC, the groups’ leaders also made it clear that they 
respected and accepted a wide range of strategies in right-to-life politics. Though they 
might disagree on strategy, right-to-lifers could still work together. National 
organizations allowed space and flexibility for grassroots activism, doing their best not to 
stifle the grassroots energy that was a crucial strength of the movement and to show that 
their cause was for all Americans. 
 Finally, while the NRLC and ACCL pursued traditional political strategies, some 
grassroots activists began trying out nonviolent direct action at abortion clinics. These 
right-to-lifers embraced strategies of the civil rights and antiwar movements. They began 
showing up at abortion clinics, forcing their way inside, and attempting to take over and 
shut down the clinics. Others began picketing clinics regularly. And while some leaders 
expressed concern about this new dramatic turn in tactics and its implications for the 
movement’s image, for the most part they were supportive, allowing these grassroots 
activists to implement this new strategy and giving it positive coverage in their main 
periodicals. The embrace of this bold new initiative further broadened the movement’s 
strategy in politics, especially at the grassroots level, and attracted a range of new 
activists. 
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 In the second half of the 1970s, right-to-lifers came the closest to achieving their 
broad-based movement. Their coalition now encompassed an extensive range of 
individuals and groups, from Republicans to Democrats, members of Congress to direct 
action advocates on the ground, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews from conservative to 
liberal. Their strategy was just as broad. Activists occupied clinics, picketed presidential 
candidates, testified in Congress, worked with the National Organization for Women 
(NOW) and the labor movement to protect women in the workplace, and traveled across 
the South starting new, local right-to-life groups. One of the reasons right-to-lifers were 
able to reach so many people and initiate such bold and broad strategies was timing—the 
small window before the rise of the Religious Right. In this liminal moment, the right-to-
life movement was able to pursue an aggressive political agenda at both the state and 
national level while courting supporters across the political and religious spectrums. But, 
increasingly, some right-to-lifers took a more hardline stance, chanting “No 
Compromise!” at rallies and demanding uniformity in strategy and beliefs, threatening 
the broad-based movement right-to-life leaders had so carefully crafted.  
4.1 The ACCL and NRLC Split 
 Throughout 1973 and 1974, the NRLC faced serious challenges, as its top leaders 
clashed over the issue of religion and strategy. Ultimately, the tension was too great, and 
though leaders in the organization worked to compromise and negotiate with one another, 
by mid 1974 Marjory Mecklenburg and Judy Fink, as well as a few other NRLC leaders, 
decided they could no longer work in the group. In August 1974, they split from that 
organization to form a new national pro-life group, American Citizens Concerned for 
Life (ACCL), which they hoped could fill in gaps in strategy and programs the NRLC 
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refused to consider. Though it might seem counterintuitive that a split in this main 
organization would strengthen the movement, the split between the NRLC and ACCL 
provided a release for the tension between right-to-life leaders like Marjory Mecklenburg, 
Judy Fink, Edward Golden, Randy Engel, and James McHugh. Furthermore, the 
separation helped broaden the scope of right-to-life strategy in national politics since it 
allowed the NRLC to continue its work toward a human life amendment while the ACCL 
pursued new legislative initiatives promoting alternatives to abortion.  
 Following nearly a year of disagreements among the NRLC Board of Directors, 
Mecklenburg tendered her resignation to the NRLC in August 1974. In a letter to the 
board, she framed her decision as driven by a desire to focus more time and money on 
state organization.421 The following day, Judy Fink sent her letter of resignation to 
Mildred Jefferson. Fink was more direct in explaining her departure. She expressed regret 
that the NRLC had not made much progress on its programs or been able “to make 
NRLC more than a Washington, D.C., lobbying office for political activities.”422 Along 
with Fink and Mecklenburg, Joseph Lampe, Warren Schaller, and Father William Hunt 
also left to start ACCL.423 While the NRLC remained steadfastly committed to passing a 
human life amendment, ACCL decided to expand its strategic repertoire to include a 
massive push for alternatives to abortion legislation. Though ACCL included support for 
a human life amendment in the group’s organizational goals, its members spent most of 
their time and energy working toward alternatives to abortion legislation to promote 
family planning, adoption, maternal health insurance, and better workplace protections 
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for pregnant women, a strategy ACCL leaders saw as “less militant than the National 
Right to Life Committee and more persuasive.”424 
 At the same time, both Fink and Mecklenburg reiterated their strong support for 
the NRLC and their respect for the NRLC’s approach to politics. Neither felt that the 
formation of ACCL weakened or fragmented the movement in any way, but rather they 
believed that having two separate national organizations would allow right-to-lifers to 
make even more progress. Fink explained to her former colleagues in October 1974 that 
the “factionalism” that had plagued the movement for the previous year was preventing 
them from making any progress at all.425 She emphasized ACCL’s belief that this split 
was the best option and that right-to-lifers should welcome myriad approaches to politics 
to try to achieve their goals: “It is my own strong conviction that only if we recognize 
that the pro life movement ‘belongs’ to no one group or organization but is composed, as 
it grows, of several groupings of people who should interact with each other will it 
succeed.”426 Like Mecklenburg, she made it clear that ACCL was “quite willing” to 
continue working with the NRLC.427 Mecklenburg too emphasized that the work of 
ACCL would complement, rather than detract from, NRLC’s strategy and would be more 
focused on “developing alternatives and finding solutions to social problems.”428 ACCL 
hoped to forge a path through the middle ground, working with right-to-lifers as well as 
others to develop and promote alternatives to abortion. 
 The NRLC accepted this decision as graciously as it could, though some NRLC 
members were critical of the new group. Writing to the board the week after Fink and 	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Mecklenburg resigned, Mildred Jefferson lamented the tension in their organization but 
emphasized that “the noble cause we represent must always be paramount—beyond 
individual egos or personal ambitions.”429 Jefferson also reassured the board members 
that Mecklenburg had assured her that ACCL would not try to compete with the NRLC. 
Similarly, when asked about the new ACCL, Ray White, NRLC’s new executive director, 
acknowledged that the NRLC and ACCL might sometimes be “opposite each other” on 
strategy but insisted that he welcomed ACCL’s formation and contributions to the right-
to-life movement.430 The two organizations would now have to find a way to work 
together to overcome the disagreements that had torn the NRLC apart during its first year 
of independence.   
 Coverage of the incident in the press described a slightly less amicable split and 
cited a number of different reasons for the creation of ACCL, from religion to strategy to 
the human life amendment to personality clashes.431 One prominent theme was tensions 
between “hard-liners” or “conservatives” and moderates in the movement. In part, these 
stories reported, Mecklenburg, Fink, and other ACCL leaders feared that the NRLC had 
been taken over by a “‘conservative’ part of the pro-life army,” a faction that did not 
embrace the same vision for a broad-based movement and took a more hardline approach 
on issues such as birth control and strategy.432 Several newspaper articles called the split 
a “departure of moderates” from the NRLC, which the new ACCL saw as too “politically 
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conservative, religiously fundamentalist and sexually puritan.”433 Though the media 
coverage of the split suggested a weakening right-to-life coalition, both the NRLC and 
ACCL downplayed the departure of the leaders who left to start ACCL. Mecklenburg and 
Fink continued to argue that the work of the ACCL would complement what the NRLC 
was already doing. Fink, for example, insisted that ACCL was looking forward to 
working together with NRLC in “broadening the base of the movement” as well as 
expanding the movement’s “sphere of influence.”434 
 Despite Fink’s reassurance, the formation of ACCL heralded a major departure in 
strategy from the NRLC with much greater emphasis on “positive solutions” to the issue 
of abortion beyond a single-minded focus on a human life amendment. ACCL’s 
reasoning for this shift in strategy relates back to the understanding of the abortion issue 
outlined in Chapter 2—the issue of violence in American society. Emphasizing this view 
of abortion as the ultimate sign of society’s violent decline, ACCL argued that the best 
solutions were nonviolent ones, what it called alternatives to abortion or positive 
solutions. Much of ACCL’s approach built upon the work Marjory Mecklenburg had 
already done with MCCL since the early 1970s when she first encouraged the group to 
support alternatives for abortion.435 During 1974, for example, MCCL leadership was still 
articulating that abortion and violence in society were inextricably linked. They viewed 
abortion as “a violent, destructive attempt to solve problems” and pushed for “positive 
solutions” like adoption, better family planning, and solving larger economic issues that 
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might push women to consider abortion.436 Mecklenburg then took this rhetoric and 
strategy and incorporated it into ACCL.  
 To highlight this aspect of its organization, ACCL emphasized that it was pro-life 
rather than antiabortion. For ACCL leaders, this was an important distinction. When 
Warren Schaller announced the formation of ACCL in August 1974, he had highlighted 
the group’s goals to implement “nonviolent solutions for the problems of women and 
children” and to “meet the increasing needs of the rapidly expanding pro-life 
movement.”437 And a few years later, Marjory Mecklenburg detailed ACCL’s stance: 
“We are not just against abortion, but truly are for alternatives to abortion, for non-violent 
solutions to social and economic problems, and for strengthening of the family.”438 For 
Mecklenburg, ACCL’s approach was more flexible and allowed right-to-lifers to build a 
truly broad-based coalition. ACCL’s leaders welcomed other right-to-lifers who shared 
this vision, and as they built up ACCL, Mecklenburg, Fink, and Schaller highlighted the 
coalition they were working with which included “antiwar pacifists, feminists and 
blacks” all while emphasizing that the group’s focus would be on alternatives to 
abortion.439 
 As they went their separate way from the NRLC, ACCL and its members 
developed a robust pro-life agenda supporting alternatives to abortion including birth 
control and family planning, special “life support centers” for pregnant women, and legal 
protections for women in the workplace. Family planning initiatives were especially 
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central to ACCL’s mission and had also been part of the impetus for Fink and 
Mecklenburg to form the group in the first place. In 1974, the NRLC had decided to take 
a neutral stance on contraceptives, in part because of its strong Catholic base and also 
because of a desire to appeal to Catholics, Protestants, and others who might have widely 
varied stances on contraception. Fink and Mecklenburg had played a central role in 
pushing for the neutral policy, but ultimately they decided they wanted to do more. 
Furthermore, despite the NRLC’s neutrality on the issue and “countless others” who 
shared her view in the movement, Mecklenburg’s strong stance in favor of family 
planning and birth control had made her a frequent target of criticism among some NRLC 
members and others in the movement.440 Given her treatment, she worried that other 
right-to-lifers who were in favor of birth control might also feel out of place.441 Now that 
ACCL was its own entity, right-to-lifers who supported contraception as a solution to the 
abortion issue had their own right-to-life organization.  
 ACCL was committed to birth control as a viable alternative to abortion and 
wanted the freedom to support legislation to make contraception more accessible. For 
ACCL’s leaders, it was vital that there was room for this approach in order to allow the 
movement to continue to broaden its base and strategic initiatives. Marjory Mecklenburg 
had defended right-to-lifers such as herself in a letter to a friend in April 1974 following 
Randy Engel’s criticism of her leadership in the NRLC.442 She worried about activists 
totally opposed to birth control because it limited the movement’s approaches to strategy. 
“I do not consider my husband or myself or the countless others who share our views as 	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second class members of this movement,” she wrote, “We are just as opposed to abortion 
as you and Randy [Engel] are and I dare say people like us are necessary to attract the 
mainstream of American to this position.”443 Clearly, Mecklenburg and other ACCL 
members believed their support of birth control would extend the movement’s base of 
support and also help reduce the number of abortions. They pushed their agenda here in a 
number of ways. In addition to supporting family planning legislation introduced by 
Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN), ACCL reached out to Senator Ted Kennedy in 1975 to 
express the group’s support for birth control and its agreement with him that any human 
life amendment should not limit access to contraception.444 The group also publicly 
supported improving sex education and family planning initiatives for the nation’s 
teenagers and young adults. In a letter to the editor in September 1979, for instance, 
Mecklenburg pushed for better sex education, including educating young people about 
contraceptive use.445 In fact, she argued that “prevention programs” should be the 
“highest priority.”446  
 In addition to promoting greater access to and education about birth control, 
ACCL’s members supported initiatives that would improve the material conditions of 
pregnant women. They did not want women to be forced to choose abortion because of 
any economic or social pressure. Mecklenburg summed up the group’s stance in June 
1975:  
 We need to ask what are the conditions of life which confront women who are 
 troubled by an unintended pregnancy but who do not choose abortion…What is 
 society’s duty to them and to the children they will bear?...have these women 
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 been largely ignored by the public sector and much of the private sector, and been 
 pushed into the background or eliminated totally from the abortion debate?447  
 
She strongly defended the rights of pregnant women and their unborn children and even 
called pregnant women “a disadvantaged class suffering a special kind of 
discrimination.”448 This strong stance led ACCL to support legislation that would provide 
resources for pregnant women as well as protect their right to health insurance coverage. 
In 1975, ACCL supported a variety of legislative initiatives introduced by Senator Bayh, 
which included the Life Support Centers Act of 1975, the Equity in Health Insurance Act, 
funding for maternal and child health services as well as funding for family planning and 
adoption services.449 And in 1977, Marjory Mecklenburg testified on behalf of ACCL 
before a Senate committee in support of the Opportunities for Adoption Act of 1977, 
which she saw as a “constructive alternative” to abortion.450 
 Along with supporting government programs and resources for pregnant women, 
ACCL also sought more protections for women in the workplace and opposed any 
discrimination against pregnant women or mothers in the labor force. In 1977, the 
organization became involved in a case in which a woman had lost her insurance benefits 
once her employer found out about her pregnancy. In cooperation with “a broad-based 
coalition of labor, human rights, and women’s groups,” ACCL supported legislation that 
would require companies to offer pregnancy benefits in their insurance plans.451 ACCL 
sent one of its members, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, to testify on its behalf at a Senate 	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committee hearing on the bill, where she explained why a right-to-life organization 
would care about job discrimination against pregnant women: “When a woman is faced 
with losing her income for several weeks…or perhaps losing her job because of 
pregnancy, her decision to abort cannot be said to be the product of free choice but of 
economic coercion.”452 Job discrimination remained a concern for ACCL, and in 1979, 
the organization again became involved in a case in which a firefighter in Iowa lost her 
job because she needed to breastfeed her baby.453 Again working with a number of other 
organizations, ACCL helped pass a law that protected women from discrimination based 
on pregnancy and motherhood. In their endeavors to improve the workplace conditions 
for pregnant women and mothers, ACCL’s activists hoped to solve economic problems 
that might force women to choose abortion.  
 In all of this, ACCL showed its willingness to compromise on many points and 
forge a middle ground on the abortion issue, something that set the group apart from the 
hardline stances taken by many other right-to-lifers. While the human life amendment 
was still one of their stated, official goals, ACCL’s members were willing to work in the 
meantime on issues that other right-to-lifers ignored and to compromise in order to get 
what they wanted. For instance, the legislation for Life Support Centers also included 
funding for abortion referral services.454 For many activists, this would have been a point 
of no compromise and the end of their support for the legislation, but ACCL decided to 
support it anyway. The group believed that, despite the funding for abortion referral 
services, in the long term the legislation would help reduce the number of abortions. 
Mecklenburg explained this position to a donor in May 1977, “None of the legislation we 	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work on will save all babies from abortion but it will save some.”455 To another right-to-
lifer, she explained that ACCL’s goal was to “save as many babies as possible each day” 
even if that meant compromising with those who supported abortion rights.456 ACCL 
focused on reducing the number of abortions through any legislative means necessary, 
and the group’s willingness to compromise was increasingly important as more and more 
right-to-lifers were trumpeting a new message of “No compromise.”457  
 This middle-of-the-road approach garnered ACCL some interesting allies outside 
the right-to-life movement. At various points, ACCL engaged in dialogue with different 
women’s groups, such as during the International Women’s Year Conference in 1977 and 
with NOW in 1979.458  Mecklenburg and ACCL reasoned that since both groups 
supported legislation to protect pregnant workers, they could find common ground on 
other issues as well.459 In addition, ACCL worked on legislation with both Republicans 
and Democrats. Whether it was working with Senator Ted Kennedy, Senator Birch Bayh, 
or President Ford, ACCL was willing to work with any politician with whom they could 
find some common ground, regardless of their political affiliation. In fact, ACCL, and 
Marjory Mecklenburg in particular, gained a reputation for being able to build bridges 
with liberal members of Congress when it came to alternatives to abortion legislation.460 
And when working on legislation regarding protections for pregnant women in the 
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workplace, ACCL even reached out to the labor movement in hopes of gaining new 
allies.461 Its willingness to work with these allies outside, and sometimes at odds with, the 
right-to-life movement was vital. From 1975 on, more and more right-to-lifers argued 
that compromise on the abortion issue was unacceptable and that any work supporting 
alternatives to abortion was merely a distraction from the human life amendment.462 
Nevertheless, ACCL persevered in its work, arguing that pro-life groups who showed 
“concern for the fetus only” ignored “their responsibility for the born child, the family 
and the mother’s problems.”463  
 In the end, ACCL made alternatives to abortion a central part of right-to-life 
strategy in the late 1970s, and Fink and Mecklenburg celebrated the course they had 
charted. In October 1978, Fink gushed to Mecklenburg about ACCL, “Anyhow, the 
enormity of this really overwhelms me. I’m terribly excited and thrilled by it, because 
you realize that this was what we left NRLC for? To ‘do both’—work on legal protection 
and alternatives? Looks like we’re winning our fight before NRLC wins theirs.”464 Most 
importantly, ACCL held space in the movement for right-to-lifers who were more 
moderate and willing to compromise, and they argued that their work was categorically 
different than other activism. In Mecklenburg’s opinion, the difference was clear. “We do 
not burn; we do not have hit lists; nor do we participate in any partisan political activity,” 
she informed John Mitchell in 1979, “We do not condemn people who may have 
different ethical or moral views; on the contrary, we work with them and have often 
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found them to be effective allies.”465 ACCL helped find a middle ground for the right-to-
life movement and the rest of American society, working on solutions its members 
believed would reduce the number of abortions and also have the support of the majority 
of Americans. The group’s work had such an impact that even the Carter administration 
took notice and considered appointing Mecklenburg to a position for the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.466 
 In the meantime, the NRLC also secured some impressive achievements. The 
organization continued its work for a human life amendment and succeeded in making 
the amendment the litmus test for politicians who wanted right-to-life support in the 1976 
elections. The NRLC also organized an aggressive campaign to make abortion the central 
issue of that election cycle. By 1976, its annual budget had grown to $400,000 and was 
projected to soon top $500,000.467 The group’s monthly publication, The National Right 
to Life News, was the prime pro-life publication for right-to-lifers across the country. 
Perhaps its greatest achievement in the late 1970s was the Hyde Amendment, which 
prohibited federal funding for abortions and which the NRLC called a “giant step” 
toward ending legal abortion.468 
 Though the split between the NRLC and ACCL had the potential to weaken the 
right-to-life movement, it actually allowed right-to-lifers to diversify their political 
strategy. The NRLC pursued the human life amendment and kept abortion on the nation’s 
agenda while ACCL forged new paths in pursuing alternatives to abortion legislation and 	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reaching out to new allies outside the movement. And despite some disagreements on 
strategy, right-to-lifers of the NRLC and ACCL continued to work together, gathering 
together each year for the March for Life and the NRLC Convention.469 With the 
combined efforts of the NRLC and ACCL in national politics and in Congress, as well as 
the support of grassroots activists in the states, the movement initiated a broad legislative 
strategy, attacking abortion on a number of fronts and continuing the work to broaden 
their base of support and reach out to all Americans.  
4.2 The 1976 Presidential Election 
 In the early 1970s, the right-to-life movement developed a bold political strategy 
that had carried over into national politics following Roe v. Wade. This strategy involved 
research and surveys on politicians’ stances on abortion, relentless lobbying efforts at 
both the state and national levels, and a sustained grassroots mobilization on the abortion 
issue. Right-to-lifers in the states could be quickly mobilized to show up at their local 
town council meetings, at the state capitol, or at their Congress member’s office in 
Washington, D.C. In the wake of Roe, the movement had successfully channeled this 
grassroots approach into supporting a human life amendment. But now the movement 
had a bigger target—the presidency—as the campaigns for the 1976 election cycle began. 
Its leadership had been focused on this presidential election since at least 1974.470 And in 
the states, leaders had worked steadfastly since the early 1970s to get pro-lifers actively 
engaged in party politics. Now they pressured both major parties to pay attention to their 
movement and to adopt a right-to-life plank in their party platforms. They also worked 
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insistently with both Democrats and Republicans to push the parties in a pro-life 
direction. Right-to-lifers wanted to make abortion the main election issue for candidates, 
both political parties, potential right-to-life allies, and ultimately, for all voters. Most of 
all, right-to-lifers urged each presidential candidate to be pro-life, picketing Carter on the 
campaign trail, pushing Ford to take a stronger stand against abortion, and even running 
their own pro-life candidate. The 1976 election presented a major opportunity in both 
political parties, in the White House, and with new groups of voters. 
 The right-to-lifers had been testing their strength and influence in national politics 
for several years and had already turned their attention to the current administration. 
Almost as soon as Ford became president after Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1974, 
right-to-lifers began to pressure him on his stance on abortion and on his choice for vice 
president.471 Their denunciation of his pick for vice president was their boldest foray into 
presidential politics yet. When Ford became president, he chose Nelson Rockefeller as 
his nominee for the now vacant office of the vice president and submitted him to 
Congress for confirmation, in accordance with the recently adopted Twenty-fifth 
Amendment.472 But right-to-lifers, especially those who got their start in activism in New 
York, were holding a grudge against Rockefeller, the former governor of that state; 
indeed, they saw him as their enemy. Their animus was due to Rockefeller’s 1972 veto of 
a bill that would have overturned legal abortion in New York. This veto by Rockefeller, 
then governor of the state, drew immense opposition from right-to-lifers across the 
country. Now the NRLC, the Catholic Church, and other right-to-lifers argued that he 
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was an “unacceptable” choice for vice president, due to his past record on abortion.473 Ed 
Golden, who had led New York State Right-to-Life during Rockefeller’s tenure as 
governor, testified on behalf of the NRLC at a hearing on Rockefeller’s confirmation. He 
called on the senators to reject Rockefeller in favor of a candidate who “embraces the 
principle of human life as sacred.”474 And prior to Rockefeller’s confirmation, members 
of the Senate Rules Committee told reporters they were receiving thousands of letters 
opposing his nomination.475 Right-to-lifers believed they deserved a say in presidential 
politics and were already drawing a hard line for future presidents and vice presidents—
they must be pro-life if they expected to get the support of the movement.  
 Of course, right-to-lifers employed a similar strategy in the 1974 Congressional 
midterm elections as well. Their approach for the 1974 midterms was focused on single-
issue voting; they would vigorously support any pro-life candidate, regardless of the 
candidate’s partisan affiliation, and fiercely criticize any candidate who was pro-choice 
or who refused to take a decisive stand on the abortion issue. They even reprimanded pro-
life politicians who dared endorse a candidate that supported abortion rights. For 
example, in 1974, right-to-lifers attacked Senator James L. Buckley, who had been one of 
their staunchest allies in Congress, for his support of a pro-choice Republican in a 
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congressional race in Ohio.476 It was prominent pro-lifer and NRLC member Jack 
Willke’s home district and had long been a Republican stronghold. Willke strongly 
supported the Democrat, a pro-life candidate. Furthermore, he criticized the Republican 
Party and Senator Buckley for endorsing the Republican candidate, a supporter of 
reproductive rights. Willke was dismayed that Buckley “waffled and dodged and hedged” 
when pro-lifers asked about his support for the candidate.477 He even asserted that 
abortion mattered more than the Watergate scandal in this election.478 The message was 
clear: no matter a politician’s party affiliation or previous stances on abortion legislation, 
he or she must be pro-life and support pro-life candidates in order to get the support of 
the movement. Already, many activists were showing their unwillingness to compromise 
and their devotion to single-issue voting in national elections. Following the 1974 
midterms, right-to-lifers were pleased with the results of this strategy and of their efforts 
in electoral politics. Ray White, Executive Director of the NRLC, expressed his relief at 
the election results: “Our overall picture is one of optimism. Right-to-Life people have 
had effects on the political scene that may never be fully assessed.”479 In 1976, the right-
to-lifers hoped to build on this success and elect more pro-life members of Congress and 
perhaps a pro-life president. 
 The first thing right-to-lifers did in 1976 was work to make abortion the main 
election issue. They wanted to ensure that politicians paid attention to the movement and 
felt pressured to take a firm right-to-life stance. This task required the work of right-to-
lifers in the national movement as well as state and local activists. State activists worked 
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to organize in each Congressional district so that every member of Congress was made 
aware of the abortion issue, from the 1974 midterm elections and into 1976.480 Local 
groups like Celebrate Life in New York kept their members up-to-date on the latest 
political news. Celebrate Life also updated its Practical Politics Kit to keep right-to-lifers 
aware of the latest legislative and political strategies.481 As the 1976 campaigns began, 
these right-to-lifers were ready to make abortion a central election issue and keep it in the 
news. The Catholic bishops played a major role in pressuring Carter and Ford to take 
strong stances against abortion. They met with both candidates, explaining the Catholic 
Church’s concerns about abortion and encouraging them to adopt a pro-life stance.482 
Likewise, the NRLC and ACCL also raised awareness about abortion with the Ford and 
Carter campaigns. Marjory Mecklenburg even began working for the Ford campaign, 
collecting information on right-to-life groups across the country and giving advice for 
how Ford should talk about abortion if it came up in the debates.483 She continued to push 
his campaign to engage with right-to-lifers and address the abortion issue. For the NRLC 
and other right-to-lifers, the central theme for the 1976 elections was “No life-no vote!” 
signaling their firm stance on abortion and their unwillingness to compromise.484 All this 
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work paid off. Already by October 1975, reporters at the Washington Star noted that the 
right-to-lifers were “emerging as the single most vocal and identifiable one-issue bloc” in 
the 1976 election.485 By the start of 1976, the NRLC was happy with the media’s 
reporting on the movement. Ray White believed that right-to-lifers had succeeded in 
making abortion “the hottest political issue in the ’76 campaign” and in causing the 
presidential candidates to “quake with concern over the abortion issue.”486 
 State groups and the NRLC also continued the essential work of vetting all 
political candidates in both parties and assessing each candidate’s stance on right-to-life 
issues. They then provided their members, and any other interested parties, with 
extensive reports in order to guide their voting. These groups generally had official 
policies against endorsing specific candidates and claimed that their candidate surveys 
were simply to educate voters and help them make an informed choice. Nevertheless, 
over the course of the election cycle, many of these groups made decisive statements 
about how right-to-lifers should be voting. The issue they focused on in the 1976 election 
was the human life amendment. It now served as a litmus test for all political candidates. 
For example, MCCL used it to differentiate between the Republican candidates for the 
open Senate seat in Minnesota in 1976. The defining feature of the candidate endorsed by 
the party, Jerry Brekke, was that he “refused” to support a human life amendment despite 
the fact that he claimed to be pro-life.487 Though MCCL still maintained that it did not 
want to make an endorsement of any candidates, in this instance the group made it clear 
that the human life amendment had to be the deciding factor. NRLC focused on the 
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presidential candidates for each party, informing its members in multiple mailings about 
where each candidate stood on abortion and on the human life amendment.488 And in 
September 1976, the leaders of the NRLC, NYPLC, the Christian Action Council, and 
Americans Against Abortion met in Oklahoma to discuss pro-life strategy in the 
upcoming election and concluded, “The committed Pro-life voter cannot in conscience 
vote for a candidate who will not endorse a Human Life Amendment.”489  By the start of 
1976, the right-to-lifers’ focus had narrowed to Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford.  
 Carter drew most of their ire for his more moderate stance on abortion.490 Though 
Carter professed to be personally pro-life and promised to do what he could to 
“discourage abortion,” neither Carter nor his running mate, Walter Mondale, supported 
any type of human life amendment.491 Because of this, pro-lifers did not support Carter 
and Mondale, even as the two tried to distance themselves from the Democratic Party’s 
platform supporting abortion rights.492 Moreover, some right-to-lifers feared Carter and 
many Democrats were hostile to the movement. Fran Watson described the cold 
treatment right-to-lifers had received from Carter’s campaign at the Democratic National 
Convention in July 1976. She argued, “The pro-life movement cannot support Jimmy 
Carter” because “it was Jimmy Carter and his representatives who forced the Democratic 
Party to go on record as endorsing abortion.”493 These activists grew so upset with Carter 
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and Mondale that as the presidential election neared some began picketing Carter’s 
campaign stops across the country from Pennsylvania to Minnesota to Missouri.494 They 
hoped to pressure Carter to take a firmer stance against abortion and perhaps come 
around to supporting a human life amendment. Archbishop Joseph Bernardin spoke for 
most right-to-lifers when he challenged Carter, “Personal opposition is not enough.”495 
 Ford did not escape criticism either, though he ultimately became the best option 
for many in the movement. For many Republican right-to-lifers, Ford was actually their 
second choice; Ronald Reagan had been their first. Right-to-lifers liked that Reagan took 
a bold stand against abortion, in contrast to Ford’s more centrist approach.496 Unlike 
Reagan, Ford was already in a little trouble with the right-to-lifers for choosing 
Rockefeller to be his vice president.497 And his stance on the human life amendment was 
also problematic. Ford favored a states’ rights amendment, as right-to-lifers called it, 
which would allow states to decide the abortion issue for themselves. The NRLC, ACCL, 
and other right-to-lifers had already made it clear that they would accept nothing less than 
a human life amendment that added constitutional protection for the unborn. But when 
Ford received the nomination, most Republican pro-lifers fell in line, despite Ford’s 
faults on abortion. They argued that Ford was the best option because he was at least 
somewhat sympathetic to their cause. Ford supported such endeavors as the Hyde 	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Amendment, which restricted federal funding for abortion, and had also chosen Bob 
Dole, who had a proven right-to-life record, to be his running mate.498 When Marjory 
Mecklenburg joined the Ford campaign, she defended his stance on abortion: “If 
candidate ‘A’ represents our viewpoint more nearly than candidate ‘B,’ then we should 
work for candidate ‘A.’”499 Ford was not the perfect pro-life candidate but he was close 
enough. 
 For some right-to-lifers, however, neither Ford nor Carter was an acceptable 
choice, and they decided to support their own candidate, New York right-to-lifer Ellen 
McCormack. McCormack was a seasoned activist and had been a leader of the group 
Women for the Unborn. She had spent years writing and speaking against abortion, 
publishing many editorials denouncing abortion as well as the women’s rights movement. 
In 1976, she decided to run in the Democratic primary because none of the candidates 
were pro-life enough in her opinion, and she wanted to challenge the “feminist power” 
that had hijacked the Democratic Party.500 McCormack also feared that if the right-to-
lifers did not run a pro-life candidate, the Democratic Party would continue to ignore 
them and Congress itself might not act on the abortion issue for another four years.501 
Now she decided to try to win the Democratic nomination, running a campaign centered 
on her right-to-life beliefs. In part, her campaign was another way to bring attention to 
the abortion issue in the election cycle—McCormack and her supporters hoped to raise 	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enough money to produce a series of pro-life commercials.502 Though she did not gain 
widespread support, sending only seven delegates to the Democratic National Convention 
that July, her supporters were pleased with her showing in the primary.503 McCormack 
was encouraged enough with her results in 1976 that in 1980 she would decide to enter 
the presidential race again.504   
 As the 1976 election neared, the movement’s attention turned to each of the major 
parties and their platforms. There was still a sense among right-to-lifers that they had a 
role to play in both parties, and in 1976 right-to-lifers demanded decisive statements 
opposing abortion or, if they could not achieve that, wanted to prevent the parties from 
adding any platform planks supporting abortion rights. They faced challenges at both 
national conventions that summer. Ellen McCormack and her contingent continued to 
press the pro-life issue at the Democratic National Convention in July.505 Activists also 
made their presence felt at the Republican National Convention that summer, to the 
chagrin of some Republicans. At least one attendee quipped, “This is still a Protestant 
country,” after the party adopted a plank sympathetic to right-to-lifers.506 Though 
Republicans did not explicitly endorse a human life amendment, they did adopt a plank at 
the convention stating that they wanted more “public dialogue on abortion” and that they 
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supported the work of right-to-lifers.507 Democrats, on the other hand, resisted right-to-
life pleas. They said they respected the complex nature of the abortion debate but did not 
support a human life amendment.508 Though right-to-lifers did not get the definitive 
statements they wanted from either party, they had succeeded in making abortion an issue 
that both parties were forced to address.  
 While working frantically to influence Ford, Carter, and both parties, right-to-
lifers also saw the election as an opportunity to reach new allies, especially evangelicals. 
The movement had previously tried, and failed, in its outreach efforts to evangelicals in 
1973 and 1974 but they remained undeterred. In fact, the 1976 election renewed right-to-
lifers’ efforts to recruit them. Despite the fact that Carter was an evangelical himself, the 
movement thought evangelicals might reject him based on his views on abortion. 
Evangelical right-to-lifers also helped make abortion a campaign issue, reminding their 
fellow evangelicals as well as both Ford and Carter that evangelicals viewed legalized 
abortion as a grave problem. Eugene Linse of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod sent 
out a letter to all pastors in his denomination with a not-so-subtle suggestion that only 
one candidate was in line with “the Judeo-Christian heritage” when it came to abortion.509 
The Christian Action Council, a new evangelical pro-life group, sought a meeting with 
President Ford to discuss the abortion issue in light of the upcoming election, reminding 
him of the “vast numbers of biblical Protestants…who are deeply distressed by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Republican Party Platform, August 16, 1976, Campaign material, Box C25, Folder 1, Ford Committee 
Records. Right-to-lifers were pleased with the platform and even credited Ronald Reagan with helping it 
pass. The Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life, Lifeletter #12, August 23, 1976, Box 1, Folder 1, Gergen 
Files. 
508 Robert J. O’Keefe, “Abortion Plank Bewailed,” July 15, 1976, Box 45, Folder 7, ACCL Records; 
“Bernardin Hits Abortion Plank,” July 4, 1976, Box 1, Folder 1, Gergen Files.  
509 Eugene Linse to Pastor, October 25, 1976, Box 45, Folder 2, ACCL Records. 
  193  
present Court-mandated, taxpayer-funded policy of mass extermination of the unborn.”510 
And Marjory Mecklenburg, who had joined Ford’s campaign officially, warned the Ford 
Campaign that Southern Baptists were paying attention to the abortion issue and that the 
campaign should highlight the candidates’ divergent stances on abortion in upcoming 
debates.511 The right-to-lifers’ rhetoric seemed to have some effect as they kept the 
abortion issue and evangelicals in the spotlight throughout the campaign. A Washington 
Post article described President Ford’s use of the abortion issue to try to woo 
evangelicals, even as it noted that evangelical support for Carter was slipping.512 Right-
to-lifers did not believe that Carter’s evangelical faith would automatically give him the 
evangelical vote. They were confident that evangelicals already recognized the 
seriousness of the abortion issue and would vote accordingly. Though previous attempts 
at reaching evangelicals had failed, the 1976 election provided a new and exciting 
opportunity for right-to-lifers to continue expanding their movement among evangelicals. 
 The 1976 election presented pro-lifers with a new chance to broaden the base of 
their movement and make a big impact. Throughout 1975 and into 1976, the movement 
pushed its agenda in both major political parties as well as with their new evangelical 
allies. Right-to-lifers demanded the presidential candidates acknowledge the abortion 
issue and take a stand. Moreover, the human life amendment emerged as the litmus test, 
which the movement used to decide which candidates it could support and to guide right-
to-life voting across the country. Right-to-lifers put so much stock in this election that 
they even had their own candidate in the race, Ellen McCormack. While they did not get 	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the pro-life president they wanted, right-to-lifers made abortion an issue that both parties 
had to pay attention to, broadened their base of support, and set the stage for abortion to 
be a central issue in subsequent elections. 
4.3 Attempting to Avoid Polarization 
 One of the highest priorities for the movement during this time was avoiding 
polarization that might tear it apart, alienate potential allies, or turn American society 
against its agenda. Many right-to-lifers believed their vision for a broad-based coalition 
was the best way to avoid such fracture. As far as these activists were concerned, 
involvement in the movement was still open to any person who expressed a concern for 
life and opposed abortion, regardless of their politics, religious affiliation, or preferred 
strategy. Because of this commitment to the broad-based ideal, right-to-lifers continued 
to work together to understand and cooperate even if they might disagree with each other 
over strategy, ideology, or politics. In the mid to late 1970s, right-to-lifers tried to present 
a united front. Ruth Karim described the uniqueness of the movement as she saw it, “I 
have seen the pro-abortion forces completely baffled by the joyous fellowship so evident 
at pro-life gatherings…The NRLC can function effectively only if we put aside all 
pettiness and accept ourselves and each other as hand picked by God to do a job.”513 In 
fact, right-to-lifers saw their unity and diversity as a major strength during the late 1970s. 
Because of their determination in these years to avoid fractures along political, religious, 
strategic, and racial fault lines, right-to-lifers fostered a truly broad-based coalition and 
welcomed a diverse group of activists with differing approaches to politics, strategy, and 
religion, representing their broadest array of the American population. 
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 In politics, the movement embraced activists from both the left and the right of 
the political spectrum, forming an odd coalition that spanned vast differences. Left-wing 
right-to-lifers became particularly active during these years. These activists often 
approached the abortion issue as it related to their activism in the antiwar, antinuclear, or 
labor movements, forging important connections between abortion and other issues. In 
1978, for example, the Catholic Peace Fellowship, an antiwar group formed in response 
to the Vietnam War, held its annual conference with the theme, “Nuclear Disarmament 
and Right to Life,” to discuss the connections between the two movements.514 The main 
event of the conference was Daniel Berrigan’s keynote address on “The Christian 
Community’s Responsibility for Human Life: A Critique.”515 Here the peace movement 
and antinuclear activism converged with the right-to-life movement, and left-wing right-
to-lifers saw a natural partnership in their causes.  
 Other groups of left-wing activists followed a similar trajectory in the second half 
of the 1970s. In 1979, Juli Loesch, who had been extensively involved in the antiwar and 
nuclear disarmament movements, founded Pro-lifers for Survival. The group grew out of 
her involvement in leftist politics in the 1960s and 1970s—her work with the United 
Farm Workers, Pax Christi, and Mobilization for Survival. Loesch was also an outspoken 
feminist, arguing that activists could support both the Equal Rights Amendment as well 
as the right-to-life movement.516 She described Pro-lifers for Survival as providing 
opportunities for those people who shared a deep concern for abortion and for the issues 	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of war and nuclear weapons: pro-lifers who were upset that their movement ignored the 
issue of nuclear weapons and “peacenik/antinukers” who were upset that theirs too often 
supported abortion rights.517 SOUL, the organization of college pro-lifers founded in the 
early 1970s, also took a decidedly left turn in its politics. In September 1975, its 
newsletter featured articles on the United Farm Workers, pro-life feminism, and direct 
action, and by the end of the 1970s the group’s members were distributing literature on 
feminism and nuclear war in addition to their right-to-life work.518 These groups, like the 
Catholic Peace Fellowship, Pro-lifers for Survival, and SOUL, served to further broaden 
the base of the movement and incorporate new ideas and approaches to abortion. They 
also show that right-to-life activism during these years was not confined to one side of 
the political spectrum or to either of the major political parties.   
 At the same time, the movement also attracted new members whose politics were 
decidedly conservative. Perhaps most notably, a strong anti-feminist cohort developed, 
opposing many of the policies of the Democrats as well as the Equal Rights Amendment. 
Phyllis Schlafly emerged during these years as an outspoken critic of feminism and the 
ERA. She had been building a conservative campaign against the ERA since the early 
1970s, connecting the ERA and feminism to abortion. In the mid-1970s, she became even 
more vocal about her concerns. She warned right-to-lifers, “The women’s libbers expect 
E.R.A. to be the constitutional means to assure and make permanent their goal of 
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unlimited abortion on demand.”519 Her views gained traction in the movement. At the 
1976 National Right to Life Convention, she chaired a panel titled “What’s Wrong with 
ERA?”520 Ellen McCormack, the right-to-life presidential candidate, also warned that the 
ERA was dangerous for the movement.521 These conservative voices would become even 
more prominent over the next several years as Schlafly and other activists continued 
connecting their opposition of abortion to anti-feminism and other conservative aims. But 
in the mid to late 1970s, they existed alongside more moderate, liberal, and even left-
wing right-to-lifers. From Phyllis Schlafly to Juli Loesch, activists during this time 
approached the abortion issue in widely divergent ways, and the movement continued to 
welcome right-to-lifers of all political persuasions. 
 In addition to its work in politics, the movement also turned its attention to racial 
fault lines in American society and attempted to attract more African Americans to the 
cause. Right-to-lifers had long tried to connect issues of race and abortion, either linking 
the fight against legal abortion to the fight for civil rights or arguing that abortion 
disproportionately affected minorities.522 They pushed this message even more in the mid 
to late 1970s. Again, their goal was a broad-based coalition that avoided any sort of 
polarization—be it religious, political, or racial. By addressing the issue of race, right-to-
lifers were making an argument that their movement represented all Americans, even 
though it had involved mostly white Americans thus far. There were only a few 
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prominent African American right-to-life leaders in the 1970s, such as Mildred Jefferson, 
who was president of the NRLC, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, and Erma Craven, a social 
worker and longtime MCCL member.523 Right-to-lifers wanted to do better.  
 The most consistent message the movement sent to African Americans was that 
abortion was genocide for minority communities. In 1976, Michael Novak pointed to the 
abortion statistics for 1975 and asked, “Who now defends the rights of unborn black 
children?”524 ACCL kept a copy of the article in its records with the word “GENOCIDE” 
scrawled across the top. The issue of race also came up in discussions of federal funding 
for abortion. When California said it would use state money to fill the funding gap 
following the Hyde Amendment’s restriction of federal funding for abortion, the 
California Pro-life Council condemned the decision and a state senator called it “waging 
a war of genocide against Latins, Blacks, and Indians.”525 The genocide trope was an old 
right-to-life favorite. Activists had been making comparisons between Nazi Germany, the 
Holocaust, and abortion in America since the late 1960s, but in the late 1970s they 
targeted that language toward minority groups in the United States. By framing the issue 
of abortion and race in such strong terms, the right-to-lifers cast their movement as the 
true defender of minority rights in America. In their opinion, right-to-lifers were, after all, 
defending minorities from genocide. At the 1976 NRLC convention, Erma Craven and 
two colleagues even led a panel that called the movement the  “cornerstone of the 	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minorities struggle for human rights.”526 Though white Catholics and Protestants had 
dominated the movement up to this point, right-to-lifers now tried to convince minorities 
in the nation that they were the ones who truly cared about minority rights. Right-to-lifers 
hoped abortion could be an issue that would transcend racial divisions and overcome the 
polarization between white and black Americans. 
 The focus on avoiding political and racial discord was reaching new groups and 
reinvigorating right-to-life activism, but as before, religion remained a sensitive subject. 
Right-to-lifers did not want a movement that was only for Catholics or only for 
Protestants but one that welcomed Americans of any religion. To mitigate any religious 
divisions, some leaders suggested they avoid framing abortion as a religious issue 
altogether—a strategy dating back to the late 1960s. In February 1974, as the NRLC 
discussed the best tactics for having religious leaders testify at legislative hearings, 
Warren Schaller advised, “Abortion is not an issue to be discussed in terms of religious 
heritage or moral background and training. We are talking about a human value which 
should be guaranteed by the Constitution.”527 Still, many right-to-lifers were concerned 
about how the media depicted the movement as a religious crusade and wanted to 
challenge this portrayal. They feared it could polarize the movement from the rest of 
American society. As ACCL’s leaders noted in their Executive Meeting in April 1975, 
“Rightly or wrongly, the words ‘life’ and ‘Right to Life’ now mean in the public mind 
political activist, religious sectarianism. They shouldn’t, but they do.”528 Combating these 
stereotypes and being mindful about the role of religion in the movement would be a 
recurring theme for right-to-lifers through the end of the decade. It gave the movement 	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another opportunity to fight polarization along religious lines and to continue building a 
broad-based coalition. 
 Because of previous disagreements over religion and their ongoing desire to 
diversify their base of support, both the NRLC and ACCL were anxious to make sure 
Americans of all religions felt welcome in the movement. In a drastic shift from religious 
tension in the aftermath of Roe, they even began using religion to present a united front. 
Both groups believed religion could bring Americans together in opposition to abortion. 
Shortly after its formation in 1974, ACCL organized the first National Prayer Breakfast 
for Life in Washington, D.C., and it quickly became an annual tradition. After two 
successful events, Marjory Mecklenburg described its impact, “It…fills the need of 
movement members to express their concern in spiritual terms…In addition, it has 
provided an effective vehicle to show religious unity in opposition to unregulated 
abortion and to demonstrate a pro-life philosophy encompassing a broad range of 
concerns.”529 The NRLC, for its part, continued its outreach to new religious groups. In 
1974, the NRLC began an extensive campaign within two conservative Protestant 
denominations—the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and the Southern Baptist 
Convention.530 And though its prime focus was on the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 
the NRLC also hoped to reach out to all Lutherans by making contact with local Lutheran 
pastors. In these endeavors, the NRLC and ACCL firmly insisted that the vast majority of 
Americans in the country’s three main faiths—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—were 
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united in opposition to “permissive pro-abortion positions.”531 They believed that the 
abortion issue did not need to divide Americans along religious lines, and any American 
of any religious tradition could and should get involved in right-to-life politics.  
 Perhaps most indicative of this shift on religion and the desire to present a united 
front was the reaction from Marjory Mecklenburg and other Protestant leaders when the 
press and abortion rights supporters again attacked Catholic involvement in the right-to-
life movement. Where there had been tension and harsh criticism of the Catholic Church 
in 1973 and 1974, Mecklenburg and other Protestants now defended their Catholic 
colleagues. When a religious abortion rights group, the Religious Coalition for Abortion 
Rights (RCAR), issued a statement, which indicted the Catholic Church for its support of 
the movement and involvement in politics in the fall of 1977, Mecklenburg and a few 
other prominent Protestant right-to-lifers stepped up and issued their own statement 
challenging RCAR and defending the Catholic Church. They wrote, 
 In our judgment abortion is not, as the signers of ‘A Call to Concern’ intimate, a 
 religious issue. Rather it is a moral question, and a moral question upon which 
 religious groups, such as the Roman Catholic hierarchy, have a right to speak. It 
 is, we believe,  most unfortunate that the ‘Call to Concern’ seeks to associate 
 opposition to abortion and to the use of public funds for abortion with the 
 teaching of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. We view this as an instance of 
 demagoguery and, alas, a latent anti-Romanism.532 
 
Though in 1973 and 1974, some of these Protestant right-to-lifers had been critical of 
Catholics in the movement, they now defended the Catholic hierarchy. Mecklenburg 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 Warren Schaller, “The Overwhelming Majority of Non-Catholic religious Organizations in the United 
States Do Not Support Permissive Abortion,” Box 8, Folder 3, ACCL Records. 
532 A Cause for Concern, October 1977, Box 8, Folder 11, Williams Papers. 
  202  
strongly rejected attempts to “polarize” Americans as she saw it and instead argued for 
unity among right-to-lifers.533  
 Work to broaden the movement and overcome religious divides also took place at 
the grassroots level. At the 1975 MCCL convention, the group highlighted the 
involvement of Protestants, featuring Charles Carroll, an Episcopal priest, Calvin 
Eichhorst, a Lutheran Minister, and Robert Holbrook, a Southern Baptist.534 And its 
conference in 1976 featured a panel specifically addressing the issue of 
“Interdenominational Action.”535 That same year, MCCL’s leaders launched an endeavor 
to support a human life amendment that incorporated this interdenominational 
cooperation.536 This initiative, called Mission Possible, had them working closely with 
Southern evangelicals to set up right-to-life organizations throughout the region.537 For 
example, in Alabama, the group made contact with Ray Dutton, a radio preacher and 
member of the Church of Christ. MCCL and Dutton worked together to organize a right-
to-life conference in the state.538 Dutton, like many others, believed that more people in 
Alabama would be actively opposed to abortion if they only heard the pro-life 
message.539 Using Mission Possible funds, MCCL also gave a grant of $3000 to Baptists 
for Life as that group worked to pass an antiabortion resolution at the Southern Baptist 
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Convention annual meeting.540 MCCL had managed to raise $14,000 total, which they 
planned to use in several southern states, and the group hoped to enact its plan of 
spreading the pro-life message to a neglected region by working with contacts they had 
made in the Church of Christ and in the Southern Baptist Convention.541 MCCL 
continued to support right-to-lifers in the South for the next several years.542 Like its 
national counterparts, MCCL worked to expand the movement and build a broader 
religious coalition. The group’s work paid off, and the movement started to build 
momentum among evangelicals, a group with which it had previously had little success.  
 Even as right-to-lifers worked to overcome their political, religious, and racial 
differences, they also had to avoid polarization over divergences in strategy. Activists 
approached the abortion issue in myriad ways and proposed many different solutions. 
Even the decision over whether to promote alternatives to abortion versus the human life 
amendment threatened to polarize right-to-lifers during these years. For example, while 
ACCL worked steadfastly on alternatives to abortion legislation, the NRLC worried that 
alternatives to abortion might be a distraction from working toward the human life 
amendment. At the end of October 1975, the NRLC circulated a memo to its Board 
members and warned them, “It seems that ‘alternatives for abortion’ is fast becoming a 
smoke screen for obscuring our real objective which is to secure a Human Life 
Amendment.”543 Arlene Doyle of Women for the Unborn also worried that alternatives to 
abortion might become a “substitute” for the human life amendment. Like many other 
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right-to-lifers, she was becoming increasingly convinced that the only option for the 
movement was “No Compromise!”544 
 Though this tension threatened to break the movement into divergent factions, 
right-to-life leaders managed to maintain some measure of unity, thanks to their shared 
goals of broadening the movement and avoiding polarization. They used annual events, 
such as the March for Life on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade and the National Right to 
Life Convention to encourage engagement with right-to-lifers who might advocate 
different strategies. For example, even after Marjory Mecklenburg split from the NRLC 
to start ACCL, she was still invited to participate in the National Right to Life 
Convention. Not only did she participate, but the NRLC also invited her to once again 
lead a workshop on organizing in the states.545 And even though NRLC leaders had 
misgivings about the alternatives-to-abortion approach, they still welcomed workshops 
on that strategy at the conventions. In fact, the National Right to Life Conventions in 
these years showed right-to-lifers that a range of approaches were allowed and welcomed 
in the movement, from pro-life feminism to alternatives to abortion to opposing the ERA 
to using science and medicine to argue against abortion to direct action and protest to 
voting and lobbying.546 The breadth of theses strategic approaches was impressive and 
allowed room for the diverse group of activists the movement represented. 
 Right-to-lifers’ work toward avoiding polarization—whether it be political, 
strategic, racial, or religious—was meant not only to unify the movement but also to 	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broaden its appeal. Right-to-lifers resisted characterizations of the movement as 
something “fringe” or only for “fanatics.” As they had done in years previously, activists 
continued to emphasize the broad-based nature of their growing coalition. Moreover, 
right-to-lifers argued that they could speak for all Americans and that their views were 
representative of mainstream and foundational American views on rights and freedom. 
Even SOUL used some of the same rhetoric. At its convention in 1975, the keynote 
speaker, Marg Wolters, blamed legalized abortion on “a free-wheeling vocal minority,” 
implying that the majority of Americans opposed abortion. And the title of her address 
itself—“The Spirit of 1776”—evoked the idea that the pro-lifers were now embracing the 
same sort of spirit and values as the American Revolution, taking part in a truly American 
endeavor.547 Whether it was polarization over politics, religion, race, or strategy, the 
right-to-lifers worked for unity and tried to make sure there was room for any American 
in the movement. And even as late as August 1979, Marjory Mecklenburg remained 
firmly committed to a broad-based movement that had room for liberals and 
conservatives, Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Mormons.548 Right-to-lifers’ answer to 
polarization and division was to work harder to represent the majority of Americans they 
claimed supported their cause and to welcome any person who opposed legal abortion, no 
matter their religion, race, or political beliefs.   
4.4 A New Strategy: Nonviolent Direct Action 
 While the leaders of the national movement worked to find a balance between 
pursuing a human life amendment, working for smaller, more incremental measures to 
promote alternatives to abortion, and avoiding political and religious polarization in the 	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movement, activists in many local communities were trying out a new tactic, nonviolent 
direct action at abortion clinics, which was a radical departure for the movement. 
Grassroots political activity had always been central in right-to-life organizing, and 
national organizations like ACCL and the NRLC acknowledged the power and influence 
of grassroots activists. Robert Greene, the Executive Director of the NRLC, called them 
“effective agents for change” who “deserve to have a piece of the action.”549 Moreover, 
he acknowledged their role in developing their own strategies: “I think they are capable 
of analyzing the forces at work in their community, state and nation which account for 
the level of anti-life activity which now must be changed.”550 Nonviolent direct action 
had the potential to test this resolve. There was some sense, at least at the national level, 
that the movement was settling down, learning the ways politics worked in Washington, 
D.C., and softening its fanaticism. In September 1975, one reporter noted this change: 
“The techniques and tactics of the anti-abortion ‘lobby’ in Congress have changed 
dramatically in the recent past…In most cases, confrontation has given way to reasoned 
debate.”551 In the media’s estimation, the movement was channeling its energy into 
appropriate political avenues, focusing on lobbying, legislation, and electoral politics. But 
in the late 1970s, some grassroots activists assessed the situation in their communities 
and decided the best strategy to stop abortion was to go to the clinics in their towns and 
use nonviolent direct action to shut them down.    
 Direct action was not a completely novel tactic for the movement. Some early 
right-to-lifers had previous experience with direct action in the civil rights and antiwar 
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movements, and a few groups even organized protests and picketed abortion clinics in the 
early 1970s before Roe v. Wade. In these early years, young people were primarily 
responsible for the direct action protests. For example, SOUL had attempted an early 
form of sidewalk counseling—confronting women as they entered clinics—in 1972 in St. 
Paul, Minnesota.552 And at the NYPLC convention in 1972, the young right-to-lifers 
copied an antiwar movement tactic, burning their birth certificates rather than their draft 
cards in protest of legalized abortion.553  In fact, the antiwar movement not only inspired 
their tactics but also their slogans and songs. Even in the late 1970s, right-to-lifers using 
direct action sang antiwar songs tailored to right-to-life activism, from “Give Life a 
Chance” to “Where Have All the Children Gone?”554 Various direct action protests 
continued throughout the early to mid 1970s. But starting in 1975 and 1976, these actions 
escalated across the country, and by 1977 there was a noticeable uptick in incidents at 
clinics as well as new direct action groups forming across the country. Right-to-lifers 
continued picketing at clinics but also started entering clinics and staging sit-ins, hoping 
to shut down the clinics for as long as they could. This shift started a trend that would 
grow in the 1980s to include a plethora of direct action organizations and massive 
demonstrations organized by groups like Operation Rescue into the early 1990s. 
 Grassroots action drove this shift in strategy, as local right-to-life leaders began 
organizing more protests at clinics in their communities and attracted the attention of 
young right-to-lifers and activists in other causes. As with early 1970s direct action, 
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many of these activists were young people. For example, SOUL, which had previously 
engaged in some direct action protests, began sit-ins at clinics in 1976.555 Young right-to-
lifers also started the group People Expressing a Concern for Everyone (PEACE), which 
had branches across the country.556 Others found their way into right-to-life direct action 
from the antiwar movement or other activism.557 In recalling the start of the sit-in 
movement, John O’Keefe, who had been a conscientious objector during the Vietnam 
War, said that the right-to-lifers wanted to “imitate” the success of the peace movement 
in using direct action to get the media’s attention.558 O’Keefe quickly emerged as an early 
leader of these new direct action activists and in the 1980s would be a national leader of 
the direct action wing of the movement. These young activists soon gained the attention 
of the media and the rest of the right-to-life movement.  
 The activists argued that their actions were just, and they were willing to risk 
arrest and trial because they felt their sit-ins at clinics had a direct impact in saving 
unborn babies. At first, many of them were simply trying to get the attention of the media 
and the public, to make sure people kept paying attention to the abortion issue. But then 
the direct action activists realized they could use their sit-ins to persuade or prevent 
women from getting abortions.559 This realization strengthened their resolve. When the 
Chicago branch of PEACE released a statement to the press following a sit-in, they 
explained the dual purpose of their protest, saying that they had “gathered…to stop 	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abortions from taking place” and “to bring to public attention that abortion is an act of 
killing and cannot be tolerated.”560 In March 1977, the National Right to Life News, the 
movement’s main publication, featured a long article on the new direct action protests—
an opinion piece by John O’Keefe. In the piece, O’Keefe pled with right-to-lifers to 
support direct action, arguing that more needed to be done to “change the pro-abortion 
stance of our country.”561 He believed sit-ins would help pro-lifers show the humanity of 
the unborn. More than that, he critiqued the right-to-lifers’ current comfort and isolation. 
To O’Keefe, direct action was a way for the movement to expand and “no longer be an 
insulated minority preaching self-righteously and indignantly from a safe distance.”562  
 These direct action protests varied across the country and pushed the boundaries 
of right-to-life activism. Though right-to-lifers still picketed, their favorite form of direct 
action was the sit-in. Typically a group of activists would enter a clinic, often passing out 
pro-life tracts to the women waiting or working there. Most often, they would simply 
occupy the waiting room, but at some sit-ins the activists would enter exam rooms, 
sometimes even chaining themselves to any equipment in the room.563 And then they 
would wait for the police to show up and arrest them, all the while trying to convince the 
clinic workers and patients of the evils of abortion. The escalation of tactics was clear. In 
Minnesota in 1974, a small group of activists, including activists from MCCL and SOUL, 
held silent demonstrations and handed out pro-life literature outside a clinic in St. Paul.564 
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The following year, about one hundred SOUL members actually entered the clinic, 
staging a sit-in in the reception area until the police showed up to remove them.565 
Similar protests occurred across the country. John O’Keefe kept a record of nearly twenty 
different sit-ins from 1976 to 1979, ranging from Washington, D.C., Virginia, and 
Maryland to Massachusetts and Connecticut to New York to California.566 His list did not 
include the protests also being conducted by SOUL and PEACE in various parts of the 
Midwest. 
 Though the NRLC, ACCL, and other groups had been trying to downplay the 
image of fanaticism in the movement, they did not seem to have any problem with the sit-
ins at abortion clinics. The protests received extensive media coverage, as the direct 
action activists had hoped, and the National Right to Life News and other pro-life 
newsletters reported on pickets and sit-ins across the country.567 Some leaders were wary 
of this turn to direct action and civil disobedience. Joseph Stanton thought right-to-lifers 
should first “exhaust every constitutional means before acts of civil disobedience become 
the last refuge of a movement without hope.”568 Yet, the movement’s major national 
publication, National Right to Life News, continued to regularly run stories about direct 
action protests and even allowed one group to solicit donations to pay for their legal 
fees.569 Most of the coverage was very favorable. The publication not only documented 
the protests themselves but also the trials of protestors, highlighting how these right-to-
lifers spoke out for the unborn even as they faced jail time or fines. The NRLC also 	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invited some of these activists to hold a workshop on nonviolent direct action at the 
National Right to Life Convention in 1978.570 While the NRLC and ACCL did not 
explicitly endorse direct action, their coverage of the protests as well as the involvement 
of direct action activists at the annual convention suggested their tacit approval. 
 The sit-ins at clinics persisted with the blessing of the rest of the movement and 
highlighted the wide range of accepted strategies during this time. All this in spite of the 
fears of NOW and NARAL, who noted a serious uptick in violence at clinics in the same 
years that direct action began—bomb threats, arson, and vandalism being the most 
common issues.571 The right-to-lifers spoke out against violence at clinics but did not 
condemn nonviolent direct action in any way. After a fire damaged a clinic in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, for example, Joseph Stanton lamented the violence but also defended direct 
action: “It may have been an upset pro-lifer pushed beyond the point of endurance. We 
can never condone such actions, but more and more deeply distressed citizens are 
considering civil disobedience as the ultimate personal act to save even one life.”572 
Overall, right-to-life leaders and the movement as a whole welcomed the direct action 
activists despite the fact that their tactics pushed the boundaries of what was acceptable 
and legal and despite concerns about the effect of these tactics on the movement’s public 
image.  
Conclusion 
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 Since the early 1970s, the right-to-lifers had organized themselves around a core 
principle about the nature of their effort—the idea of a broad-based movement. They had 
not always lived up to this ideal, especially in the fraught aftermath of Roe v. Wade, but it 
had been their central organizing ethos: the sense that abortion was such an abhorrent 
crime that all Americans—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or atheist, Democrat or 
Republican, liberal or conservative—would naturally oppose it. Over and over again, 
right-to-lifers argued that their pro-life stance was the true American stance, in line with 
the founding documents, rights, and values of the nation, and that despite Roe v. Wade, 
the majority of Americans still opposed abortion. Ed Golden made this belief explicit: 
“The actual numbers of membership reflect that we do in fact represent what we feel to 
be the majority of the people in the United States.”573 This push for a broad-based 
movement led right-to-lifers to actively fight against polarization within their ranks as 
well as between the movement and the rest of society. They fought stereotypes that their 
movement was “fringe” or “fanatic” or “a dangerous and mindless mob,” and continued 
their efforts of outreach to a broad range of Americans.574 Right-to-lifers asserted that all 
“decent citizens” must be willing to become active politically and confront the evils of 
abortion.575  
 In the late 1970s, right-to-lifers came the closest to achieving the broad-based 
movement they so desired. They finally made an impact in national elections, making 
their presence felt in both political parties and on the campaign trail. The NRLC 
continued lobbying Congress for a human life amendment, and though the organization 
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did not get its amendment banning abortion, it did help secure the Hyde Amendment, 
which prohibited federal funding for abortions. ACCL, meanwhile, worked to support 
alternatives to abortion and made important new connections in Congress, the labor 
movement, and in the women’s movement. Catholics and Protestants found ways to work 
together and use religion to build unity. The movement also did not give up on 
evangelicals but continued its determined outreach efforts. And on the ground, grassroots 
activists developed a bold strategy—clinic sit-ins—to gain wider publicity for the 
movement and perhaps even save some babies. These successes buoyed the movement 
and helped it “sustain the kind of long term action that is necessary for success” as 
MCCL president Leo LaLonde described it.576 The movement now represented a broad 
range of Americans, black and white, Catholic and Protestant, Republican and Democrat, 
as it worked more aggressively to achieve its goals, setting an “ambitious agenda for 
1980 and beyond” with the help of its “single-minded, fiercely dedicated supporters.”577  
 In January 1979, the right-to-lifers had their biggest turnout yet for the annual 
March for Life as nearly sixty thousand people converged on Washington, D.C. Yet one 
chant, in particular, seemed to be the new favorite refrain: “No compromise!”578 It was 
becoming increasingly common among right-to-lifers. Whether calling their opponents 
“baby killers” or staking a campaign strategy of “No Life—no vote!” or chanting “No 
compromise!” at rallies, right-to-lifers were beginning to draw an even starker boundary 
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around what they saw as the true pro-life position.579 The position was far removed from 
that of Marjory Mecklenburg and ACCL who tried to stake their place in a middle ground 
that was slowly but surely shrinking.  
 Because of this emerging hardline approach, the right-to-life movement itself was 
starting to show signs of fracture, despite several years of fostering a truly broad-based 
coalition comprised of diverse individuals and groups with diverse approaches and 
strategies. Dr. Fred Mecklenburg had warned right-to-lifers that they needed to be careful 
and remain flexible and willing to compromise—with each other and with their 
opponents. “The ‘all-or-nothing’, ‘no compromise ever’ rhetoric may stir the masses at 
the pro-life rallies,” he wrote, “but realistically if those are the only two choices we will 
give our legislative leaders, it seems more likely that we will be left with nothing.”580 Yet 
by 1979, even Fred Mecklenburg, who had been a stalwart right-to-life supporter and 
activist since he became MCCL’s first president in 1968, found himself on the opposite 
side from MCCL.581 During debates over family planning legislation and funding in 
Minnesota, MCCL’s Executive Director David O’Steen sent around a memo listing 
Mecklenburg on the “pro-abortion” side because he had testified in opposition to a bill 
that would have severely restricted family planning funding in the state, a bill that MCCL 
supported.582 Despite Mecklenburg’s earlier warnings, it seemed the middle ground on 
the abortion issue was quickly disappearing. 
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 Opportunities for dialogue with those outside the movement also seemed to be 
fading away. In a somewhat surprising move, NOW had called for a day of discussion 
with the pro-life movement at the start of 1979. ACCL and a few other right-to-life 
groups accepted the invitation, hoping to find some middle ground on the abortion issue 
upon which they could all agree.583 After a day of dialogue, the groups held a press 
conference to express the concerns they shared for women, especially poor women and 
young women they felt were most vulnerable. But as NOW’s Eleanor Smeal spoke to the 
press, PEACE activists interrupted her, carrying the body of an aborted fetus, weeping, 
and proclaiming to the room: “We weep for her and all innocent children killed through 
abortion.”584 Despite apologies for the incident from several right-to-life groups, the 
damage was done. The middle ground on the abortion issue was almost completely gone, 
and as John O’Keefe later recalled, “The dialogue between prolife and pro-abortion 
leaders was aborted that day, and buried at an unsuccessful follow-up meeting two 
months later.”585  
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5.0 Right-to-Life Resistance to the New Right in the Age of Reagan 
 
Introduction 
 On the campaign trail in February 1980, presidential candidate Ronald Reagan 
admitted he had made a big “mistake” during his time as governor of California.586 The 
mistake he referred to? Signing California’s liberal abortion law in 1967. But Reagan 
promised that as president he would support strict regulations for abortion, including a 
human life amendment. This was just the rhetoric that pro-lifers had longed to hear from 
a presidential candidate, and that November, they helped elect Reagan to the presidency. 
His victory signaled the rise of a new powerful player in American politics—what 
journalists and scholars called the New Right. For many pro-lifers, the victory of Ronald 
Reagan and, by extension, the New Right was a sign of new and exciting times for their 
movement, and some activists saw the New Right as a potentially powerful ally in the 
fight against legalized abortion. Believing that a human life amendment was now within 
their reach, right-to-lifers looked to put pressure on Reagan and the new Republicans 
elected to Congress and to hold them accountable to their campaign promises. As MCCL 
members recognized in their March for Life in St. Paul just days after Reagan’s 
inauguration, the 1980s would be the “Decade for Life.”587 
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Yet not all right-to-lifers were so optimistic. In the fall of 1980, Marjory 
Mecklenburg alerted ACCL members to the growth of the New Right and its “close 
association” with the right-to-life movement. The situation was so dire that she believed 
ACCL must shift its focus to “capture the leadership and direct pro-life energies toward 
positive activities.”588 Likewise, Monsignor George Higgins warned Catholics that the 
New Right was the “antithesis” of what the right-to-life movement and the Catholic 
Church stood for.589 The influence of the New Right immediately alarmed many right-to-
lifers, but these activists would not give up without fighting for their cause and for their 
vision of a broad-based movement. A clash between the two sides was imminent as the 
conservative right-to-lifers basked in their victory, embraced an alliance with the New 
Right, and renewed efforts for a human life amendment while a coalition of centrists, 
liberals, and left-wing right-to-lifers as well as Catholic Church officials tried to prevent 
right-wing politics from completely dominating the abortion debate. 
 The conservative turn in the antiabortion movement has been covered extensively 
in the scholarly literature. By the early 1990s, sociologist Dallas Blanchard explained the 
clear connection between right-to-life activism and the New Right and Religious Right.590 
Historian Daniel Williams has documented the role of abortion in cementing the 
allegiance of the Religious Right to the Republican Party.591 J. Brooks Flippen describes 
the role the abortion issue played in turning evangelical voters against Jimmy Carter and 	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the Democratic Party.592 And Robert O. Self explained the emergence of “breadwinner 
conservatism” in the 1970s, which connected the abortion issue and backlash to the 1960s 
rights revolutions and contributed to the shift toward conservatism in American 
politics.593 There are many other similar studies, and the connection between abortion and 
conservative politics since the early 1980s is clear.  
 At the same time, this alliance between conservative politics and religion and the 
right-to-life movement was not inevitable. In fact, some right-to-lifers actively resisted it. 
Unfortunately, their history has been generally ignored. Most literature on the movement 
during the 1980s tends to overemphasize the role of the New Right and portrays right-to-
lifers as monolithically conservative.594 There is such a proliferation of such studies that 
it can seem as if all right-to-lifers agreed that an alliance with the New Right was positive 
progress for the movement. However, during the early 1980s, an important contingent of 
right-to-lifers, many of whom had been involved in the movement for close to a decade, 
were still fighting for a broad-based movement and believed that an alliance with the 
New Right jeopardized this goal by excluding liberals and the left from the cause. This 
chapter recovers the story of those right-to-lifers who opposed, and at times actively 
fought against, the conservative turn in politics. Rather than passively accept the new 
alliance with conservative politics and religion, these activists decided to fight for their 
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vision of a broad-based movement, to stake their claim in right-to-life politics, and to 
challenge the ascendancy of the New Right. 
 Members of the Catholic Church hierarchy, pro-life moderates and liberals in 
groups like ACCL, and activists of the pro-life left led the resistance. This coalition 
worked together to maintain the right-to-life movement’s broad-based identity and 
contested the New Right’s growing involvement in politics. Within the Catholic Church, 
church officials as well as lay Catholics pointed out the ways New Right policies clashed 
with church teaching, monitored New Right activity in various right-to-life organizations, 
and opposed the New Right in the legislative arena. Liberal and moderate right-to-lifers, 
such as those in ACCL, were in an even tougher fight. They faced battles on two fronts: 
fending off the New Right as well as staking their place in the Democratic Party and 
among their fellow liberals. Increasingly through the 1980s, they tried to remind people 
on both sides of the political spectrum that pro-life Democrats and liberals still existed 
and still mattered. Confronting conservatives on their own turf, the pro-life left 
challenged the notion that opposing abortion was an issue for conservatives alone, and 
they pushed for a pro-life agenda that included issues of concern for the left, from nuclear 
disarmament to capital punishment to the ERA. The ACCL and other pro-life moderates, 
the pro-life left, and the Catholic Church tried to defend their cause against the 
conservative onslaught, but, as the 1980s progressed and political divisions crystallized, 
they found themselves and their vision for a broad-based movement increasingly 
alienated from other right-to-lifers.  
 Telling the story of this dissenting corps of right-to-life activists is vital because it 
reminds us that the 1980s was not a time of monolithic, conservative triumphalism and 
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that the rise of the New Right and the Religious Right was not inevitable. Up to the 
1980s, the abortion issue was not a conservative issue alone, and even in the right-to-life 
movement, traditionally seen as a bastion of support for the New Right, a large cohort of 
right-to-lifers vehemently resisted the link between abortion and conservative religion 
and politics. Of course, some conservative Americans had quickly rallied around the 
issue but they opposed abortion alongside moderate, liberal, and left-wing right-to-lifers. 
Moreover, right-to-life leaders who had created a diverse and complex movement by the 
mid-1970s—a movement they argued was made for all Americans, regardless of their 
political affiliation or religious beliefs—fought to preserve the broad-based coalition they 
had spent over a decade building. Yet despite their ardent attempts, by the mid-1980s the 
broad-based movement had mostly fallen apart and right-to-life politics and the right-
wing political agenda became even more inextricably linked. 
5.1 Conservative Politics in the Right-to-Life Movement 
 Conservatives had been part of the movement for a long time, but had never been 
the majority or dominant voice. At times, Republicans had tried to poach right-to-life 
voters from the Democratic Party. For example, in 1970, California’s Republican Party 
sent voter registrars to a number of Catholic churches in hopes of getting right-to-lifers to 
change their party affiliation.595 Right-to-lifers had also been members of conservative 
groups like the John Birch Society, and some held conservative stances on a range of 
social issues. Even the letters that flooded Senator Beilenson’s office in the late 1960s 
already contained some conservative strains of argument about abortion and its causes, 
namely that the push for liberal abortion laws exemplified the decline of traditional 
values. As one constituent lamented, Beilenson’s abortion bill threatened “the God-	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fearing, God-loving land our founders intended it to be.”596 Some leaders in the 
movement also helped advance these arguments. Father Paul Marx of Minnesota, who 
had long been a conservative voice in right-to-life politics, wrote frequently about the 
importance of traditional family values. By 1980, he was blaming abortion on “the 
growth of secular humanism, Godlessness, weakness of the churches.”597 But until the 
1980s, these conservative voices remained marginal—just a few voices among many 
other diverse approaches to the cause. 
 By the late 1970s, conservative momentum was already building in the 
movement. In 1976, many right-to-lifers enthusiastically supported Reagan in his primary 
campaign. They liked that he supported a human life amendment, took a strong stance 
against abortion, unlike Ford’s more “moderate” approach, and forced the Republican 
Party to seriously debate the issue.598 For some liberal right-to-lifers, this was an early 
warning sign. Reagan’s supporters in the movement were a vocal enough contingent that 
Msgr. Charles Owen Rice felt the need to denounce them in an article for the Pittsburgh 
Catholic.599 Rice had earned a reputation as a labor priest and a radical after several 
decades of activism, defined by his strong support of unions and the labor movement, 
advocacy for civil rights, and opposition to the Vietnam War.600 In addition to this long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596 Dorothy Messina to Mr. Haberman (local editor), March 1967, Box 78, Folder 2, Beilenson Papers. 
597 “Father Marx: Long Fight; Education is Best Weapon,” October 1981, About Issues, Box 2, Folder 7, 
George Huntston Williams Papers, Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Harvard Divinity School, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA (hereafter cited as Williams Papers). 
598 The Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life, Lifeletter #6, April 6, 1976, Box 1, Folder 1, David R. 
Gergen Files, 1974-1979, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter cited as Gergen Files); “Gov. 
Reagan Decries Dehumanization of the Unborn,” May-June 1975, MCCL Newsletter, Box 12, Folder 16, 
ACCL Records; Carolyn Gerster to NRLC Board of Directors, “Presidential Candidates,” December 30, 
1975, Box 10, Folder 5, ACCL Records.  
599 Msgr. Charles Owen Rice, “Pro-lifers Err,” August 6, 1976, Pittsburgh Catholic, Box 74, Folder 1, 
Higgins Papers. 
600 Kenneth J. Heineman, A Catholic New Deal: Religion and Reform in Depression Pittsburgh (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999); Charles McCollester, “In Memoriam: Charles 
  222  
tenure of activism, Rice fervently opposed abortion. Moreover, he “was not one to pull 
punches,” as historian Kenneth Heineman explained, especially when he confronted 
“hypocritical behavior among Catholics.”601 Rice was disturbed as he witnessed right-to-
lifers trying to link their opposition to abortion to conservative causes.602 Addressing 
Reagan’s pro-life supporters, specifically, he castigated pro-life groups who took too 
partisan a stand on the abortion issue and who risked alienating potential allies. He even 
called “pro-life right-wingers” a “liability” for the rest of the movement.603 However, his 
warning had little impact, and Rice became increasingly “disenchanted” with right-to-
lifers.604  
 By 1979, reporters in the country’s major newspapers and magazines were noting 
the New Right’s affinity for the abortion issue and wondering if it was using the issue to 
build its political base. In 1979, reporter Jon Margolis wondered “Should it be called Life 
for the Right?” instead of the right-to-life movement.605 Janet Gallagher, a writer for the 
left-wing Workshop in Nonviolence (WIN) magazine, observed that the New Right was 
trying to build a “pro-family base.”606 And James Wall, a writer for Christian Century, a 
mainline Protestant magazine, worried that the New Right exploited the issue of abortion 
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to “emotionally bludgeon” voters into supporting its candidates.607  New, explicitly 
conservative right-to-life groups also emerged during this time and made it their mission 
to target any liberal politicians who supported abortion. At least one even developed a 
“hit list” with their top targets, including Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, Robert Byrd of 
West Virginia, and number of others.608 Most of the targets, though not all, were liberal 
Democrats. 
 With Reagan’s election in 1980, many right-to-lifers were hopeful about what 
could be accomplished for the cause. Some of them even started calling 1980 the “Year 
of Life.”609 In addition to Reagan’s election, the Supreme Court upheld the Hyde 
Amendment, which had banned federal funding for abortions. Moreover, right-to-lifers 
helped elect a pro-life majority to the Senate.610 Reagan, however, was their crowning 
achievement. He was the first presidential candidate who supported a human life 
amendment to the Constitution and had been a longtime favorite for right-to-lifers.611 By 
the mid-1970s, news of Reagan’s opposition to abortion and his support for a human life 
amendment had filtered in to the movement’s periodicals.612 A 1975 article in MCCL’s 
newsletter, for example, quoted Reagan extensively. In that article, he made several 	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strong pro-life statements, such as, “There is a subtle, but nonetheless effective, move 
afoot to dehumanize babies…It is time to say to all the world: we are not talking a slug or 
a snail…We are talking about a real, live baby.”613 These statements seemed indicate that 
Reagan had taken a decisive stand against abortion. 
 This sentiment did not go unnoticed by right-to-lifers and garnered their support 
for his campaign for the Republican nomination in 1976.614 When he ran in 1980 with a 
similar platform opposing abortion, right-to-lifers were ready to support him again. His 
previous opposition to abortion was a huge factor for them. “If presidential candidates are 
jumping on the pro-life bandwagon, that’s fine with me,” Marvin Truit, a pro-lifer from 
St. Joseph, Minnesota, wrote to his local newspaper, “But let’s get the facts straight.”615 
Truit then went on to highlight Reagan’s consistent opposition to abortion since the mid-
1970s, referencing articles on Reagan he had seen in periodicals like the National Right 
to Life News. Because of this consistent opposition since the middle of the decade, Truit 
argued that Reagan would be the ideal candidate for pro-lifers. Reagan also won their 
favor because he promised to uphold the Republican Party’s platform, which took a 
decisive stand against legalized abortion and against federal funding for abortion.616 But 
right-to-lifers were not going to sit idly by. They were ready to ensure Reagan fulfilled 
his campaign promises and supported right-to-life initiatives. Just a few weeks after the 
election, Patrick Trueman, writing for the National Right-to-Life News, urged right-to-
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lifers to “hold [Reagan’s] and the Senate’s feet to the fire now that the election is 
over.”617 
 If Reagan was their crowning achievement, the human life amendment remained 
pro-lifers’ prime goal, and now they thought it might be within reach. Not only had they 
elected a pro-life president, but they had also helped elect many new pro-life members of 
Congress. As “an enthusiastic Sandy Faucher” reported, “It wasn’t only Ronald Reagan, 
we had a gain of 10 (U.S.) Senate seats.”618 Faucher also indicated that right-to-lifers 
hoped they could get a human life amendment from the House to the Senate by 1983. 
Jack Willke, now president of the NRLC, said he too hoped Reagan would push for a 
human life amendment and nominate “‘pro-life’ justices to the U.S. Supreme Court.”619 
And Reagan himself seemed supportive. Though he did not attend the March for Life in 
1981, despite expressing a desire to do so, his Secretary of Health and Human Services 
spoke to the crowd and promised his agency would do all it could to promote right-to-life 
policies. Reagan made sure to meet with leaders of the movement the day of the march to 
discuss a human life amendment.620 The simple fact of having Reagan in the White 
House buoyed right-to-lifers, with one MCCL member commenting, “Finally we are 
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being heard.”621 Right-to-lifers believed that they now had a strong ally in the White 
House and that their human life amendment might soon become a reality.  
 Not only were conservative right-to-lifers making their presence felt in national 
politics but also in their local communities and right-to-life groups. In Minnesota, for 
example, letters containing conservative arguments against abortion appeared more 
frequently in local newspapers, decrying the moral and religious decline of America 
caused by abortion. 622 Fran Wood of Jordan, Minnesota, responded to a letter to the 
editor favoring abortion rights in August 1979. She connected the abortion issue to a loss 
of Christian principles in the country and declared her support for a human life 
amendment. “Satan is waiting hungrily for this blessed nation of God to fall into his 
hands,” she lamented, “We should be working to uphold our godly principles and 
restoring those that have been lost.”623  Local evangelical pastor, Reverend LaVern 
Swanson, wrote a column wondering if America was heading for God’s judgment 
because of abortion: “Will we as a nation have to be judged as guilty before the Highest 
Court in heaven, for our careless disregard for the lives of the unborn?”624 Conservative 
rhetoric started to appear in local papers in New York as well. From critiques of Planned 
Parenthood to laments over the decline of “traditional Judeo-Christian philosophy” to 
charges that abortion rights supporters might be inspired “by the devil, by misguided 
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liberals, by deluded clergy or just by ignorance,” New York’s conservative right-to-lifers 
echoed similar concerns and linked abortion to conservative politics and religion.625  
 This was a distinct departure from much of the rhetoric the movement had 
previously used. Whereas in the early to mid-1970s, right-to-lifers tended to see abortion 
as a sign of the problem of violence in American society, now there was a firmer 
assertion that the problem was a decline in morality and the abandonment of Judeo-
Christian norms. Moreover, right-to-lifers connected abortion to a range of conservative 
concerns. For instance, Minnesotan David Michael Crowser listed abortion as his first 
grievance but then went on to name a litany of conservative causes—welfare reform, 
opposition to the ERA, school prayer, “celebrating Christmas without Christ.”626 In his 
letter, he also hinted that the rejection of Christian values was the root cause of all these 
problems. Similarly, another concerned parent named secular humanism and the loss of 
religion as the main threat. She warned, “It [secular humanism] openly denies the 
existence of a Creator…and embraces complete sexual freedom, abortion, homosexuality, 
suicide and euthanasia.”627 Here again the connection between abortion and other 
conservative social concerns was clear. For many of these people, abortion was no longer 
a single issue but was intricately connected to a number of other conservative causes—
conservative causes that happened to be espoused by the New Right as well. 
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 Local right-to-life groups also saw a turn toward conservatism in their ranks. In 
Minnesota, when MCCL urged its members to attend a White House Conference on 
Families organized near the end of the Carter administration, the group ended up 
unleashing a pro-life, pro-family contingent. Officials had expected about three hundred 
people but more than nine hundred turned up, and the pro-lifers ended up gaining control 
of the discussion at the conference.628 While the pro-lifers said they were worried about a 
number of issues, “the core of the current family problem, most agreed, was the legalized 
killing of babies still in their mother’s womb.”629 Now, the contingent concluded, “It’s 
time we as pro-family people fight back.”630 The shift was also evident in MCCL 
advertisements. Whereas early ads had often connected abortion to fundamental 
American values and rights, such as an advertisement proudly displaying excerpts from 
the Declaration of Independence, in 1980 a local MCCL chapter released a stark 
advertisement bearing a single Biblical warning: “I set before you life or death…choose 
life then that you and your descendants may live.”631 In California, the pro-family 
rhetoric was also apparent. Catholics United for Life, a conservative Catholic group, 
explained that it fought to save “Christian family life.”632 Another group highlighted 
Reagan’s article for the Human Life Review in 1983 in which the president had compared 
abortion to slavery. That same group also lauded Reagan’s designation of 1983 as “The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 Peg Meier, “Antiabortion faction controls parley,” Minneapolis Tribune, January 20, 1980, Reel 8, 
MCCL Newspaper Clippings. 
629 “Pro-family, pro-life: trying to regain the status quo,” Echo Press (Alexandria, MN), January 30, 1980, 
Reel 8, MCCL Newspaper Clippings. 
630 Ibid. 
631 MCCL Chapters Rockville-Cold Spring Richmond, January 17, 1980, Record (Cold Springs, MN), Reel 
8, MCCL Newspaper Clippings. 
632 Dennis Musk, Catholics United for Life newsletter, July 1983, Box 8, Folder 1, John Cavanaugh-
O’Keefe Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society Archives, Madison, WI (hereafter cited as Cavanaugh-
O’Keefe Papers). 
  229  
Year of the Bible.”633 Thus, local right-to-life groups helped promote the conservative 
worldview, which saw abortion as a sign of society’s moral decline and the dangerous 
influence of secular humanism.  
 A clear example of this shift in the understanding of abortion at the grassroots 
level was the growing popularity of evangelical Francis Schaeffer and his documentaries 
Whatever Happened to the Human Race? and How Should We Then Live? These 
documentaries, and their accompanying books, described the horrors of abortion and the 
dangerous moral decay of society.634 Most importantly, they urged Christians to take 
action to stop abortion, arguing that Christians could no longer remain passive but must 
vigorously oppose abortion in society and in politics. In 1979 and into the early 1980s, 
churches and right-to-life groups across the country hosted screenings of these films and 
publicized Schaeffer’s work. In November 1980, MCCL sponsored a film series featuring 
the documentary Whatever Happened to the Human Race?, which was attended by over 
two hundred people.635 After the documentary, audience members reported that they 
believed “the lack of cohesiveness in family life” had led to the rise in abortions in 
America. In Honeoye Falls in western New York, the series was shown at the local 
middle school. Local newspaper called the documentary “stunning” and “a classic of our 
times.”636 The film series was also shown in a number of evangelical churches throughout 
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the state.637 A few years later, in September 1983, Schaeffer even traveled to St. Paul, 
Minnesota, to speak at an event sponsored by Citizens for Community Action, a local 
right-to-life group. In his speech, he encouraged these activists to continue their work to 
resist Planned Parenthood in their neighborhood. The group’s president, John Healy, 
reported that Schaeffer reminded them, “Day to day, we must assert our values…We 
must continue to shape our history, or be judged accordingly.”638 Once more, Schaeffer 
delivered a bold message. Abortion was a threat to traditional social and moral values, 
and right-to-lifers must act decisively and boldly to preserve their “Judeo-Christian 
heritage.”  
 Clearly, conservative rhetoric resonated with people on the ground and with right-
to-lifers in particular. Because of this, some activists looked to work with the New Right 
to achieve a human life amendment. As right-to-lifers built an alliance with the New 
Right and promoted a conservative approach to abortion, some also fought attempts by 
their fellow right-to-lifers to rein them in. In fact, they challenged attempts to broaden 
right-to-life concern or to link it to any “liberal” causes. Even as the Catholic Church, 
moderate right-to-lifers, and the pro-life left sought to expand the scope of the movement 
and connect abortion to issues like capital punishment, conservative activists argued that 
such an approach would dilute their effectiveness and detract from the fight against 
abortion. One article, written by Virginia Evers, exemplifies this position in many 
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ways.639 In September 1983, she wrote a vitriolic critique of right-to-lifers involved in the 
peace and nuclear disarmament movements. She argued that the pro-life movement 
should not link abortion to those causes because “those who really have the best interest 
of the pro-life cause at heart do not wear any other hat while spreading the pro-life 
message.”640 Never mind the fact that she was writing for an organization with close ties 
to the New Right and its accompanying political initiatives. Conservative right-to-lifers 
reacted in a similar way when Joseph Cardinal Bernardin began promoting the consistent 
ethic of life in 1983. Phyllis Schlafly called it “very divisive,” and a right-to-life group in 
Chicago protested the bishops’ meeting in the city that year due to the bishops’ attempts 
to connect abortion to nuclear disarmament. 641 At the protest, these right-to-lifers even 
distributed the article Reagan had recently written for the pro-life periodical The Human 
Life Review, in which he reflected on the tenth anniversary of Roe v. Wade and explained 
the importance of opposing abortion.642 This move on the part of the protesters at the 
bishops’ meeting signaled which leader the activists thought had the correct view on 
abortion.  
 In addition to rebuffing attempts to broaden the movement, conservative right-to-
lifers also defended the New Right, Reagan, and other right-wing politicians. In one 
instance, a Catholic Church report surfaced that was critical of Reagan and other 
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conservative politicians for their “inaction” on the abortion issue.643 Henry Hyde, who 
had been a stalwart pro-life politician, quickly sent a letter to Cardinal Krol calling the 
report “slanderous” and asking Krol, “When will we Catholics stop insulting those who 
help us?”644 His message was clear. The New Right could be a powerful ally in the fight 
against abortion, and Catholics and other right-to-lifers should embrace conservatives as 
friends rather than alienate or challenge them. Similarly, when Msgr. George Higgins 
wrote a scathing critique of the New Right, pro-lifers protested his characterization of 
their work and defended their alliance with the New Right. Patricia M. Glienna asserted 
that the movement “should be doing everything possible to end the killing as quickly as 
possible.”645 A political alliance with the New Right was fine if it meant a faster end to 
legal abortion. Like Hyde, Glienna defended the right-to-life alliance with the New Right 
because such an alliance might advance their agenda.   
 Already by 1980, stories of the New Right and conservative right-to-lifers were 
overshadowing the work of any other activists in the movement. Furthermore, by the 
mid-1980s, conservative right-to-lifers were defending the New Right as a valuable ally, 
while challenging their fellow right-to-lifers who believed otherwise. Despite this vocal 
support for Reagan and the New Right, some right-to-lifers were determined to counter 
the conservative rhetoric and political activity in their movement. From the start, these 
right-to-lifers had grave concerns about an alliance with the New Right and worked 
urgently to combat its influence and maintain the broad-based right-to-life coalition of the 
1970s. 	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5.2 The Catholic Church and the Consistent Ethic of Life 
 Among some of the first right-to-lifers to oppose the New Right and its 
involvement in the movement were some members of the Catholic Church. In 
publications as well as private correspondence, church officials and lay Catholics 
expressed concern about the new and close association between the New Right and some 
right-to-life groups and about the proliferation of conservative rhetoric among right-to-
lifers. They urged a cautious approach in dealing with right-wing political activists. At 
the same time, some church officials began working on strategies to directly counter the 
right-wing approach to the abortion issue. In the early 1980s, the bishops began tracking 
the involvement of right-to-life groups in right-wing politics and pushed back against 
some of the New Right’s legislative agenda. And in addition to reemphasizing their 1975 
Pastoral Plan, which situated abortion amongst a number of life issues, church officials 
like Cardinal Bernardin also started publicly supporting the consistent ethic of life. In 
doing so, Catholics directly opposed some of the defining policies of the New Right and 
challenged the connection of abortion to the New Right agenda. The Church, however, 
was in a difficult position, trying to promote church teachings on a broad range of life 
issues without upsetting the hardline right-to-lifers. Michele Magar, writing for 
Conscience magazine in 1981, observed this complexity: “In 1973, the Catholic hierarchy 
clearly perceived abortion as an issue on which it could not lose. Now it seems that there 
is no way to win.”646 Depending on the course of action, the Church risked becoming 
“alienated from many of its own members.”647  Yet, the bishops and many lay Catholics 
knew that abortion would be a paramount issue in the 1980s and believed that despite the 	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complex and difficult situation they must carefully emphasize “the pro-life values we 
espouse.”648 
 Since 1975, the bishops had been focusing their pro-life initiatives on parish 
education and outreach as outlined in their 1975 Pastoral Plan for Pro-life Activities. The 
plan had focused on local dioceses and parishes with three main initiatives: an education 
program for the general public, an intensive program for priests, religious, and all 
“church-sponsored or identifiably Catholic organizations” with an emphasis on pastoral 
care and counseling, and legislative efforts to push for a human life amendment and other 
legislation that might limit abortions.649 The bishops also organized special programs in 
parishes, such as the Respect Life initiative, which they had been facilitating since 1972 
and which they hoped would promote “internal consistency in the pro-life 
commitment.”650 This program encouraged local parishes to devote a month each year to 
various life issues, educating parishioners on church teachings and reminding them of the 
importance the church placed on these issues.651 Abortion was always included but the 
programs also featured teachings on people with disabilities, the elderly, and the death 
penalty, among other issues.  
 Though there had been earlier warnings from right-to-lifers about right-wing 
politics, the concern over the New Right grew during the 1980 election cycle. Some 
church officials were cautiously optimistic about Reagan, such as Cardinal Cooke who 
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had praised Reagan and the Republican Party’s platform.652 Others, however, were less 
hopeful. Msgr. George Higgins started to worry about the changes he saw in the 
movement, and in May 1980, he wrote a short piece on the “New Right connection” and 
warned that many pro-life Catholics were “being manipulated in the political chess game 
of the right wing.”653 A few months later, Higgins issued an even more serious warning, 
publishing an article in America magazine that warned Catholic pro-lifers about the 
dangers of an alliance with the New Right and of ignoring the influence of right-wing 
politics in the movement. He directed his warning to both church officials as well as lay 
Catholics. Higgins had two main concerns. First, he argued that the New Right’s policies 
“almost without exception, contradict official positions of the church.”654 According to 
Higgins, on issues from gun control to capital punishment to welfare reform, the New 
Right was diametrically opposed to the official stance of the Church. Second, Higgins 
worried that a close alliance with the New Right on abortion would turn it into a hyper-
partisan issue. He believed the movement should oppose any efforts to make abortion a 
partisan issue and should instead try to hold the middle ground. “Those of us concerned 
about the pro life cause would do well to scrutinize more closely this apparent attempt to 
transform prolife sentiment into a right-wing political movement,” he wrote, “One of the 
worst things that could happen to the right-to-life movement is to be taken over by 
ideologues of the right or the left.”655 But he feared that some right-to-lifers were too 
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anxious for any sort of help in fighting against abortion that they did not bother 
considering the dangers posed by an alliance with the New Right and did not worry that 
working with the New Right could turn the pro-life movement into a right-wing cause. 
 In addition to Higgins’ public warnings, the bishops also received a private report 
on the New Right and its connections to pro-life activism. In February 1980, Greg 
Denier, who was affiliated with the International Association of Machinists and had been 
keeping track of developments in the New Right and right-to-life movement, sent his 
report to Msgr. Francis Lally of the United States Catholic Conference. Lally then 
circulated the report to several others including Russell Shaw, a longtime right-to-life 
expert for the USCC, as well as Bishop Thomas Kelly, who was the General Secretary of 
the NCCB. Denier’s report was grim, and he argued that the New Right had already 
“been able to establish the political agenda for the entire right-to-life movement.”656 He 
believed it was an orchestrated attempt by New Right activists such as Paul Weyrich and 
Richard Viguerie to “co-opt” the cause to support right-wing political candidates. And he 
warned church officials: “The end result of this strategy will be to turn a basically 
positive pro-life movement into part of an essentially anti-life right-wing resurgence.”657 
The report received a mixed response from church officials. Some agreed with his 
assessment while others wondered if the situation was as dire as Denier suggested. Shaw, 
for example, supported the overall premise of Denier’s argument—that the New Right 
was making powerful inroads into the movement and that the Church should exercise 
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caution. At the same time, he placed some of the blame on the Democrats as well for 
holding “the right-to-life movement at arm’s length (or worse).”658 
 The bishops and other church officials were not the only Catholics who were 
troubled about the New Right; other Catholics, both lay and religious, also expressed 
comparable concerns. Following the party conventions in the summer of 1980, several 
priests, religious, and lay people wrote to the bishops with concern over the Republican 
Party’s platform. The NCCB had praised the Republican Party’s stance on abortion and 
condemned Democrats. But some Catholics looked at the Republican platform and found 
equally troubling issues. Several wrote letters to Bishop Thomas Kelly. Sister Dolores 
Brinkel praised the NCCB for protesting the Democratic platform on abortion but she 
wondered, “I am sure that the NCCB has or will issue a statement concerning the 
Republican National Convention plank which support and promotes capital 
punishment.”659 Another layperson asked Kelly, “Does the NCCB see human life as 
sacred only at the pre-born stage?”660 The woman, who identified herself as a 63-year-old 
widow and daily mass attendee, wanted to see an “equally strong condemnation” of the 
Republican Party’s support for capital punishment.661 Father Robert Schramm, who 
worked for a criminal advocacy group, also accused the bishops of being 
“inconsistent.”662 These Catholics on the ground demanded the bishops do something to 
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stem the growing influence of the New Right and to challenge stances that contradicted 
church teaching. 
 Over the next few years, the Church responded in several different ways, 
reevaluating the 1975 Pastoral Plan and reshaping their right-to-life strategy. One of the 
first things the bishops did was to begin tracking the political affiliation of the main right-
to-life organizations, noting which were unaffiliated and which ones were closely linked 
to right-wing politics. They also tracked the involvement of prominent Catholics with 
such groups. On March 5, 1980, for example, Russell Shaw informed Bishop Kelly that a 
few prominent Catholics were participating in a Family Forum featuring speakers like 
Jerry Falwell and other figures on the right. These Catholics included people like legal 
scholar, law professor, and author John T. Noonan, who had written several important 
works on contraception, abortion, and the Church.663 Since the late 1960s, right-to-lifers 
and the NRLC had frequently relied on his advice and expertise. Shaw had initially 
thought to “dismiss” the Family Forum as “extremist enterprises unworthy of our 
attention.”664 But when he noticed Noonan and a few other Catholics on the event 
brochure, he concluded, “something is going on here, which has a bearing on matters of 
concern to NCCB/USCC.”665 And in the spring of 1982, Edward Bryce compiled a list of 
national pro-life organizations for the Bishops’ Committee for Pro-life Activities.666 
Bryce gave special designations to groups that were affiliated with right-wing politics. 	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These designations ranged from “de facto preference—conservative Republican” to 
“linked with New Right Conservative Republicans.” And he seemed to pay particular 
attention to political affiliation on the right—the only other designations for groups were 
“neutral” or “bipartisan.”667 Overall, the bishops urged extreme caution in dealing with 
explicitly partisan groups.668 The bishops had reason to be suspicious. Aside from their 
support for policies that violated church teachings, some of these groups had been openly 
antagonistic to the Catholic Church. In the summer of 1980, the Life Amendment 
Political Action Committee (LAPAC), a right-wing group, threatened to sue the Church 
because some Catholic parishes had prohibited them from distributing literature in their 
parking lots.669 In the early 1980s, the Church recognized the New Right and its affiliate 
right-to-life groups as a potential threat not only to the Catholic Church but also to the 
right-to-life movement itself, and they took action to educate themselves and other 
Catholics on the exact threat posed by the New Right. 
 In 1981 and 1982, the Catholic Church also pushed back against the New Right’s 
legislative agenda when, in the course of a debate over several proposed human life 
amendments, the bishops chose to support the Hatch amendment rather than the Helms 
amendment. This choice had huge ramifications, and the debate over which amendment 
to support caused fierce debate and division in the movement. The Helms amendment 
was controversial because it linked an amendment stating that life began at conception to 
a few other New Right issues, including judicial oversight in school prayer cases. By 	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contrast, the Hatch amendment would return jurisdiction over abortion to the states, 
though many right-to-lifers felt it did not go far enough.670 When the Catholic bishops 
chose not to support the Helms amendment, it caused uproar in the movement, and by 
July 1982, Martin Haley warned Cardinal Cooke that the movement was “as fragmented 
as they were eleven months ago and perhaps more so.”671 But the bishops stuck with their 
decision and did not give in to pressure to support the New Right’s legislative attempt to 
restrict abortion. They firmly believed that Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) made a mistake 
in linking his abortion amendment to other New Right concerns, saying it “prevented 
unified pro-life support.”672 Moreover, they criticized Reagan and other Republican 
senators for using the disagreements in the right-to-life movement over which 
amendment to support as an excuse to not do anything at all.673 This episode with the 
Helms and Hatch amendments was just one example of how the bishops were critical of 
the New Right’s legislative agenda and willing to push back against it, even if it meant 
upsetting their fellow right-to-lifers. 
 Perhaps most importantly, the bishops started more explicitly promoting the idea 
of the consistent ethic of life, a view that emphasized consistency on all life issues 
including abortion but also issues like capital punishment, nuclear disarmament, and war. 
Right-to-lifers had been developing this idea since the early 1970s, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. In recognizing the issue of violence as the root cause for abortion, many right-
to-lifers adopted a stance of consistent opposition to all violence in society whether it be 	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war or capital punishment or abortion. The Church’s own Respect Life programs for 
parishes had been subtly promoting the consistent ethic since the mid-1970s.674 Covering 
issues from abortion to gun control to euthanasia to the nuclear arms race, the annual 
Respect Life programs worked to remind Catholics that the Church cared about a range 
of life issues, not just abortion.675 But in the early 1980s, there was a sense that more 
needed to be done. 
 Joseph Cardinal Bernardin was a leader on this front and publicly promoted the 
consistent ethic of life. In 1983 and 1984, Bernardin helped convince the bishops to more 
explicitly support this approach. During a speech at Fordham University in 1983, 
Bernardin first explained his understanding of the consistent ethic and how it related to 
church teaching. He argued that the consistent ethic approach was necessary because 
“success on any one of the issues threatening life requires a concern for the broader 
attitude in society about respect for human life.”676 And he urged people to combine all 
these life issues into one “seamless garment.”677 Bernardin’s idea gained traction with 
Catholics as well as other right-to-life activists, and the idea cropped up in several 
different religious periodicals, including Commonweal, a lay Catholic journal, and 
Sojourners, a progressive evangelical magazine. At least one commentator noted that the 
consistent ethic was meant to challenge the New Right. In an article for Commonweal, 
reporter David Carlin argued that the ethic was intended to situate abortion within a 
“liberal or progressive framework of political thinking, and to rescue it from the 	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conservative or right-wing ideology within which it is frequently found.”678 The church 
leadership also seemed to support Bernardin’s work and promoted the consistent life 
project. In 1984, he was even appointed the chairman of the Bishop’s Pro-life 
Committee.679 And he promised to make sure the church embraced this “broader attitude” 
and remained “a pro-life church.”680 
 As Bernardin continued his public campaign for the consistent ethic, the idea 
gained ground in the right-to-life movement. Despite the continued ascendancy of the 
New Right, Bernardin expressed optimism that the consistent ethic was resonating with 
many people. He explained, “Thank God, I now sense a rising tide of outrage…Many 
people have had enough—enough of abortion on demand, enough of the arms race and 
the threat of nuclear holocaust, enough of terrorism, assaults on human rights, and all the 
rest.”681 He was not wrong—his rhetoric about the consistent ethic of life had an almost 
immediate impact on many pro-lifers who had been speaking about consistency and 
searching for the right rhetoric to describe how their stance differed from that of the New 
Right. References to Bernardin’s speech soon appeared in the publications of left-wing 
pro-lifers and became ubiquitous in their rhetoric. For example, in 1984, Jim Wallis, a 
progressive evangelical and leader of Sojourners, used Bernardin’s language in a critique 
of Reagan’s theology. He wished more people would listen to Bernardin rather than 
Reagan as he believed Bernardin was “much saner” and had “better theology.”682 For 
many right-to-lifers, promoting the consistent ethic of life helped them clearly articulate 	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why they opposed the New Right and what set them apart as truly pro-life rather than just 
antiabortion. 
 In myriad ways, the Catholic Church challenged the New Right’s newfound 
influence in right-to-life politics—or at the very least cautioned Catholic right-to-lifers 
about seeking alliances with the New Right on the abortion issue. Church officials issued 
public warnings about the New Right, and the bishops began tracking organizations that 
were directly linked with right-wing politics. The bishops also challenged the New 
Right’s legislative agenda, even though it risked dividing the right-to-life movement. 
Moreover, they rethought their approach to educating Catholics and the public about the 
Church’s teachings on various life issues. While the Respect Life program continued in 
parishes, trying to show lay Catholics the interconnectedness of abortion with a number 
of other issues, the bishops also took more decisive steps to highlight other life issues. In 
both their pastoral letter of 1983, “The Challenge of Peace,” which focused on the issue 
of nuclear weapons, as well as in Cardinal Bernardin’s public campaign to promote the 
consistent ethic of life, the bishops helped expand the scope of right-to-life activism. 
With all of these initiatives, the Catholic Church promoted an alternative approach to 
politics and sought to directly counteract efforts by the New Right to link abortion to its 
other right-wing causes. 
5.3 Right-to-life Moderates and the Shrinking Middle Ground 
 While the Catholic Church cautioned right-to-lifers about the influence of the 
New Right, moderate activists in the movement—some who considered themselves 
liberals or centrists or Democrats—also sounded the alarm. Here a mix of individual 
activists, state and national right-to-life groups, and liberal politicians tried to hold the 
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center on the abortion issue and find workable solutions that could appeal to both the 
right and the left of the political spectrum. This was a challenging task—not only were 
they facing off with conservative activists but also with liberals and Democrats who 
supported abortion rights. Nevertheless, ACCL and its members, MCCL, some members 
of the NRLC, and other right-to-life moderates on the ground continued promoting a 
middle-of-the-road approach to politics. They fought against the New Right as well as to 
keep their place in the Democratic Party, asserting to both sides that they could be both 
liberal and opponents of legalized abortion. Since the 1960s, many of these moderate pro-
lifers had focused their energy on building a broad-based right-to-life movement made up 
of all sorts of Americans—it was what they believed was the best and most effective 
strategy. Now, as they fought to defend this vision, these activists watched as right-wing 
right-to-lifers became an increasingly vocal part of the movement and as opposition to 
abortion became firmly wedded to this new conservative politics. 
 At the same time as Catholic leaders were warning people about the growing 
influence of right-wing politics in the right-to-life movement, ACCL’s leaders were also 
growing concerned, and they quickly decided to help lead the fight against the New Right 
among moderate right-to-lifers. The organization had to proceed carefully—its official 
policy dictated that the group stay out of partisan politics.683 But ACCL’s leaders had 
similar concerns as the Catholic Church. Following Msgr. Higgins’ piece in America in 
September 1980, Marjory Mecklenburg praised Higgins’ analysis. In a letter to him the 
month after its publication, Mecklenburg noted that ACCL’s leaders were also worried 
about the influence of right-wing politics, but they were hopeful that it might motivate 
liberals and moderates to become even more involved in right-to-life politics. 	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Mecklenburg wrote, “We expect that increased awareness of the right-wing, anti-abortion 
political alliance will stimulate thoughtful people to realize that centrist and liberal pro-
life activity must be sharply increased.”684 She believed that a strong moderate right-to-
life group was the only way to keep people from being “hooked into the right-wing 
organizations and political activity.”685 According to Mecklenburg, ACCL was the best 
solution as it was “the only effective national centrist group with ties both left and right,” 
but to succeed the group must “increase influence and visibility.”686 ACCL’s members 
were more convinced than ever that the New Right was dangerous, threatened their 
bipartisan approach, and must be countered by any means necessary.  
 Following Higgins’ warnings about “the danger of this new political alliance,” 
Mecklenburg and the ACCL got to work trying to increase their membership and educate 
pro-lifers about the dangers of right-wing politics in the movement. While the Catholic 
Church emphasized and promoted church teachings, ACCL worked to promote bipartisan 
strategies and to mobilize moderates. In a letter to the group’s members following the 
publication of Higgins’ article in America, Mecklenburg articulated their plan for 
challenging the New Right takeover of right-to-life politics. The plan was simple—stick 
to the strategy that ACCL had embraced since its founding. Thus, its leaders decided they 
would continue to promote alternatives to abortion, which they believed would help 
women and children and advertise their reasonable approach. Mecklenburg explained, 
“For six years we have quietly and effectively worked to improve the quality of life and 
the legal protection offered vulnerable human beings.”  They would now continue to 
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execute that plan with “consistency, professionalism and cooperative approach.”687 
Mecklenburg emphasized this consistency and reasonableness when she wrote to 
researcher James Kelly in the fall of 1980 and described ACCL as “intelligent and 
constructive” as well as “a credible voice in behind-the-scenes formation of public 
policy.”688  She hoped that these efforts and this unique approach would make a big 
impact not only in the right-to-life movement but also in American society as a whole. 
She wrote, “It will not be easy…to reframe the pro-life position so that it appeals to a 
broad majority. But our past success has taught us that it can be done…but only if we 
persuade—not pressure; educate—not intimidate; gather—not divide.”689 Mecklenburg 
and other ACCL members trusted the strategy that they had developed in the 1970s. By 
maintaining their professional, reasonable, and bipartisan approach, Mecklenburg 
believed that ACCL and its members could counter the New Right and protect their 
broad-based coalition.  
 One of ACCL’s main goals, in addition to fostering a “reasonable” middle-of-the-
road approach, was to try to attract more liberal or moderate activists. ACCL maintained 
that liberals should be welcomed into the pro-life movement by other right-to-lifers and 
enjoy full participation in the movement’s organizations. In March 1980, Congressman 
Richard Nolan (D-MN) wrote a piece for the ACCL newsletter arguing that “‘Pro-lifers’ 
ought to be liberals.”690 He explained how the movement could benefit from it: “Growth 
should happen as committed liberals are welcomed into the pro-life movement. And 	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liberals should be welcomed, because pro-life…encompasses the same principles 
advanced by liberals since the time of Thomas Jefferson…Because I am for life I work to 
achieve a society with a decent quality of life for all.”691 He went on to argue that right-
to-lifers must work with liberals as “allies” in the fight for life. ACCL also reached out to 
various Catholic officials they thought might be liberal allies in the fight against the New 
Right. Mecklenburg invited Msgr. Higgins to partner in this work and become an ACCL 
board member, though he was unable to accept her offer.692 And ACCL member Ray 
DiBlasio reached out to Bishop James Malone of Youngstown, Ohio, who The Wanderer 
had already labeled a “progressivist,” in hopes that he might be interested in working 
with them.693 ACCL and its members saw liberals as full allies in the fight against 
abortion and an important pillar in their broad-based movement. 
 Over the course of a few years, ACCL undertook a number of endeavors to 
promote their moderate approach and recruit new members. Its efforts were most intense 
in 1980 and 1981 in the lead up to and aftermath of Reagan’s election. As Mecklenburg 
noted, “Our campaign to make visible and discover additional pro-life moderates and 
liberals has been sharply stepped-up.”694 ACCL worked to expand its mailing lists to try 
to reach new members and sent mailings to subscribers of the National Catholic Reporter 
and US Catholic.695 The group also distributed Higgins’ article, in hopes that it would 
make other right-to-lifers wary of the New Right.696 But for the most part, its political 
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strategy seemed to remain the same. In a document listing ACCL’s accomplishments 
from 1976 to 1981, there was no noticeable shift in strategy in the 1980s.697 ACCL’s 
members still testified in favor of legislation supporting adoption, programs to help with 
teen pregnancy, and other alternatives to abortion initiatives, promoted their cause in 
newspapers and magazines, and traveled the country speaking to right-to-life groups. 
Though in the early 1980s they worked to expand their mailing lists, reach new groups of 
people, and promote the work of liberals in right-to-life politics, when it came to their 
legislative agenda the ACCL and its members relied on the “reasonable” and 
“cooperative approach” that had helped them become successful in the 1970s. 
 ACCL was not the only major right-to-life group to challenge the New Right; 
even the NRLC was wary of the rightward shift in the movement. Since its separation 
from the Catholic Church in 1973, the NRLC had tried to avoid any specific partisan or 
sectarian affiliation. The New Right had proposed an alliance with them in the late 1970s 
but the NRLC had turned them down. Its leaders insisted abortion was an issue that cut 
across political affiliations and did not want to alienate any potential supporters.698 Still, 
the NRLC faced its own internal divisions over the conservative approach to abortion. As 
with the dilemma faced by church officials, NRLC members dealt with disagreements 
over the Helms and Hatch amendments. Because of this tense debate, Jack Willke 
advised his organization and its affiliates to prioritize civility and cooperation with one 
another and to focus on their shared opposition to abortion. In 1982, he urged all NRLC 
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members to remember this goal even amidst intense debate over proposed legislation: 
“Let’s all try to be less absolute, less dogmatic, more humble and really—really, let’s 
pray. Actively support your preference but don’t actively oppose another major pro-life 
legislative initiative. Our goal is to help babies, not the pro-abortionists.”699 The NRLC 
also faced off with a conservative Catholic pro-life group out of California, Catholics 
United for Life (CUL). When the NRLC canceled a CUL workshop at the national 
convention in 1982, CUL claimed that the NRLC was trying to “make the pro-life 
movement non-religious.”700 The organization struggled to remain nonsectarian and 
nonpartisan as many of its constituents shifted further to the right in both politics and 
religion. As president of the NRLC, Willke tried to head off any conflict between 
hardline, conservative right-to-lifers and their more moderate counterparts, emphasizing 
their shared goal of “helping babies.”701  
 As the NRLC and ACCL tried to maintain a moderate approach at the national 
level, some state groups also helped sustain the broad-based movement—working both to 
expand the conversation around abortion as well as to maintain their influence in state 
political parties. MCCL and pro-life moderates in Minnesota provide a particularly 
helpful example as liberals and moderates had a long history of activism in MCCL and 
still had a large contingent of right-to-lifers involved in the state’s Democratic Party in 
the 1980s. Thus, they were in a prime position to respond to Reagan’s election and the 
rise of the New Right. MCCL made sure to offer a careful definition of single-issue 
voting to avoid hardline approaches to abortion. The definition emphasized that the group 	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cared for many issues including people with disabilities, the poor, and the elderly.702 Leo 
LaLonde, MCCL’s president, also reminded Minnesotans that MCCL was in favor of 
family planning initiatives. LaLonde said the group only opposed family planning funds 
that paid for abortions.703 And even as many right-to-lifers and other conservatives turned 
against the ERA, Minnesota’s Feminists for Life insisted that right-to-lifers should work 
for a human life amendment but never forget that they also had a “responsibility” to 
“form coalitions with existing groups that seek to give assistance to poor women, men, 
and children.”704 For these moderate right-to-lifers, supporting a human life amendment 
was vital, but it was not enough anymore. They insisted that the pro-life area of concern 
must be broader and that right-to-lifers must be willing to form new coalitions with other 
political groups. 
 MCCL continued to emphasize that the right-to-life movement was broad-based, 
encompassing right-to-lifers of all political persuasions. At its 1981 convention, for 
example, the group made a point to describe the conference as a gathering that would 
“draw together pro-lifers from totally disparate backgrounds, demonstrating the broad-
based support the pro-life movement has gathered in recent years.”705 In state politics, 
MCCL and its members also continued supporting both Republican and Democratic 
politicians.706 And in its own publications, MCCL highlighted a range of views, regularly 
reporting on the work of liberal and left-wing activists and promoting an alternative 	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image of the movement. These included stories on Sojourners, a progressive evangelical 
organization, as well as highlighting the work of local groups like the Minnesota branch 
of Feminists for Life.707  
 While much of their energy was focused on mitigating the influence of the New 
Right, liberal right-to-lifers also clashed with their fellow liberals. In doing so, they 
challenged stereotypes that the right-to-life movement was only conservative and, as 
Democrats took a firmer stance in favor of abortion rights, these activists also argued that 
pro-lifers belonged in the Democratic Party. Following the 1980 election, a local right-to-
lifer from Rice, Minnesota, responded to Senator George McGovern’s new political 
group and his assertion that pro-lifers were all right-wing. The man pointed out that 
during the recent election right-to-lifers backed both liberals and conservatives—all that 
mattered was their stance on abortion, not their party affiliation.708 Denis Wadley, who 
had long been involved in both the MCCL as well as progressive politics in Minnesota, 
also criticized liberals’ stance on abortion. He argued that liberals needed to broaden their 
thinking on the abortion issue. As he talked about balancing the rights of women and the 
rights of the unborn, he wondered, “Isn’t there room for a position that says both are 
victims, and the rights of both should be respected?”709 Likewise, right-to-lifer Mary 
Joyce still insisted that a strategic alliance between the pro-life movement and the 
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women’s movement was possible and would be beneficial—arguing that they should 
work together to stop rape and abortion.710 
 The plight of right-to-lifers in the Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) Party in 
Minnesota provides an instructive case study. In general, pro-life Democrats were finding 
themselves in an increasingly precarious position and saw their place in the party quickly 
disappearing. But they tried to argue for their legitimacy in both the national party as well 
as in their respective state parties. This shift was particularly acute for pro-life Democrats 
in Minnesota, as they had always had a large and influential cohort in the DFL. In 1979 
and 1980, for example, they maintained enough influence in at least one county to 
completely control the county party and elect pro-life DFL members to all the party 
offices for the county.711 They also had one liberal Democratic representative, Rep. 
James Oberstar, who proved to them that at least some “liberal Democrats…seem to have 
no difficulty resisting pressure from pro-abortion coworkers and supporters.”712 And they 
were still a vocal group at the state conventions. At the state convention in 1980, some 
pro-lifers left feeling a guarded optimism: “They (prochoicers) put us in our place, but 
the important thing is we have a place.”713  These right-to-lifers pledged to stay in the 
party.714  
 Despite their optimism after the state convention, right-to-lifers in the DFL were 
already feeling the strain of trying to hold their place in the party. Several publicly 	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denounced the party’s platform in 1980. During the 1980 election, pro-life DFL members 
also warned Carter that if he did not “make some overtures to the anti-abortion 
movement,” they would “defect in droves to Ronald Reagan.”715 At least one member 
followed through on this threat. James Kraher of Crystal, Minnesota, wrote into his local 
paper to announce his abandonment of the party after being a member since 1938: 
“People, like me, who are ‘pro-life’…have been invited to leave on all convention 
levels—congressional, state, and national.”716 Likewise, Judy Lee, who had been a 
delegate to the 1980 Democratic National Convention, lamented the Democratic Party’s 
strong stance in favor of abortion rights. Unlike Kraher, she decided to remain a 
Democrat, though she described the frustration pro-life Democrats faced: “We gain 
nothing from candidates or platform positions and seemingly knock our heads against 
brick walls trying to be heard.”717 Carl Provost from Proctor, Minnesota, also wrote into 
the local paper, questioning his longtime membership in the party: “I and my family have 
always been Democrats but now I find my party has deserted a fundamental right…There 
are tens of thousands of pro-life Democrats across this nation—where do we go?”718 It 
was a difficult position for these right-to-lifers who liked the party’s platform, except on 
abortion. David LaFontaine, one of the DFL Pro-life Coordinators, summed up the 
feelings of many pro-life Democrats: “I view a Reagan presidency with real dread. But 
we’ve got to have something we can take back to our people. Just being a Democrat isn’t 
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good enough anymore.”719 With the New Right ascendant and the Democratic Party more 
firmly supporting abortion rights, pro-life Democrats were caught in the middle. In 
Minnesota, these Democrats debated what to do—stay loyal to their party despite its 
views on abortion or support a candidate they viewed with dread. Neither option was 
appealing. 
 The 1980 Democratic National Convention further alienated the right-to-lifers. 
That year, MCCL sent a contingent of pro-life Democrats to the convention where they 
tried to prevent abortion rights platform planks from being adopted but with no 
success.720 At the convention, MCCL member Carol Wold gave an impassioned speech 
about their place in the party. Wold was not only a member of MCCL’s Board of 
Directors but also part of the DFL Pro-life Caucus. She lamented, “I am a Democrat. I am 
pro-life. Today my party is telling me that I cannot be both.”721 Wold warned the party 
that it risked alienating and losing the support of pro-life Democrats across the country. 
Despite Wold’s warnings, the DNC approved a plank that reaffirmed Roe v. Wade and 
opposed any sort of human life amendment.722 It confirmed right-to-lifers’ fears that there 
would be no room for them going forward in the Democratic Party, despite their efforts to 
keep pro-life Democrats in the spotlight and remind their fellow Democrats that some of 
them opposed legalized abortion.  
 By the mid-1980s, the situation looked bleak for the moderate right-to-lifers. 
Carol Wold, who had spoken so boldly at the DNC in 1980, found herself in a now 	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familiar position for these activists. “Despite her willingness to ‘go along with the party,’ 
Wold was seen as one who did not go far enough in appeasing the liberals to satisfy 
them,” historian Christopher Anglim observed.723 Yet at the same time she “was not 
‘pure’ enough for many conservative pro-lifers.”724 In another blow for moderate right-
to-lifers, ACCL’s membership was dwindling, and the group had lost its main leader, 
Marjory Mecklenburg, who had stepped down to take a position in the Reagan 
administration dealing with the issue of teen pregnancy.725  
 The moderates in the right-to-life movement tried to challenge the New Right in 
national politics, in their state organizations, and in their local communities, but they 
never saw the influx of liberals into the movement that they had hoped for. Moreover, the 
moderate right-to-lifers failed to make the Democratic Party any more flexible in its 
stance on abortion. Instead, they found themselves alienated there as well. Though they 
never completely disappeared from the movement, the pro-life moderates no longer had 
the same sway as they had in the 1960s and 1970s when they could enthusiastically and 
vocally push for things like better contraceptive access and sex education or alternatives 
to abortion legislation. Now, they retreated and became a small, quiet minority in both 
the right-to-life movement and the Democratic Party. 
5.4 The Pro-life Left and a Renewed Vision for Right-to-Life Activism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 Christopher Anglim, “Loaves and Fishes: A History of Pro-life Activism in the Democratic-Farmer-
Labor Party of Minnesota’s Fifth Congressional District 1968-1981” (unpublished manuscript, 1981) 
Minnesota Historical Library, St. Paul, MN, 154. 
724 Ibid.  
725 Lucy Dalgilsh, “Federal post for Mecklenburg worries abortion rights head,” Pioneer Press (St. Paul, 
MN), February 20, 1981, Reel 10, MCCL Newspaper Clippings; Bill Peterson, “Abortion foes quietly gain 
U.S. policy role,” Minneapolis Star, March 13, 1981, Reel 10, MCCL Newspaper Clippings; Edward M. 
Bryce to Bishop Thomas Kelly, January 28, 1981, Box 64, Folder Ad Hoc Committee January-June 1981, 
USCCB Records. 
  256  
 As the debate around abortion grew more divisive at the end of the 1970s, a 
coalition of pro-lifers with ties to left-wing activism became even more vocal and started 
attacking the New Right from a more radical perspective. These activists were a diverse 
group—feminists, college students, old antiwar activists, nuclear disarmament activists, 
Catholics, progressive evangelicals from groups like Sojourners, and more. As discussed 
in Chapters 2 and 4, such activists had been involved in the movement for years and had 
already founded organizations like Feminists for Life and Pro-lifers for Survival, names 
that highlighted the groups’ feminist and antiwar roots. In the early 1980s, these right-to-
lifers worked alongside the Catholic Church and pro-life moderates to oppose the New 
Right; however, unlike the Catholic Church and moderates, the pro-life left argued more 
decisively for a stance against abortion that embraced opposition to war, nuclear 
weapons, and capital punishment. It was a push for a radical consistency on anything that 
could be considered a life issue. And while ACCL and other moderates still argued that 
there was room for all right-to-lifers in the movement regardless of political affiliation, 
the pro-life left insisted that right-to-lifers must uphold a consistent stance on life issues 
and faced off directly with New Right and Religious Right figures from President Reagan 
to Jerry Falwell.  
 The pro-life left made the broadest claims of right-to-lifers who opposed the New 
Right. Most were unapologetic in their support for feminism, the peace movement, and 
nuclear disarmament. Juli Loesch of Prolifers for Survival stated, “As a civil-libertarian 
and a feminist, I support sexual and reproductive freedom. I also support, as a prior and 
more basic consideration, the right of everyone to live—and this includes the 
handicapped, the defective, the eccentric, the elderly, and children, regardless of their 
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dependency, at every stage in their development.”726 Others could not fathom the New 
Right approach to abortion. In Minnesota, the young people of SOUL expressed 
confusion over the position of conservative right-to-lifers who supported the New Right. 
Their Board of Directors explained: “SOUL cannot understand how anyone can be 
opposed to destruction through abortion, yet sanctify another legalized death through 
capital punishment, or justify nuclear proliferation and misuse, or condone drafting of our 
youth for a war over oil in the name of freedom.”727 To them, it seemed the New Right’s 
policies were fundamentally anathema to a consistent right-to-life position. 
 The pro-life left not only confronted the New Right but also claimed that the 
right-to-life position was more in line with the aims of the left than it was with the project 
of the right. This claim was significant at a time when conservative right-to-lifers were 
situating abortion among a constellation of conservative issues while liberals and the left 
were taking firmer stances in favor of abortion rights. But the pro-life left remained 
convinced that opposition to abortion and other left-wing causes were naturally 
complementary. For example, when talking with fellow activists on the left, left-wing 
right-to-lifers used the Vietnam War to emphasize this continuity. In an article on the 
pro-life left for Commonweal, Mary Meehan observed, “To pro-lifers on the left, all of 
this brings back memories of Vietnam…They see little, if any, moral difference between 
killing a fetus in the womb with salt solution and killing a Vietnamese baby with 
napalm.”728 In interviews and articles, Loesch confirmed Meehan’s observations and 
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constantly made the connection between opposing war and opposing abortion.729 She 
claimed that she had come to realize that “abortion is war” and had adopted a pro-life 
stance “not despite, but because of my other commitments against violence and social 
injustice.”730 Just as Vietnam antiwar protests had played a vital role in shaping and 
strengthening the left in the 1960s, opposition to abortion coupled with opposition to the 
Vietnam War emboldened the pro-life left, encouraging these right-to-lifers to argue that 
opposition to abortion fit seamlessly among the larger projects of the left.  
 Why, then, were the majority of those on the left unwilling to make the same 
connection? Longtime antiwar activist Elizabeth McAlister argued that Vietnam made 
people numb to death and that American society had become “morally bankrupt.”731 In 
making this observation, McAlister drew on an extensive history of antiwar and 
antinuclear activism; she was opposed to the Vietnam War and had even been arrested as 
part of the “Harrisburg Seven” in 1971 for “conspiring to raid federal offices, to bomb 
government property, and to kidnap the presidential advisor Henry Kissinger.”732 She had 
married fellow activist Philip Berrigan, and she continued to be involved in left-wing 
religious movements such as the Plowshares Movement.733 Now, McAlister recalled the 
lack of concern for the rising “body count” in Vietnam—how Americans treated the 
growing death toll there with “the same spirit as it measures the ball scores”—and she 
wondered why right-to-lifers were surprised when there was little outcry over legal 
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abortion.734 Something had gone terribly wrong in American society, and only a “re-
valuing of human life” in all areas could fix it.735 Because activists like McAlister and 
Loesch connected the Vietnam experience with a right-to-life stance, they believed they 
were the remnants of the true left that had remained morally viable. And they argued that 
the pro-life left could see the connections between these different life issues—abortion, 
war, nuclear weapons, and capital punishment—in ways that other activists could not.  
 Confident of the legitimacy of their position, left-wing right-to-lifers turned their 
attention to the right-to-life movement. Similar to Bernardin, the pro-life left’s biggest 
point of contention with the New Right and conservative right-to-lifers was consistency, 
and the pro-life left pushed for a radical consistency on all life issues. They were 
concerned on two accounts: that other right-to-lifers viewed abortion as the single most 
important issue in American society and ignored other life issues and that they embraced 
the New Right platform completely and unquestioningly. A common criticism was that 
right-to-lifers focused so single-mindedly on abortion that they failed to take action on 
other issues and thus appeared callous. The pro-life left challenged this perceived 
indifference by publicly professing their own consistency on the issues of abortion, 
violence, and death. SOUL, for example, defended their organization and its consistency 
on life issues. “We cry loudly over violent deaths through abortion,” SOUL member 
Rebecca Wodelak informed the St. Paul Pioneer Press in 1981, “but protest equally 
when a prisoner is burned to death in an electric chair…We cannot accept the horrible 
poisoning, maiming death forced upon humans by abortion, euthanasia, war, uranium 
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mining and nuclear radiation.”736 At other times, the pro-life left criticized the 
conservative right-to-life stance directly, calling out its many shortcomings.737  Jim 
Wallis articulated this viewpoint in the November 1980 issue of Sojourners: 
Like many, we have often been put off by the anti-abortion movement. Its 
attitudes toward women and the poor, combined with its positive support for 
militarism and capital punishment, have been deeply offensive to us and have 
helped keep us away from the issue of abortion. Serious contradictions, along 
with the insensitivity of rhetoric and tactics of many in the pro-life movement, 
have alienated others from their cause.738 
 
These were serious charges and, as Jim Wallis noted, had kept many potential right-to-
life activists away from the movement. But the pro-life left pushed the issue, believing 
that the movement must confront the issue of consistency if it were to remain a viable and 
moral cause.  
 Very quickly, however, the pro-life left felt compelled to take further action. In 
1980, Sojourners, the progressive evangelical group led by Wallis, dedicated an entire 
issue of its monthly magazine to coming out publicly in opposition to abortion. That issue 
of Sojourners was one of the best and most comprehensive statements of the pro-life left 
and helped bring together the Catholic left and the evangelical left. Though Sojourners 
was an evangelical magazine, many of the contributing authors were Catholics, including 
Juli Loesch, Daniel Berrigan, and Elizabeth McAlister. This issue of Sojourners also 
circulated throughout the rest of the movement. MCCL reported on its publication and 
noted Sojourners’ “strong pro-life stance” as well as the ways the magazine issue 
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challenged the stereotype that “casts all pro-lifers as ultra-rightwingers.”739 MCCL also 
offered to provide copies of the magazine for any of its interested members. That issue of 
Sojourners set the tone for the pro-life left throughout the decade, definitively and 
publicly affirming their radical consistency on abortion and other life issues. Similarly, 
Prolifers for Survival picked up its publicity of right-to-life activities as well as other left-
wing causes. In the early 1980s, its newsletter advertised the March for Life but also a 
conference for the Religious Left, a campaign by the National War Tax Resistance 
Coordinating Committee, and a member’s work settling refugees in the United States.740 
 By the mid-1980s, the pro-life left was actively opposing the New Right, their 
wariness giving way to outright denunciation. Juli Loesch tried to meet conservative 
right-to-lifers on their own turf. Starting in January 1983, Loesch toured the South and 
visited local right-to-life groups to spread the pro-life left message. She persisted in 
explaining the need to oppose abortion, war, and nuclear weapons despite encountering 
“forceful pro-arms-race viewpoints,” “folks from Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum,” and 
the “regional head of the John Birch Society” along the way.741 On the other hand, she 
was heartened to meet a few other progressive pro-lifers during her trip. Sojourners also 
enacted a bolder strategy. After much planning in the early 1980s, Wallis and the 
Sojourners organized a Peace Pentecost in the summer of 1985 to directly challenge 
Reagan and the New Right. The group marched around Washington, D.C. to “pray, sing, 
and engage in nonviolent civil disobedience.”742  They went to the White House, the State 
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Department, the Soviet Embassy, the South African Embassy, the Supreme Court, and 
the Department of Health and Human Services. The group chose those sites specifically 
to emphasize the group’s radical consistency on life issues, from racism to abortion to 
war to capital punishment. In an article on the protest, Wallis was hopeful and optimistic 
about the emergence of a new conscience and respect for all human life among a variety 
of Christians.743 Prominent conservative Jerry Falwell, meanwhile, blasted Wallis and the 
others, calling them “pseudo-evangelicals” and comparing Wallis to Hitler.744 Wallis 
dismissed Falwell and argued instead that the time was right for the pro-life left to “reject 
the inconsistencies and polarities of the political Right, Left, and center.”745 
 Through all these protests, trips, and speaking events, Reagan and the New Right 
remained the prime targets of the pro-life left. They did not trust Reagan’s pro-life 
credentials or his appeals to religious Americans, and they believed the New Right’s 
approach to abortion was fundamentally flawed. As Wallis explained, “an abundance of 
religious language does not a good theology make.”746 It was in this same article that 
Wallis argued that Cardinal Bernardin offered a “much saner” approach for the right-to-
life movement. Along with the Catholic Church and the moderate right-to-lifers, the pro-
life left tried desperately to keep right-wing politics from completely dominating the 
movement. By promoting a left-wing approach to abortion, reaching out to fellow right-
to-lifers, and confronting New Right activists, the pro-life left mounted a strong challenge 
to the conservative right-to-lifers and hoped to reshape right-to-life activism. However, it 
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would not be enough, and they shared a similar fate as their moderate counterparts, 
marginalized in the right-to-life movement itself as well as within left-wing activism. 
Conclusion 
 No matter how hard the Catholic Church, the moderates of ACCL and MCCL, or 
the pro-life left worked, there seemed to be no remaining middle ground when it came to 
the abortion issue, and, despite their passionate activism, right-to-lifers who opposed the 
New Right soon found little space left for them in right-to-life politics. David Carlin 
summed it up well in an article for Commonweal: “The liberals will disown you, since 
you can't be one of them without being a feminist, and you can't be a feminist without 
being pro-choice. And the conservatives won't receive you, since no matter how right you 
may be on the abortion question, you're still wrong, from their point of view, on a 
hundred and one other questions.”747 Thus, right-to-lifers opposed to the New Right 
retreated into the background or left the right-to-life movement altogether. Marjory 
Mecklenburg left ACCL and accepted a position in the Reagan administration working 
on issues like teen pregnancy. The NRLC persisted though it still tried to maintain its 
political neutrality. MCCL also survived though its pro-life contingency in the DFL 
struggled to make an impact.  
 Despite their failure in the mid-1980s, these right-to-lifers defended their 
nonpartisan, nonsectarian, and consistent approach to right-to-life activism, believing it 
was the best hope for their cause. After his run-in with Falwell in 1985, Wallis argued 
that their unique approach to life issues was “a position that knows no ideological 
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Left…The political conservatives and liberals each have their favorite causes and victims 
and ignore the cries of many of God’s children. It must not be so with us.”748 Yet, in 
refusing to choose sides, these activists were relegated to the margins. The polarized 
political landscape of the 1980s left little room for them on the left or the right. 
Democrats took a hard line on abortion rights, and Republicans’ embrace of the New 
Right made the party intolerable for the activists. And given these conditions, it was 
nearly impossible to hold together the broad-based right-to-life movement of the 1970s. 
By 1986, Sojourner Danny Collum concluded that they only had one option: “All we can 
do is speak and act faithfully.”749  
 In spite of this resignation and their relative obscurity since then, right-to-lifers 
who resisted the New Right carved out an enduring, though little known, legacy, 
especially in their emphasis on consistency. The consistent ethic of life has been a 
recurring theme in right-to-life politics since the 1980s. In 1987, Prolifers for Survival 
helped organize the Seamless Garment Network based on Cardinal Bernardin’s work 
promoting the consistent ethic of life. Sojourners also joined the network. It exists today 
as the organization Consistent Life with about two hundred member groups and is 
“committed to the protection of life, which is threatened in today's world by war, 
abortion, poverty, racism, capital punishment and euthanasia.”750  
 The story of these right-to-lifers who resisted the New Right’s interference in 
politics is important because it challenges more conventional views of Reagan-era 
America and the role of abortion in the rise of the New Right. Many scholars and the 
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1980s—the issue that rallied people to Ronald Reagan and the New Right; however, even 
in the early 1980s, at the height of the conservative ascendancy, the right-to-life 
movement was not monolithically conservative. Though some right-to-lifers readily 
embraced Reagan or cautiously began alliances with the New Right, many right-to-lifers 
did not, including key leaders of the movement. Members of the Catholic Church, 
moderate right-to-lifers in groups like ACCL, and left-wing activists fought back against 
the New Right’s incursions into the right-to-life cause at the grassroots and state level as 
well as in national politics. These right-to-lifers not only resisted the New Right but saw 
the conservative stance on abortion and other life issues as fundamentally antithetical to 
the right-to-life movement. And they boldly asserted that abortion was not simply a 
conservative cause. Instead of allying with the New Right, they proposed alternative 
visions for right-to-life activism—a broad-based movement for all Americans that was 
consistent, nonpartisan, and nonsectarian, offering positive alternatives to abortion. 
 In spite of their frustrations in the early 1980s and their failure to rally large 
numbers of right-to-lifers to their cause, many of these right-to-lifers persisted in the 
belief that abortion was an issue that could transcend political polarization and rally all 
Americans to a common cause. And despite their failures, this coalition of diverse right-
to-life activists still maintained that their broad-based approach was the best and most 
effective way to oppose abortion and sustain the movement. In 1984, Juli Loesch 
reiterated this optimism, the belief that their approach would win in the end and that their 
movement was for all people: “Society can be changed by people for whom ‘Right and 
Left’ are not as important as ‘Right and Wrong.’ People who will strain every muscle to 
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defend the right to life for everybody: man and woman…believer and unbeliever…white 
and black…American and Russian…born and unborn.”751  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In January 2018, thousands of right-to-lifers once again gathered in Washington, 
D.C., for their annual March for Life. In a first for any American president, Donald 
Trump spoke to the gathered crowd via live television broadcast. In his address, Trump 
praised the movement’s “great citizens” who came to the march “from many 
backgrounds, many places.” 752 He also promised that his administration would do even 
more to fight abortion, pledging, “Under my administration, we will always defend the 
very first right in the Declaration of Independence, and that is the right to life.”753 In 
addition, Trump connected the abortion issue to religion and especially to the issue of 
religious freedom. He ended his speech by declaring his solidarity with the marchers and 
praising the work being done by right-to-lifers to protect “the gift of life itself”: “That is 
why we march. That is why we pray. And that is why we declare that America’s future 
will be filled with goodness, peace, joy, dignity, and life for every child of God.”754  
 Many right-to-lifers lauded his speech. Dave Andrusko, writing for the NRLC, 
rejoiced, “Today was a glorious day for unborn children.”755 And Jeanne Mancini, 
president of the March for Life, praised Trump’s remarks and enthusiasm for the cause: 
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“He seems so excited about it. I could sort of see it looking up at the jumbotron.”756 At a 
private gathering with leaders of the movement, Vice President Mike Pence reassured 
them, “Life is winning.”757 In a presidency that has been met with historically low 
approval ratings, Trump has won the overwhelming approval of those activists dedicated 
to fighting legal abortion. And his repeated overtures to the movement show that, despite 
consistent public support for legal abortion, the right-to-life movement still holds a 
powerful position in politics in the United States.758 
 In some ways, this recent March for Life was a familiar scene, and the imprint of 
earlier right-to-life activism still shapes the movement. The march itself has been a 
mainstay for these activists, their most important annual ritual since 1974. Trump’s 
invocation of the Declaration of Independence harkened back to the rights-based 
approach favored by many right-to-lifers. The religious references throughout the speech 
were reminiscent of so many letters penned by right-to-lifers to their legislators since the 
1960s. Trump even discussed maternity homes in his address, a nod to the alternatives-to-
abortion approach to the issue. Clearly, right-to-lifers still draw on the playbook 
developed by their forebears in the 1960s and 1970s. To this day, they employ the 
rhetoric and strategies created by people like Alice Hartle and Ed Golden, Marjory 
Mecklenburg and Judy Fink, Bob Holbrook and Father James McHugh, and countless 
others who pioneered right-to-life activism in the 1960s and 1970s. But in many other 
ways, everything has changed.  	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 Though Trump hailed activists from a variety of backgrounds, he spoke to a 
movement of increasingly monolithic politics and religion. Since the early 1980s, 
opposition to abortion has become confined to a smaller and less diverse segment of 
society, thanks in part to the marriage of conservative religion and politics to the right-to-
life movement.759 In fact, religiosity and political affiliation have become prime 
predictors of a person’s stance on abortion.760 For example, sixty-five percent of 
Republicans “say abortion should be illegal in all or most cases” while seventy-five 
percent of Democrats believe the reverse.761 Indeed, opposition to abortion has been 
increasingly tied to the Republican Party since the 1980s.762 And higher religiosity also 
correlates directly to greater opposition to abortion.763 Highly religious, conservative 
Republicans, then, have become dominant in the movement.  
 This is a far cry from the broad-based coalition right-to-lifers set out to create in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1960s, a small group of men and women scattered across 
the United States became aware of the abortion issue as states started reforming or 
repealing their abortion statutes. Though many of these people had little political 
experience, they soon began building the local and state organizations that would form 
the bedrock of the right-to-life movement into the 1980s. They organized massive letter-
writing campaigns, developed books, pamphlets, and other educational material, lobbied 
their state legislators, and recruited new activists in their local communities. This 
movement, though initially dominated by Catholics, soon realized that its best chance of 	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success would be with a coalition made up of Americans from across the religious and 
political spectrums. It would increasingly diversify its membership throughout the 1970s 
as right-to-lifers fostered a vision for a broad-based movement.  
 In the early 1970s, these new groups made an aggressive pivot in state politics 
and mounted an ambitious campaign to oppose the abortion rights movement. Rather 
than simply reacting defensively against new reform or repeal measures, right-to-lifers 
decided to work to implement their own agenda at the state level. They sought firmer 
laws against abortion and began considering a human life amendment to the Constitution 
that would ban abortion nationwide. The activists enacted this pivot in strategy by 
becoming savvy political actors. They showed up for protests at their state capitols, 
hounded their legislators, protested at clinics that dared perform abortions, and infiltrated 
state Democratic and Republican parties. Right-to-lifers also reached out to new 
segments of the population, especially women and young people, in hopes of broadening 
their support and invigorating their activism. Moreover, they reframed abortion, 
connecting it to the problem of violence in society and creating rhetoric they hoped 
would compel all Americans to oppose abortion. 
 Thanks to these organizing efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, right-to-lifers 
responded quickly to Roe v. Wade, continuing their activism in the states and 
implementing a bold strategy in national politics. Because of their foresight and planning 
in the year preceding Roe, state leaders were able to react immediately, officially 
separating the NRLC from the Catholic Church and pushing legislators to consider a 
human life amendment. In this way, they hoped to reverse Roe v. Wade and make 
abortion illegal in most cases nationwide. At the same time, latent tension erupted 
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between Catholic and Protestant leaders of the NRLC. Through 1973 and into 1974, it 
seemed their broad-based movement might be in jeopardy, as these leaders struggled to 
reconcile their religious and political differences and agree upon their organization’s 
policies and initiatives. In the wake of Roe, the movement also struggled to recruit some 
key allies—evangelical Christians.  
 But right-to-lifers persisted. In the second half of the 1970s, the movement’s 
leaders overcame their differences and pursued a wide range of initiatives with renewed 
determination. In fact, in these years, the movement was the closest to achieving and 
enacting its vision for a broad-based movement. In state and national politics, both 
Democratic and Republican right-to-lifers found opportunities to push their agenda in 
their parties. Through these efforts, the movement tried to get both parties to recognize its 
political clout. Catholic and Protestant leaders learned to work together again, reached 
important compromises on strategy, and supported each other’s initiatives. And right-to-
lifers implemented an extensive repertoire of strategies, reflecting their own diverse 
approaches to the abortion issue. They pursued a human life amendment, worked to limit 
federal funding for abortion, lobbied Congress to enact legislation to help women and 
their families, fought to protect women’s rights as workers, and employed nonviolent 
direct action to confront abortion at clinics themselves. There was a unique flexibility and 
dynamism in the movement during these years, and right-to-lifers celebrated their 
growing and eclectic movement.  
 But this coalition quickly came apart as American religion and politics became 
more fragmented and polarized. In the early 1980s, the movement was especially divided 
over how to respond to the New Right and Religious Right’s overtures. On the one hand, 
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some right-to-lifers saw a potentially fruitful partnership—one that would allow them to 
finally achieve their legislative goals and reverse Roe v. Wade. On the other hand, a 
cohort of activists—primarily made up of Catholics, pro-life moderates, and the pro-life 
left—feared that an alliance with the Religious Right would jeopardize the broad-based 
movement they had been building for over a decade. Despite the latter’s efforts to 
preserve the movement of the 1970s, the right-to-life movement would be even more tied 
to conservative religion and the Republican Party over the course of the decade. 
 The marriage of the abortion issue and conservative politics and religion still 
looms large in histories of the last few decades. And in the popular imagination, 
Americans—both liberal and conservative—think of the right-to-life movement as the 
consummate conservative cause, one of the main issues that has defined the Religious 
Right and conservative politics today. But it did not start out that way. Indeed, the story is 
much more complex. In the 1960s and 1970s, right-to-lifers thought they were creating a 
broad-based movement in society. They tried to craft a movement built by and for all 
Americans, regardless of their political or religious affiliation. Right-to-lifers argued that 
a movement that welcomed people from these different backgrounds and with varied 
approaches to the abortion issue would be the strongest and most effective force for 
combatting legal abortion. And they believed that opposition to abortion could be the 
issue that would transcend political and religious boundaries in the United States. In the 
1970s their broad-based movement briefly flourished. Despite this coalition’s failure, its 
activists proved the powerful resonance that the abortion issue would have in American 
society and politics—so powerful that it compelled thousands of ordinary Americans to 
become politically active and create a movement that still endures. 
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